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 Suppose we encounter the statement “We stumbled upon a great discovery”. Would we actually activate the sensorimo-tor brain areas involved in ‘stumbling’ when we understand this sentence? Or would we only grasp the abstract meaning of the sentence first and then activate the brain areas in-volved in stumbling later? Or perhaps we would not activate those areas because no actual stumbling action was per-formed. Would the answers be any different in the case of a non-native language? To answer these questions, this thesis investigated two inter-related issues concerning the relevance of sensorimotor activation for language understanding. First, assuming that embodied effects do indeed exist, when do their effects emerge during reading? And do they appear dynamically over time? Second, what is the functional contribution of any such effects for understanding? How does the contribution vary by contextual plausibility, task demands, and linguistic experi-ence? The first issue of temporal availability is examined in Chapter II, while Chapters III through IV are dedicated to exploring the second issue of functional relevance of the motor system. To provide a theoretical and empirical background for these issues, I first present currently prominent embodied theories of language comprehension and supporting evidence for each perspective. In general, the thesis adopts the embodied view of language processing: Understanding language relies (par-tially) on the very same brain areas that are also involved in how we perceive and act with the world. For example, brain areas responsible for hand movements are activated when understanding the word ‘grasp’ (e.g., Boulenger, Hauk, & Pulvermüller, 2009; Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 2004; Pulvermüller, Härle, & Hummel, 2001; Rueschemeyer, Brass, & Friederici, 2007; Tettamanti et al., 2005). Likewise, reading the word ‘red’ activates brain areas involved in colour per-ception (e.g., Kellenbach, Brett, & Patterson, 2001; Martin, Haxby, Lalonde, Wiggs, & Ungerleider, 1995; Pulvermüller & Hauk, 2006; Simmons, Ramjee, Beauchamp, McRae, & Martin, 2007; van Dam, van Dijk, Bekkering, & Rueschemeyer, 2012). Observations of this sort have led some researchers to con-clude that these non-language areas constitute a word’s meaning. Others, however, have interpreted the involvement as a consequence of understanding a word’s meaning. The empirical chapters of this thesis will examine how both inter-pretations may explain different forms of processing during language comprehension. Following the theoretical overview, an assessment of the two inter-related issues — i.e., temporal availability, and the func-tional relevance of the motor system — is given in the context of relevant literature. Finally, I conclude the chapter with an overview of the upcoming four empirical chapters. 
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 In a lexical decision task, Pulvermüller, Hauk, Nikulin, and Ilmoniemi (2005) applied trans-cranial magnetic stimulation to motor areas over the scalp at 150 ms after visual word onset. The authors reported faster response times to arm-related words such as ‘pick’, ‘grasp’, and ‘write’ when stimulation was applied to motor areas involved in arm movements. Likewise, faster response times were reported to words such as ‘kick’, ‘run’, and ‘step’ when stimulation was applied to areas involved in leg movements. The authors concluded that motor activation serves a 
functional role in language comprehension; otherwise, stimulation to these motor areas should not have affected responses. Altogether, the series of studies by Pulver-müller and colleagues supports the APNs’ account that language and action systems in the brain cooperate to bring about meaning. Understanding an action word leads to near-instantaneous and automatic activation of action-related brain areas. Moreover, such co-activation appears functionally necessary for comprehension. 
 
(b) Language and Situated Simulation The Language and Situated Simulation theory (LASS; Barsalou, Santos, Simmons, & Wilson, 2008) has its roots in Paivio’s (1971; 1986) dual code theory and Glaser’s (1992) exten-sion of Paivio’s theory, called the lexical hy-pothesis. That is, two processing streams are posited to contribute towards meaning or conceptual processing. According to LASS, meaning relies heavily on the representation and processing of words together with situ-ated simulations; both streams interact con-tinuously and dynamically across contexts. Because our conceptual system evolved to process non-linguistic stimuli first, the au-thors argue that processing of experience via the simulation system takes precedence over words within the linguistic system. Both systems rely heavily on statistical properties for their respective representations. The term ‘linguistic system’ here refers to the system responsible for processing word forms, not word meaning. It supports superfi-cial processing that allows for sufficiently good performance. For instance, word associ-ation is one form of linguistic processing that can lead to very productive results in tasks such as lexical decision. The word ‘cat’ results in co-activation of associatively related words like ‘fur’, ‘purr’, and ‘pet’, sufficient to elicit semantic priming effects. The simulation system carries the bulk of meaning and is thus assumed to represent deep conceptual processing. Here, simulators detect and retain the statistical frequencies of properties and the relations between them acquired through experience. Once a word is 
recognised, its simulation and those of asso-ciated words take place. The simulation of ‘cat’ does not take place in a vacuum; a specif-ic cat is situated in a particular setting, event, 
etc. Because language tasks by necessity initially activate word forms, the activation of word representations peaks before activation re-lated to simulation – i.e., words elicit linguis-tic processing before simulation. Likewise, processing of non-linguistic stimuli would initially activate like information – e.g., pic-tures elicit visual-form processing. This view takes after the principles of encoding specific-ity and content addressability (Tulving & Thomson, 1973).  LASS contends that simulations, though acti-vated after word activation, can occur quickly and automatically, but the simulations do not dominate conscious processing at the time point. Nevertheless, simulations are essential, because they provide meaning to word forms. This is because symbolic operations (e.g., predication, conceptual combination, and recursion) are only possible with simulation mechanisms that manipulate meaning, whereas manipulating word forms does not result in meaning. Symbolic manipulation with word forms is akin to manipulating words in an unfamiliar language, leading to no true comprehension. In short, word forms serve as pointers to simulations that hold and provide meaning. Depending on the current task, conceptual processing will rely heavily and dynamically on either or both, whichever leads to an optimal outcome. 
 
Embodied Theories of Language Comprehension:  
Language Dependency on Sensorimotor Activations 
 In this section, I introduce three embodied theories of language comprehension that represent the generally adopted positions of the debate. These theories describe the rela-tive dependency of language on sensorimotor activations.   The Action-Perception Networks view (Pul-vermüller, 2005; 2008) states that language necessarily entails the activation of modality-specific brain areas. During word acquisition, language and modality-specific activations become intertwined to form word meaning. The link is further strengthened by repeated exposure and use. The Language and Situated Simulation theory (Barsalou, Santos, Sim-mons, & Wilson, 2008) posits that linguistic and embodied representations both contrib-ute to meaning. Greater importance, howev-
er, is allocated to modality-specific activa-tions, because the theory assumes that deep comprehension hinges on embodied repre-sentations. The Symbol Interdependency Theory (Louwerse, 2011; Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2008) also assumes the contribu-tion of both linguistic and embodied repre-sentations to meaning. This theory, however, accords greater importance to linguistic representations, because language, like a well-crafted tool, has been shaped over time by its users to encode meaning. Because language itself constitutes meaning, this stance puts it in direct contrast to the Action-Perception Networks view which assumes that meaning is to be found in embodied representations. In the following, evidence for each theory is presented.   
(a) Action-Perception Networks Pulvermüller (2005; 2008) offers a neurosci-entific approach, the theory of Action-Perception Networks (APNs), in explaining how meaning arises within the brain. His account rests on the assumption that specific links between language and action systems are formed by way of frequent co-activation of neurons, otherwise described as “neurons that fire together, wire together” (Hebb, 1949). Specifically, when an action word is learned alongside the performing of an ac-tion, the motor program and neural represen-tation of the word become tightly interwoven to form a neuronal ensemble. The ensemble is strengthened with repeated exposure such that any subsequent encounter with the word will automatically ‘ignite’ this neuronal en-semble. Pulvermüller proceeded to introduce a se-mantic somatotopy of action words to demonstrate the tight coupling between the word and its meaning. Taking advantage of the somatotopic organisation of the motor cortex, Hauk, Johnsrude, and Pulvermüller (2004) conducted an fMRI study that showed activation of the face, arm, and leg areas in response to the reading of ‘lick’, ‘pick’, and ‘kick’, respectively. Also, such activation was 
found to occur early in the word recognition process at approximately 250 ms after visual word onset (Pulvermüller, Härle, & Hummel, 2001). Furthermore, motor activation is automatic, occurring even when participants are actively distracted. This was shown in a study by Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, and Ilmoniemi (2005) using mismatch negativities (MMNs). MMNs are brain responses that are elicited when a deviant stimuli is presented in a series of frequent standard stimuli. Notably, these effects can arise when stimuli are unattend-ed; they are thus an automatic and implicit change-detection response. In this particular study, the authors auditorily presented the Finnish verbs ‘hotki’ (eat) and ‘potki’ (kick) as deviant stimuli embedded amongst repeated presentation of acoustically matched pseudowords ‘hotpi’ and ‘potpi’. Interestingly, Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, and Ilmoniemi report-ed somatotopically distributed MMNs (see Hauk, Shtyrov, & Pulvermüller, 2006, for similar evidence using sounds produced by finger and tongue movements). Importantly, such evidence demonstrates that somatotopic activation from words can occur automatical-ly without overt attention. 
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 To Louwerse, language itself already retains sufficient information. To demonstrate that perceptual information is indeed encoded in language, Louwerse reassessed existing evi-dence within his proposed framework. In particular, he examined whether spatial iconicity patterns can be found in word order patterns (Louwerse, 2008). For example, we often use and encounter ‘up and down’, ‘high 
and low’, and ‘above and below’ in that partic-ular order. If it is true that such conventions reflect conceptualisations (of spatial iconicity in this case), then we should expect higher frequency of occurrence for iconic word pairs such as ‘attic’—‘basement’ relative to ‘base-
ment’—‘attic’. Furthermore, as reported by Zwaan and Yaxley (2003), participants should respond faster to ‘attic’—‘basement’ when the pair is vertically presented, reflect-ing the spatial arrangement of attics always positioned above basements. Indeed, iconic pairs appear more frequently in a linguistic corpus, but unlike Zwaan and Yaxley’s em-bodied interpretation, Louwerse showed that word order frequency better explained RT performance. Furthermore, the word order effect persisted when iconic pairs were pre-sented horizontally, whereas the embodied effect disappeared, replicating Zwaan and Yaxley’s null effect.  Likewise, Louwerse (2011) reassessed stud-ies showing the action-sentence compatibility effect. One such study by Zwaan and Taylor (2006) played sentences describing clock-wise (e.g., “Jim tightened the lug nuts”) and 
counterclockwise (e.g., “Dave removed the screw from the wall”) movements to partici-pants who were asked to make sensibility judgements. Critically, responses were made by either rotating a knob clockwise or coun-terclockwise. Unsurprisingly by now, re-sponses were faster when the direction of rotation matched that described in the sen-tences (thus the action-sentence compatibil-ity effect). Louwerse performed a computa-tional linguistic analysis on the stimuli that indicated that language does encode some motor affordance information. The ability of statistical linguistic patterns to explain em-bodied effects has also been demonstrated in other ways. Louwerse and Zwaan (2009) showed that language encodes geographical information whereas Louwerse and Connell (2011) were able to predict which perceptual modality a word belongs to (auditory, olfac-tory-gustatory, visual-haptic) using word co-occurrences. Like LASS (Barsalou, Santos, Simmons & Wilson, 2008), SIT posits that language com-prehension is both embodied and symbolic, and that linguistic processes precede simula-tion processes (Louwerse & Jeauniaux, 2008, 2010). Unlike LASS, SIT places greater em-phasis on the linguistic system as demon-strated by the ability of statistical linguistic representations to account for supposed embodied effects (for other related views, see Feldman & Narayanan, 2004; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Glenberg & Robertson, 2000).  
Section summary To summarise, APNs posit that language comprehension necessarily entails the activa-tion of modality-specific brain areas. Regard-less of the task, context, and perhaps also language experience in one or more language, embodied effects are pervasive and occur almost instantaneously. Moreover, APNs assert that these effects occur early, which is taken as evidence for their important roles.  By contrast, LASS and SIT make concessions to both linguistic and embodied representa-tions, but the relative importance of either sets the two views apart. Like APNs, LASS accords a greater role to embodied effects in 
their contribution to meaning. According to this view, linguistic representations can only provide limited meaning. When the task requires deeper understanding, embodied representations are recruited to help elicit “full” meaning.  SIT, by contrast, asserts that linguistic repre-sentations contain enough meaning without having to rely on embodied representations. Nevertheless, both LASS and SIT concede that linguistic processes occur first because lan-guage processing necessarily elicits word form representations. 
 To illustrate, Santos, Chaigneau, Simmons, and Barsalou (2011) conducted two experi-ments to test LASS. In Experiment 1, partici-pants produced word associations to a cue word for no more than 3 seconds. For exam-ple, when cued with ‘bee’, participants pro-duced ‘hive’ and ‘honey’ as possible respons-es. In Experiment 2, participants were given up to 15 seconds to generate properties of a concept, such as “What characteristics are typically true of dogs?” Importantly, a shorter response period pre-dominantly yielded linguistic responses of the associative nature (e.g., ‘bee’ yields ‘hive’), whereas a longer response period elicited responses predominantly describing situated simulations (e.g., ‘bee’ yields ‘flowers’). Though the effects of both the linguistic and simulation systems were evident in the two intervals, the linguistic system exerted stronger effects in the shorter period, the simulation system in the longer period. Neuroimaging evidence further supports this interpretation. In an fMRI study using the same stimuli and design from the above study (Experiment 2, Santos, Chaigneau, Simmons, & Barsalou, 2011), Simmons, Hamann, Ha-renski, Hu, and Barsalou (2008) compared brain activations in the property generation task to two localiser tasks performed a week later. In the first task, participants implicitly 
generated word associates for 5 seconds (e.g., ‘automobile’ and ‘vehicle’ to the cue ‘car’) and in the second, they imagined a situation for a given concept for 15 seconds (e.g., driving a car). Brain areas active in the early period of the property generation task overlapped with those reported in the word association local-iser (left inferior frontal gyrus and right cere-bellum). Brain areas active in the late period overlapped with those reported in the situa-tion localiser (precuneus and right middle temporal gyrus). As posited by LASS, two distinct brain regions are implicated in early and late periods, each corresponding to the linguistic and simulation systems. Supporting evidence elsewhere using property verifica-tion has also been reported with behavioural measures (Solomon & Barsalou, 2004) and with fMRI (Kan, Barsalou, Solomon, Minor, & Thompson-Schill, 2003). In sum, LASS posits the parallel contribution of a linguistic and a simulation system. Lan-guage processing necessarily initiates the linguistic system first, because word forms are the input. This system is sufficient for tasks needing only shallow processing. The simulation system, by contrast, brings about meaning, because its representations contain the properties and relations about experi-ence. Deep conceptual processing therefore relies on the latter system. 
 
(c) Symbol Interdependency Theory The Symbol Interdependency Theory (SIT; Louwerse, 2011) takes after Deacon’s (1997) language evolution theory and Peirce’s (1923) theory of signs. The human ability for symbolic thinking and thus language gave rise to a cognitive tool that has been well-adapted for its sole communicative purpose. Notably, Louwerse asserts that there is struc-ture in language in such a way that it already reflects the embodied relations found in the world. As Louwerse illustrates (2011, p. 281), a hammer is structured to hit nails easily, a screwdriver likewise to turn screws. Lan-guage thus evolved to help users understand the world, and this is achieved not arbitrarily but by encoding relations in the world. For example, most languages apply the subject-verb-object order presumably to emphasise 
who is doing something rather than who is undergoing the action (Greenberg, 1963). As a matter of convenience, short words pre-dominate in describing frequent objects and events (Zipf, 1935). Actions and objects are each represented as verbs and nouns in most languages. Symbols such as words can refer to each other but they can also refer to more concrete entities. The interdependency of symbols, be it between symbols or between symbols and objects, means that not all symbols need to be grounded. So long as some are and there is interrelation amongst symbols, language users can benefit from this and thus compre-hension can take place.  
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 pertains to how these various types of knowledge are organised within the semantic network. Research on the organisation of semantic representations has demonstrated that related concepts are linked. This mani-fests itself in priming (i.e., facilitated RTs). For example, deciding that the word ‘doctor’ is a real word is faster having first seen a related word such as ‘nurse’ compared to ‘student’ (e.g., Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971; McNamara, 2005). The subsequent encounter with ‘doctor’ is facilitated (i.e., primed) be-cause the previous processing of ‘nurse’, unlike ‘student’, co-activates associations such as ‘hospital’, ‘ambulance’ as well as ‘doc-
tor’. The priming effect thus indexes the re-latedness between concepts.   An interesting observation from an embodied perspective is the finding that priming occurs also for words with shared features: for ex-ample, shared perceptual (e.g., ‘pizza’ and ‘coin’, Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Raaijmakers, 1998; Schreuder, Flores d’Arcais, & Glazen-borg, 1984) or action (e.g., ‘typewriter’ and ‘piano’, Myung, Blumstein, & Sedivy, 2006, Experiment 1) features. That is, reading a word denoting an object retrieves knowledge about its shape and how to manipulate it. Similar priming effects are also present using pictorial stimuli (Kiefer, Sim, Helbig, & Graf, 2011). For instance, participants saw a prime presented either as a word or as a picture followed by a target picture and were asked to name both stimuli when cued. Pairs were either congruent (‘pliers’—‘nutcracker’) or incongruent (‘pliers’—‘horseshoe’) with re-gard to their shared implied action – e.g., the compressed grip when using pliers and a nutcracker is very similar. Congruent pairs elicited priming effects in two online indices of brain activity (i.e., N1 and N400). Notably, pictures primes elicited early (N1) and late (N400) priming effects; word primes, by contrast, showed effects only later in the N400 component. The authors interpreted the finding as evidence of two stages of prim-ing effects: a fast and slow activation stage of 
action features with pictures, but a slow activation stage only with words. Thus, fea-ture activation appears to develop over time, and this is partially determined by stimulus characteristics (i.e., pictorial vs. linguistic).  A similar observation of temporal develop-ment can be found in an eye-tracking study (Yee, Huffstetler, & Thompson-Schill, 2011) that examined the activation of visual infor-mation (i.e., information about the visual form of an object in the real world) in con-junction with word processing. In a visual world paradigm, participants identified the picture that best matched the spoken word. Notably, participants spent significantly long-er looking at distractor items (e.g., ‘pizza’) having a matching visual form as the object denoted by the spoken word (e.g., ‘frisbee’). Interestingly, this effect appeared only if participants had a relatively short amount of time to explore the visual scene (1,000 ms); the effect disappeared when the visual scene was presented for a longer time period (2,000 ms). The authors argue that effects of visual form are seen early in word and object identification but decay over time (see simi-lar results in Huettig & McQueen, 2007).  In general, the reviewed studies suggest that different aspects of a word’s referent (i.e., the object’s features) can be independently acti-vated, in the form of action and visual prim-ing effects. Nonetheless, studies make the implicit assumption that feature activation is constant and stable over time, as is implied by their use of a single ISI in most (priming) experiments. The studies by Kiefer et al. (2011) and Yee et al. (2011), instead, show that the time course of feature activation is dynamic. Accordingly, Chapter II presents a behavioural priming experiment using word pairs sharing either action or visual features. Critically, the presence of action and visual priming effects are examined across four intervals to document the dynamics of fea-ture activation. 
 
(b) Functional Relevance of Motor Activation The second issue addressed in the thesis concerns the functional relevance of motor activation. The question of functional rele- vance is broken down into three sub-issues of context, task, and linguistic experience. 
 
Language Dependency on Sensorimotor Activations: 
A Question of Temporal Availability and Functional Relevance 
 The discussion of the three theories in rela-tion to the reviewed empirical studies raises two important questions concerning tem-poral availability and functional relevance. The timing of embodied effects appears to be a key determiner in ascribing what role em-bodied effects play in language comprehen-sion. In the case of APNs, early modality-specific activation is a trait of action-related word processing. Early activation is also interpreted as evidence for a functional role of the activation for comprehension. By con-trast, LASS and SIT concede that because language tasks necessarily activate word forms, the linguistic system must first come into play. Nevertheless, these two latter theo-ries attribute different functional roles to linguistic and embodied representations.  With regard to the issue of temporal availa-bility, what is not taken explicitly into ac-count in the time course discussion is the possibility that some features (e.g., action, visual) may take longer than others to be-come activated. A feature that takes more time to appear and therefore becomes measureable later would be described as “epiphenomenal”. Consequently, the activat-ed information is interpreted as less im-portant for a concept’s representation.   However, it is an assumption that the timing of activation directly reflects conceptual importance or relevance. Arguably, a feature can nevertheless form an integral part of a word’s meaning despite its late availability. At the same time, not all studies are able to consistently report embodied effects, sug-gesting that feature activation might be vola-tile. The more pertinent question addressed in the thesis is the dynamics of feature activa-tion: when different features of a concept appear over time. Investigating the dynamics of activation can shed light on the time point at which a particular type of information is 
made available and thus measureable.  With regard to the issue of functional rele-vance, any resultant motor activation during language processing must at least be partly determined by the focus on meaning, or the lack thereof. Otherwise, embodied effects would be a robust phenomenon. Even so, explicit attention to meaning could fail to elicit embodied effects. A considerable litera-ture exists showing that language compre-hension typically proceeds in a “good enough” fashion. If so, it is surprising that embodied effects are found if such effects are supposedly the province of deep processing. At the same time, embodied effects ought to be persistent if indeed these effects are as automatic and necessary as some theoretical views claim. Clearly, this matter invites a closer inspection.  A glaring omission in both theoretical and empirical treatment of the embodied issue is non-native language processing. At the same time, the literature on bilingualism has not incorporated the embodied view to help explain bilingual processing. The thesis will help to clarify whether the embodied phe-nomenon generalises to other forms of lan-guage processing, native or otherwise. The results can also inform models of bilingual processing in specifying the content of repre-sentations; in particular, whether first and second language representations share se-mantic representations and processing strat-egies.  In the following, the two main queries of the thesis – temporal availability and functional relevance – are expanded upon in the context of relevant literature. The discussion on func-tional relevance is broken down into three sub-sections related to context, task, and linguistic experience. 
 
(a) Temporal Availability of Action and Visual Features The first issue addressed in the thesis con-cerns the temporal availability of features associated with objects. The knowledge asso- ciated with an object includes features such as the shape, texture, colour, and manner of manipulation. By implication, one question 
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 expectation nor provides sufficient evidence to discount it. Critically, pseudo-verbs showed an activation profile similar to that found for action verbs; i.e., the underspecified situation model is maintained through motor activation.  The reviewed studies thus show that motor 
activation is not a unique feature of words with motor meaning. Such activation is found to vary according to contextual relevance. Chapter III presents an EEG study that exam-ined how motor activation differs by context (plausible vs. implausible action descriptions) and meaning (specific vs. non-specific ac-tions) in a silent reading task.  
 
The Relevance of Motor Activation in Linguistic Tasks There is increasing recognition that tasks determine the relative involvement of the motor system (e.g., Hauk & Tschentscher, 2013). For example, motor activation is more likely to be found when a task explicitly re-quires elaborate processing of meaning. Via task instructions, participants are often invit-ed to consider the motor meaning of the stimuli to elicit deeper processing, or engage in a distraction task to draw attention away from meaning. In one fMRI study (Tomasino, Werner, Weiss, & Fink, 2007), the contrast between motor (e.g., “She paints”) and non-motor (e.g. “He borrows”) phrases showed greater motor activation when participants were engaged in an explicit motor imagery task relative to a letter-search task. The motor imagery task elicited a difference between motor and non-motor phrases that was absent in the letter-search task. Even so, motor activation was nevertheless found in the letter-search task. In this regard, some access to meaning took place in a shallow task, but to what extent motor activation reflected meaning is un-clear.  Similarly, a TMS study (Experiment 3; Papeo, Vallesi, Isaja, & Rumiati, 2009) reported differences in motor activity between tasks. In a syllable segmentation task (i.e., count the number of syllables in a verb), motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) measured on the right-hand muscles while reading hand-actions 
(e.g., “I stir”) decreased, whereas in the se-mantic task (i.e., judge whether verbs are action-related), MEPs increased. Importantly, this difference was specific to hand-action and not to non-action (e.g., “I wonder”) verbs. The authors explained that motor activation was inhibited during action verb processing in the syllable task. Considering that a de-crease in MEPs implies that a particular mo-tor program was activated and needed to be inhibited (Koch et al., 2006), this indicates that motor activity was indeed present in the syllable task. In the above studies, motor activation per-sisted in tasks that presumably did not neces-sitate meaning retrieval. However, motor activation patterns did not distinguish be-tween differences in meaning. Just as im-portantly, deeper semantic tasks explicitly direct attention to motor meaning. At the same time, manual responses are typically made as soon as the stimuli are encountered. In this regard, it is unsurprising to find corre-spondingly greater motor activation due to such biases. To clarify whether motor activa-tion proactively contributes to language tasks, Chapter IV presents an EEG study com-paring the letter-search task to a sensibility judgement task. Importantly, motor activa-tion was measured during online processing without concurrent manual responses and without explicit mention of motor meaning in the sensibility judgement task. 
The Relevance of Motor Activation for Non-Native Readers A discussion of motor contribution to lan-guage processing is not complete without considering individuals who possess another language besides their native language. In fact, examining potential differences in this 
group of language users is highly relevant for assessing the inter-relationship between language and modality-specific activation that occurs during language acquisition. Consider the differences between native (L1) 
 
The Contextual Modulation of Action Plausibility Studies reporting an influence of context on the processing of action-related language indicate that the meaning of words does not 
per se determine the presence or absence of motor activation. Indeed, the mere presence of an action word does not elicit motor acti-vation. For instance, a German word such as ‘greifen’ (to grasp) with action meaning acti-vates motor-related brain areas (de Grauwe, Willems, Rueschemeyer, Lemhöfer, & Schriefers, 2014; Rueschemeyer, Brass, & Friederici, 2007). However, ‘begreifen’ (to comprehend), though it contains ‘greifen’, does not show the same activation; instead, the lack of motor activation reflects its non-action meaning.  Context-dependent activation can be seen more clearly in studies making explicit use of a particular conceptual attribute for a given task. In one such study combining EEG and fMRI measures (Hoenig, Sim, Bochev, Herrn-berger, & Kiefer, 2008), participants deter-mined whether a visual or an action attribute correctly described a subsequently presented object noun (e.g., ‘elongated’ for a knife, or ‘round’ for an orange). Remarkably, the brain area responsible for processing the particular feature (e.g., the elongated shape of a knife) elicited a higher level of activation when it was task-relevant. In other words, bringing the feature into focus elicited more activation of the relevant area. Complementary EEG measures showed that these effects occurred early. An fMRI study (van Dam, van Dijk, Bekkering, & Rueschemeyer, 2012) further showed that similar effects can be observed even for objects with dominant action and visual features (e.g., the colour and shape of a tennis ball). Altogether, the brain makes efficient use of the necessary neural struc-tures according to the contextual demands.  Contextual influences extend beyond the word level. In an fMRI study (Raposo, Moss, Stamatakis, & Tyler, 2009), literal sentences elicited motor activation (e.g., “The fruit cake was the last one so Claire grabbed it”; “The muddy children trampled over Sarah’s clean floor”). However, the same verbs used in idiomatic sentences did not yield the same activation (e.g., “The job offer was a great 
chance so Claire grabbed it”; “The spiteful critic trampled over Sarah’s feelings”). Inter-estingly, Boulenger, Hauk, and Pulvermüller (2009) reported somatotopic activation to both literal and idiomatic arm- and leg-action sentences (e.g., “John grasped the ob-ject/idea”; “Pablo kicked the ball/habit”). However, somatotopic activation was great-est at the end of the sentence, when the meanings of the words were combined. A subsequent study showed that when the context was established prior to the verb (e.g., in Dutch, “De student had het tentamen toch gehaald, ondanks dat hij op zijn tenen liep”/ “The student had passed the exam, even though he on his toes walked”), there was less motor activation measured on the verb used idiomatically (Schuil, Smits, & Zwaan, 2013). Results such as these indicate that motor activation is thus not simply a reflection of the word’s meaning in isolation.  Motor activation may even reflect the accrual of information for simulation or perhaps motoric assessment. Indeed, a recent EEG study confirmed that motor activation meas-ured by mu activity is not restricted to the meaning of the verb but involved also in subsequent processing of nouns in the sen-tence (Moreno et al., 2015). Motor activation also occurs when attempting to process pseudo-verbs in an action-setting context (Experiment 2, Aravena et al., 2014). A pre-ceding phrase functioned to set up an action context followed by a target action verb, non-action verb, or pseudo-verb (e.g., “With his black pen, Paul signs the contract”, “With his black pen, Paul plans to sign the contract”, and “With his black pen, Paul griles the con-tract”, respectively). The context guides par-ticipants toward the most plausible action associated with using a pen, as exemplified here. Both action and non-action verbs are lexical entries that complete the situation model – a mental scene incorporating various pieces of information to represent the de-scribed event (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998; Zwaan & Madden, 2004). Accordingly, action verbs elicited a significant increase in grip-force amplitudes, whereas non-action verbs showed otherwise. A pseudo-verb, however, does not fulfil the 
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 expectation nor provides sufficient evidence to discount it. Critically, pseudo-verbs showed an activation profile similar to that found for action verbs; i.e., the underspecified situation model is maintained through motor activation.  The reviewed studies thus show that motor 
activation is not a unique feature of words with motor meaning. Such activation is found to vary according to contextual relevance. Chapter III presents an EEG study that exam-ined how motor activation differs by context (plausible vs. implausible action descriptions) and meaning (specific vs. non-specific ac-tions) in a silent reading task.  
 
The Relevance of Motor Activation in Linguistic Tasks There is increasing recognition that tasks determine the relative involvement of the motor system (e.g., Hauk & Tschentscher, 2013). For example, motor activation is more likely to be found when a task explicitly re-quires elaborate processing of meaning. Via task instructions, participants are often invit-ed to consider the motor meaning of the stimuli to elicit deeper processing, or engage in a distraction task to draw attention away from meaning. In one fMRI study (Tomasino, Werner, Weiss, & Fink, 2007), the contrast between motor (e.g., “She paints”) and non-motor (e.g. “He borrows”) phrases showed greater motor activation when participants were engaged in an explicit motor imagery task relative to a letter-search task. The motor imagery task elicited a difference between motor and non-motor phrases that was absent in the letter-search task. Even so, motor activation was nevertheless found in the letter-search task. In this regard, some access to meaning took place in a shallow task, but to what extent motor activation reflected meaning is un-clear.  Similarly, a TMS study (Experiment 3; Papeo, Vallesi, Isaja, & Rumiati, 2009) reported differences in motor activity between tasks. In a syllable segmentation task (i.e., count the number of syllables in a verb), motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) measured on the right-hand muscles while reading hand-actions 
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 implausible actions (e.g., sewing trolleys) to determine how readers process such sen-tences in terms of motor activation. That is, to see whether the pattern of motor activation still reflects verb specificity even when the implied action cannot be meaningfully per-formed on the object. This manipulation can tell us if and how language processing makes use of the motor system to resolve incongru-encies (i.e., the functional contribution of motor activation to language comprehen-sion). In Chapter IV, I address these questions in a different way by comparing the motor activa-tion patterns (as measured by mu activity) during sentence processing in two tasks. Using similar sentence stimuli as in Chapter III, one group performed a letter-search task and another group a sensibility judgement task. In the former task, participants are asked if a given letter appears in the object noun and verb; there is no requirement to read for meaning in order to perform opti-mally. In the latter task, participants are asked to judge whether the combination of the object noun and verb makes sense. Im-portantly, there is no explicit mention to judge for motoric plausibility. This latter task 
offers an interesting test to see if sensibility judgements can be made without motor activation. Together, the two experiments will measure whether motor activation oc-curs in two language tasks, each of which differs in processing depth. The embodied literature already provides a large stockpile of L1 data, including those to be presented in Chapters II through IV. With limited and inconsistent evidence for the L2, in Chapter V, I make a contribution by test-ing a group of highly proficient German learners of Dutch. These participants read Dutch sentences similar to those used in Chapters III and IV. If the assumption that L1 and L2 representations are identical or large-ly overlapping holds, the expected outcome is clear. The reported study can inform models of bilingual processing in making better spec-ifications of what is indeed shared between the L1 and the L2, and just as importantly, inform embodied theories of language com-prehension about possible differences in embodied representations across different languages within a language user. 
  
 and non-native (L2) language acquisition. An L2 learned later in life, such as in a formal classroom setting (involving, for example, rote learning of word pairs) offers experienc-es substantially different from an immersive one.  Reasoning along the lines of the embodied view would suggest that this experience should lead to less reliance on the motor system. Yet, there are claims that sensorimo-tor activations are crucial for a word’s mean-ing. How then do we reconcile the fact that L2 users can nevertheless understand their L2? At the same time, the evidence reveals pro-cessing costs associated with having and using two languages (e.g., Abutalebi et al., 2007; Ardila, 2003; Hasegawa, Carpenter, & Just, 2002; Meuter & Allport, 1999). If the motor system does play a role in L2 pro-cessing, the extent of its involvement may be restricted from a processing cost viewpoint. Previous work does suggest that motor activ-ity is involved in L2 processing. In a picture-word matching task, Bergen, Lau, Narayanan, Stojanovic, and Wheeler (2010) reported interference effects when participants decid-ed whether a stick man figure matched a given verb. When the verb and picture im-plied a common effector, RTs were slowed. Interestingly, both L1 and L2 (learners of English) participants showed an interference effect. The L2, like the L1, may indeed involve 
motor activation during verb processing. An fMRI study (de Grauwe, Willems, Rueschemeyer, Lemhöfer, & Schriefers, 2014) showed comparable effects between native Dutch and German learners of Dutch: Dutch motor verbs (e.g., ‘gooien’, throw) elicited greater activation in motor areas relative to non-motor verbs (e.g., ‘aarzelen’, hesitate). Using time-resolved EEG, however, a priming study conducted on German learners of Eng-lish reported magnitude differences in motor activation in the L1 and the L2 (Vukovic & Shtyrov, 2014). Motor activation was greater to verbs read in the L1 relative to the L2. Unlike the previous studies, a difference in motor contribution between the L1 and the L2 was found using EEG.  To clarify the apparent discrepancy between the L1 and L2, Chapter V presents an EEG study similar to Chapter III to examine whether meaning and context modulated motor activity during online L2 sentence processing. The chapter also compares the results of L1 and L2 readers. In summary, the preceding discussion pro-vided the theoretical and empirical back-ground for the thesis. The two lines of inquiry – temporal availability and functional rele-vance – are addressed in the four empirical chapters, which are outlined next.  
 
Thesis Outline 
 To recapitulate, the preceding overview high-lighted the two main issues of temporal availability and functional relevance. These issues guide the research aims of the four empirical chapters, described next. In Chapter II, I examine the different features that make up the semantic representations of words and the concepts of their referents. Two such features – visual and action fea-tures – have been found to be part of object nouns. However, their relative time courses during word recognition are less clear; that is, the point in time in which action and visual information become available upon word recognition. There are also indications that different features have different time courses, 
but the relative differences have yet to be studied within one experiment.  In Chapter III, I examine differences in verb specificity during sentence processing. In addition to confirming whether mu activity can reliably index motor activation resulting from language processing, as reported by van Elk, van Schie, Zwaan, and Bekkering (2010), this experiment will demonstrate whether this activity is also sensitive to the motor specificity implied by verbs embedded in sentences, as reported by previous fMRI studies (Moody & Gennari, 2009; van Dam, Rueschemeyer, & Bekkering, 2010). Unlike these previous studies, the experiment will also present sentences describing motorically 
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  Embodied theories of language postulate that language mean-ing is stored in modality-specific brain areas generally in-volved in perception and action in the real world. However, the temporal dynamics of the interaction between modality-specific information and lexical-semantic processing remain unclear. We investigated the relative timing at which two types of modality-specific information (action-based and visual-form information) contribute to lexical-semantic com-prehension. To this end, we applied a behavioural priming paradigm in which prime and target words were related with respect to (1) action features, (2) visual features, or (3) se-mantically associative information. Using a Go/No-Go lexical decision task, priming effects were measured across four inter-stimulus intervals (ISI = 100 ms, 250 ms, 400 ms, and 1,000 ms) to determine the relative time course of the differ-ent features. Notably, action priming effects were found in ISIs of 100 ms, 250 ms, and 1,000 ms whereas a visual prim-ing effect was seen only in the ISI of 1,000 ms. Importantly, our data suggest that features follow different time courses of activation during word recognition. In this regard, feature activation is dynamic, measurable in specific time windows but not in others. Thus the current study (1) demonstrates how multiple ISIs can be used within an experiment to help chart the time course of feature activation and (2) provides new evidence for embodied theories of language. 
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 priming effects. Nonetheless, studies make the implicit assumption that feature activa-tion is constant and stable over time, as is evident from their use of a single ISI in most (priming) experiments. Interestingly, in Yee 
et al. (2011), the authors reported a decay of visual features over time which was deter-mined by comparing two ISIs. In Kiefer et al. (2011), the authors proposed fast and slow feature activation as a function of stimuli type; however, it is unclear if the same results would hold if the authors included at least another ISI. Still, unlike the commonly held assumption, the authors of both studies as-sume that the time course of feature activa-tion is dynamic.  The focus on the issue of timing is non-trivial, especially when considered alongside the discussion of embodied theories of language. Some authors have demonstrated very fast (160 – 250 ms after word onset) and auto-matic (activation even when attention is diverted away) activation of sensorimotor information, taking this as evidence for the integral role of such information in the word’s representation (Pulvermüller, Härle, & Hummel, 2001; Hauk & Pulvermüller, 2004; for a review, see Pulvermüller, 2005). However, other researchers have come to slightly different positions with respect to timing. With the Language as Situated Simu-lation (LASS) model, Barsalou and colleagues have claimed that perceptual and action information, though important for conceptual knowledge, are activated relatively late dur-
ing language comprehension (Barsalou, 2008; Barsalou et al., 2008; Solomon & Barsalou, 2004). The slower reaction times for proper-ty verification judgements reflect the need to (consciously) activate deep, perceptually-based conceptual knowledge, because quickly accessed language-based relationships will not suffice to perform the task.  The Symbol Interdependency Theory (SIT; Louwerse, 2011), too, claims that perceptual simulations play a greater role later on and reflect more detailed representations but, unlike LASS (Barsalou, 2008), it emphasises the symbolic (linguistic) rather than the embodied (modality-specific) aspect of lin-guistic processing. For example, Louwerse showed that the results of a previous iconici-ty study (Zwaan & Yaxley, 2003), which was interpreted as support for embodied repre-sentations, could actually be accounted for predominantly by linguistic frequency. In other words, supposed perceptual simula-tions can be traced back to language itself. The symbolic aspect serves to create under-specified representations quickly for good-enough comprehension; the embodied aspect goes further when full and deep comprehen-sion is needed by relying on embodied rela-tions already encoded into language. In sum, LASS and SIT make similar proposals; only the relative importance of each component differs whereby the task dictates which com-ponent is more or less relevant. Both theories claim that perceptual features are time-consuming and resource-hungry. 
The present study Firstly, we focused on action and visual fea-tures, because previous research has shown the two features to be highly relevant in word processing. More importantly, action and visual features have not been directly com-pared within one study to determine whether they each have unique time courses. Also, such a comparison may shed light on the relative importance of different features for the conceptual representations of objects (e.g., Wheatley, Weisberg, Beauchamp, & Martin, 2005). Based on previous literature (e.g., Myung, Blumstein, & Sedivy, 2006; Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Raaijmakers, 1998; Schreuder, Flores d’Arcais, & Glazenborg, 
1984), we hypothesised that both feature-based action and visual priming should show effects similar in direction to those seen for associative semantic priming. That is, word pairs related along action and visual features should show facilitation of reaction times.  Secondly, we used the Go/NoGo task in com-bination with lexical decision. Participants were instructed to respond with a button press when a stimulus pair consists of words (‘Go’); otherwise, they did not need to re-spond (‘NoGo’). This task has previously been used to examine time-course related issues in language processing (e.g., van Turennout, 
 
I  n  t  r  o  d  u  c  t  i  o  n  
 One of the oldest issues in cognitive psychol-ogy concerns the mental representation of meaning. In the past decade, embodied theo-ries of language, postulating that language meaning is stored in modality-specific brain areas, have gained in popularity and empiri-cal support. For example, the meaning of the word ‘grasp’ activates some of the neural areas involved in planning and performing everyday grasping actions (e.g., Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 2004; Rueschemeyer, Brass, & Friederici, 2007), while comprehension of the word ‘red’ entails activation of parts of the neural visual path-way (e.g., Simmons et al., 2007; van Dam, van Dijk, Bekkering, & Rueschemeyer, 2012). Nevertheless, despite much research, im-portant questions remain unanswered. One of these is when modality-specific infor-mation becomes activated during language comprehension.  In line with a general embodied framework, a number of behavioural studies have demon-strated that words with shared perceptual features prime each other. This indicates that the physical properties of an object in the real world influence how the word denoting the object is processed. For example, words re-ferring to objects with similar shapes, such as 
pizza and coin, prime each other (Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Raaijmakers, 1998; Schreuder, Flores d’Arcais, & Glazenborg, 1984; see also Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971), as do words referring to objects with shared manipulation features such as typewriter and piano (Myung, Blumstein, & Sedivy, 2006). Note that in both of these examples, participants showed priming (which is interpreted as facilitated processing) for words with shared perceptual or action features, even in the absence of any obvious conceptual or seman-tic relationship (see McNamara, 2005 for an in-depth treatment).  Neuroimaging evidence such as those report-ed by Kiefer, Sim, Helbig, and Graf (2011) using EEG and fMRI further substantiates the results above. Participants saw a prime pre-sented either as a word or as a picture fol-lowed by a target picture and were asked to name both stimuli when cued. Pairs were 
either congruent (e.g., ‘pliers’—‘nutcracker’) or incongruent (e.g., ‘pliers’—‘horseshoe’) with regard to the implied action. Most nota-bly, picture primes elicited early (N1) and late (N400) priming effects; word primes, by contrast, showed effects only later in the N400 component. The authors interpreted the finding as evidence for two stages of priming effects: fast and slow activation of action features with pictures, but slow activa-tion with words. Specifically, the authors argued that pictures make certain features more salient, therefore activating more de-tailed representations that may also lead to earlier activation. Word stimuli appear less suitable to generate early action priming effects, at least when manipulations of con-gruency are employed to induce priming effects.  Other experimental methods have also been used to test for the activation of visual infor-mation (i.e., information about the visual form of an object) in conjunction with word processing. In an eye-tracking study (Yee, Huffstetler, & Thompson-Schill, 2011), partic-ipants heard a spoken word and saw four objects displayed on a screen in a given trial. In this visual world paradigm, participants identified the picture that best matched the spoken word. Notably, participants spent significantly longer looking at distractor items with a visual form matching that of the object denoted by the spoken word. For ex-ample, when participants heard ‘frisbee’, they looked significantly longer at a picture of a pizza (both objects are round) than to a lin-guistically matched control with no shared perceptual features (e.g., a thimble). Interest-ingly, this effect appeared only if participants had a relatively short amount of time to ex-plore the visual scene (1,000 ms); the effect was not present when the visual scene was presented for a longer time period (2,000 ms). The authors argue that effects of visual form are seen early in word and object identi-fication but decay over time.  Altogether, the reviewed studies suggest that different aspects of a word’s referent (i.e., the object’s features) can be independently acti-vated, as evidenced by action and visual 
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 priming effects. Nonetheless, studies make the implicit assumption that feature activa-tion is constant and stable over time, as is evident from their use of a single ISI in most (priming) experiments. Interestingly, in Yee 
et al. (2011), the authors reported a decay of visual features over time which was deter-mined by comparing two ISIs. In Kiefer et al. (2011), the authors proposed fast and slow feature activation as a function of stimuli type; however, it is unclear if the same results would hold if the authors included at least another ISI. Still, unlike the commonly held assumption, the authors of both studies as-sume that the time course of feature activa-tion is dynamic.  The focus on the issue of timing is non-trivial, especially when considered alongside the discussion of embodied theories of language. Some authors have demonstrated very fast (160 – 250 ms after word onset) and auto-matic (activation even when attention is diverted away) activation of sensorimotor information, taking this as evidence for the integral role of such information in the word’s representation (Pulvermüller, Härle, & Hummel, 2001; Hauk & Pulvermüller, 2004; for a review, see Pulvermüller, 2005). However, other researchers have come to slightly different positions with respect to timing. With the Language as Situated Simu-lation (LASS) model, Barsalou and colleagues have claimed that perceptual and action information, though important for conceptual knowledge, are activated relatively late dur-
ing language comprehension (Barsalou, 2008; Barsalou et al., 2008; Solomon & Barsalou, 2004). The slower reaction times for proper-ty verification judgements reflect the need to (consciously) activate deep, perceptually-based conceptual knowledge, because quickly accessed language-based relationships will not suffice to perform the task.  The Symbol Interdependency Theory (SIT; Louwerse, 2011), too, claims that perceptual simulations play a greater role later on and reflect more detailed representations but, unlike LASS (Barsalou, 2008), it emphasises the symbolic (linguistic) rather than the embodied (modality-specific) aspect of lin-guistic processing. For example, Louwerse showed that the results of a previous iconici-ty study (Zwaan & Yaxley, 2003), which was interpreted as support for embodied repre-sentations, could actually be accounted for predominantly by linguistic frequency. In other words, supposed perceptual simula-tions can be traced back to language itself. The symbolic aspect serves to create under-specified representations quickly for good-enough comprehension; the embodied aspect goes further when full and deep comprehen-sion is needed by relying on embodied rela-tions already encoded into language. In sum, LASS and SIT make similar proposals; only the relative importance of each component differs whereby the task dictates which com-ponent is more or less relevant. Both theories claim that perceptual features are time-consuming and resource-hungry. 
The present study Firstly, we focused on action and visual fea-tures, because previous research has shown the two features to be highly relevant in word processing. More importantly, action and visual features have not been directly com-pared within one study to determine whether they each have unique time courses. Also, such a comparison may shed light on the relative importance of different features for the conceptual representations of objects (e.g., Wheatley, Weisberg, Beauchamp, & Martin, 2005). Based on previous literature (e.g., Myung, Blumstein, & Sedivy, 2006; Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Raaijmakers, 1998; Schreuder, Flores d’Arcais, & Glazenborg, 
1984), we hypothesised that both feature-based action and visual priming should show effects similar in direction to those seen for associative semantic priming. That is, word pairs related along action and visual features should show facilitation of reaction times.  Secondly, we used the Go/NoGo task in com-bination with lexical decision. Participants were instructed to respond with a button press when a stimulus pair consists of words (‘Go’); otherwise, they did not need to re-spond (‘NoGo’). This task has previously been used to examine time-course related issues in language processing (e.g., van Turennout, 
 
I  n  t  r  o  d  u  c  t  i  o  n  
 One of the oldest issues in cognitive psychol-ogy concerns the mental representation of meaning. In the past decade, embodied theo-ries of language, postulating that language meaning is stored in modality-specific brain areas, have gained in popularity and empiri-cal support. For example, the meaning of the word ‘grasp’ activates some of the neural areas involved in planning and performing everyday grasping actions (e.g., Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 2004; Rueschemeyer, Brass, & Friederici, 2007), while comprehension of the word ‘red’ entails activation of parts of the neural visual path-way (e.g., Simmons et al., 2007; van Dam, van Dijk, Bekkering, & Rueschemeyer, 2012). Nevertheless, despite much research, im-portant questions remain unanswered. One of these is when modality-specific infor-mation becomes activated during language comprehension.  In line with a general embodied framework, a number of behavioural studies have demon-strated that words with shared perceptual features prime each other. This indicates that the physical properties of an object in the real world influence how the word denoting the object is processed. For example, words re-ferring to objects with similar shapes, such as 
pizza and coin, prime each other (Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Raaijmakers, 1998; Schreuder, Flores d’Arcais, & Glazenborg, 1984; see also Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971), as do words referring to objects with shared manipulation features such as typewriter and piano (Myung, Blumstein, & Sedivy, 2006). Note that in both of these examples, participants showed priming (which is interpreted as facilitated processing) for words with shared perceptual or action features, even in the absence of any obvious conceptual or seman-tic relationship (see McNamara, 2005 for an in-depth treatment).  Neuroimaging evidence such as those report-ed by Kiefer, Sim, Helbig, and Graf (2011) using EEG and fMRI further substantiates the results above. Participants saw a prime pre-sented either as a word or as a picture fol-lowed by a target picture and were asked to name both stimuli when cued. Pairs were 
either congruent (e.g., ‘pliers’—‘nutcracker’) or incongruent (e.g., ‘pliers’—‘horseshoe’) with regard to the implied action. Most nota-bly, picture primes elicited early (N1) and late (N400) priming effects; word primes, by contrast, showed effects only later in the N400 component. The authors interpreted the finding as evidence for two stages of priming effects: fast and slow activation of action features with pictures, but slow activa-tion with words. Specifically, the authors argued that pictures make certain features more salient, therefore activating more de-tailed representations that may also lead to earlier activation. Word stimuli appear less suitable to generate early action priming effects, at least when manipulations of con-gruency are employed to induce priming effects.  Other experimental methods have also been used to test for the activation of visual infor-mation (i.e., information about the visual form of an object) in conjunction with word processing. In an eye-tracking study (Yee, Huffstetler, & Thompson-Schill, 2011), partic-ipants heard a spoken word and saw four objects displayed on a screen in a given trial. In this visual world paradigm, participants identified the picture that best matched the spoken word. Notably, participants spent significantly longer looking at distractor items with a visual form matching that of the object denoted by the spoken word. For ex-ample, when participants heard ‘frisbee’, they looked significantly longer at a picture of a pizza (both objects are round) than to a lin-guistically matched control with no shared perceptual features (e.g., a thimble). Interest-ingly, this effect appeared only if participants had a relatively short amount of time to ex-plore the visual scene (1,000 ms); the effect was not present when the visual scene was presented for a longer time period (2,000 ms). The authors argue that effects of visual form are seen early in word and object identi-fication but decay over time.  Altogether, the reviewed studies suggest that different aspects of a word’s referent (i.e., the object’s features) can be independently acti-vated, as evidenced by action and visual 
 
Table 1.  Sample primes from the four conditions paired with the same target in German with their corresponding English translations. 
 prime word target word 
 
unrelated 
 Ladegerät ‘charger’     Schraubenzieher 
‘screwdriver’ 
 
semantic  Dübel ‘bolt’ 
 
action 
 Haustürschlüssel ‘house key’ 
 
visual 
 Lötkolben ‘soldering iron’  
Stimulus materials German words denoting familiar tools and other manipulable objects were used either as prime or target words. Each of the 24 target words was paired with four prime words corresponding to the four prime con-ditions (see sample stimuli in Table 1; see Appendix 1 for complete stimulus materials):  (1) semantically related, (2) action-related, (3) visually related, and (4) unrelated. In the semantically related condition, the prime and target pair denoted related objects by associ-ation (e.g., ‘bolt’—‘screwdriver’) and had no action and visual relatedness. In the action-related condition, the prime and target pair denoted objects that are manipulated in a similar manner but do not have any semantic or visual relatedness (e.g., ‘house key’—‘screwdriver’). Also, all actions implied by these objects are restricted to the hands or arms. In the visual-related condition, the 
prime and target pair denoted objects similar in form or appearance but did not share any semantic or action relatedness (e.g., ‘soldering 
iron’—'screwdriver’). Finally, the prime and target pair in the unrelated condition denoted objects that shared none of the above rela-tionships (e.g., ‘charger’—‘screwdriver’).   A norming study using a new selection of participants (n=10) confirmed our manipula-tions (see Table 2). For all comparisons of interest, words were matched for length and frequency (see Table 3) using the SUBTLEX-DE database (Brysbaert et al., 2011). Also, 24 pseudowords were added from a pseudoword generator (Keuleers & Brysba-ert, 2010) to serve as catch trials in the ‘Go/No-Go’ lexical decision task, described below. 
 
 
Table 2.  Norming data for the four conditions rated along semantic, action, and visual relatedness on a scale of 1 (not related) to 7 (highly related). Standard de-viation values within parentheses.  
 semantic relatedness action relatedness visual relatedness 
unrelated 1.3 (0.6) 1.3 (0.6) 1.2 (0.6) 
semantic 6.0 (1.0) 1.9 (1.1) 1.7 (1.0) 
action 1.7 (1.0) 5.9 (1.0) 1.7 (1.0) 
visual 1.6 (1.0) 1.6 (1.0) 5.9 (1.1)  
 
 Hagoort, & Brown, 1997; 1998; 1999). We also included associative-semantically related stimuli to elicit standard semantic priming effects as a verification measure (see Gomez, Ratcliff, & Perea, 2007 for a comparison of the Go/NoGo and standard two-choice tasks).   Thirdly, we systematically varied the time between presentation of the prime word and the target word; that is, the inter-stimulus interval, or ISI, which is the interval between the offset of the prime and the onset of the target. Participants in the pilot phase report-ed that they could not always identify the prime and target stimuli if a presentation duration of less than 400 ms was used (mean word length no less than 9.5 letters). Conse-quently, we used a fixed prime and target duration of 400 ms and varied the ISIs ac-cordingly. The ISI factor was thus a manipula-tion of preview time between prime and target word presentation to determine the relative timing of and processing differences between different features. We assume that activation is a dynamic process, thus there is likely no single ISI value that can capture all features. The use of multiple ISI values there-fore was intended to sample feature activa-tion over time (see Hauk, Coutout, Holden, & Chen, 2012 and Moss, Ostrin, Tyler, & Marslen-Wilson, 1995 for similar arguments). Previous relevant priming studies (Kiefer et 
al., 2011; Myung et al., 2006) have used ISIs of 50 ms and 70 ms, with SOAs ranging be-tween 370 ms and 1,250 ms. In line with those earlier studies, we employed three ISIs in 150 ms-increments: 100 ms, 250 ms and 400 ms (corresponding to SOAs of 500 ms, 650 ms, and 800 ms, respectively). The fourth ISI of 1,000 ms (equivalent to an SOA of 1,400 
ms) served as a long interval in which we expected the greatest modulation of effects to occur.   Different embodied theories of language predict such effects at different time inter-vals: strong embodied theories (e.g., Pulver-müller, 2005; Pulvermüller & Fadiga, 2010) predict effects in the early phase, but moder-ate and disembodied theories (e.g., Mahon & Caramazza, 2008) in the late phase. Hybrid theories such as LASS (e.g., Barsalou, 2008) and SIT (Louwerse, 2011) allow the involve-ment of both language-based and perceptual-based information, with more or less empha-sis on either depending on the task. The cur-rent study will provide detailed timing in-formation to help adjudicate between the competing theories.  In summary, we investigated priming in three distinct conditions: (1) associative semantic priming (e.g., 'bolt'—'screwdriver'), (2) fea-ture-based action priming (e.g., 'house key'—
'screwdriver'), and (3) feature-based visual form priming (e.g., 'soldering iron'—
'screwdriver'). By including three priming conditions within one experimental design, we investigated whether feature-based action and visual priming produce effects directly comparable to associative semantic priming. More importantly, by looking at priming at four ISIs, we assessed how long after presen-tation of a prime word, specific types of in-formation become available in order to affect processing of the target word. In this manner, we can draw conclusions about the relative timing of different types of feature-based semantic knowledge.    
M  a  t  e  r  i  a  l  s    &    m  e  t  h  o  d  s   
ParticipantsOne hundred and seventy-six right-handed native German speakers aged 18 – 25 years (136 females; mean age = 21 years) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision were recruited within the Radboud University Nijmegen. Participants were assigned to one of the four inter-stimulus interval (ISI) 
groups, consisting of 44 participants each. Participants gave informed consent and were offered course credit or monetary compensa-tion. This study was approved by the local Nijmegen Ethical Committee of the Faculty of Social Sciences (ECG2012-2711-05). 
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Table 1.  Sample primes from the four conditions paired with the same target in German with their corresponding English translations. 
 prime word target word 
 
unrelated 
 Ladegerät ‘charger’     Schraubenzieher 
‘screwdriver’ 
 
semantic  Dübel ‘bolt’ 
 
action 
 Haustürschlüssel ‘house key’ 
 
visual 
 Lötkolben ‘soldering iron’  
Stimulus materials German words denoting familiar tools and other manipulable objects were used either as prime or target words. Each of the 24 target words was paired with four prime words corresponding to the four prime con-ditions (see sample stimuli in Table 1; see Appendix 1 for complete stimulus materials):  (1) semantically related, (2) action-related, (3) visually related, and (4) unrelated. In the semantically related condition, the prime and target pair denoted related objects by associ-ation (e.g., ‘bolt’—‘screwdriver’) and had no action and visual relatedness. In the action-related condition, the prime and target pair denoted objects that are manipulated in a similar manner but do not have any semantic or visual relatedness (e.g., ‘house key’—‘screwdriver’). Also, all actions implied by these objects are restricted to the hands or arms. In the visual-related condition, the 
prime and target pair denoted objects similar in form or appearance but did not share any semantic or action relatedness (e.g., ‘soldering 
iron’—'screwdriver’). Finally, the prime and target pair in the unrelated condition denoted objects that shared none of the above rela-tionships (e.g., ‘charger’—‘screwdriver’).   A norming study using a new selection of participants (n=10) confirmed our manipula-tions (see Table 2). For all comparisons of interest, words were matched for length and frequency (see Table 3) using the SUBTLEX-DE database (Brysbaert et al., 2011). Also, 24 pseudowords were added from a pseudoword generator (Keuleers & Brysba-ert, 2010) to serve as catch trials in the ‘Go/No-Go’ lexical decision task, described below. 
 
 
Table 2.  Norming data for the four conditions rated along semantic, action, and visual relatedness on a scale of 1 (not related) to 7 (highly related). Standard de-viation values within parentheses.  
 semantic relatedness action relatedness visual relatedness 
unrelated 1.3 (0.6) 1.3 (0.6) 1.2 (0.6) 
semantic 6.0 (1.0) 1.9 (1.1) 1.7 (1.0) 
action 1.7 (1.0) 5.9 (1.0) 1.7 (1.0) 
visual 1.6 (1.0) 1.6 (1.0) 5.9 (1.1)  
 
 Hagoort, & Brown, 1997; 1998; 1999). We also included associative-semantically related stimuli to elicit standard semantic priming effects as a verification measure (see Gomez, Ratcliff, & Perea, 2007 for a comparison of the Go/NoGo and standard two-choice tasks).   Thirdly, we systematically varied the time between presentation of the prime word and the target word; that is, the inter-stimulus interval, or ISI, which is the interval between the offset of the prime and the onset of the target. Participants in the pilot phase report-ed that they could not always identify the prime and target stimuli if a presentation duration of less than 400 ms was used (mean word length no less than 9.5 letters). Conse-quently, we used a fixed prime and target duration of 400 ms and varied the ISIs ac-cordingly. The ISI factor was thus a manipula-tion of preview time between prime and target word presentation to determine the relative timing of and processing differences between different features. We assume that activation is a dynamic process, thus there is likely no single ISI value that can capture all features. The use of multiple ISI values there-fore was intended to sample feature activa-tion over time (see Hauk, Coutout, Holden, & Chen, 2012 and Moss, Ostrin, Tyler, & Marslen-Wilson, 1995 for similar arguments). Previous relevant priming studies (Kiefer et 
al., 2011; Myung et al., 2006) have used ISIs of 50 ms and 70 ms, with SOAs ranging be-tween 370 ms and 1,250 ms. In line with those earlier studies, we employed three ISIs in 150 ms-increments: 100 ms, 250 ms and 400 ms (corresponding to SOAs of 500 ms, 650 ms, and 800 ms, respectively). The fourth ISI of 1,000 ms (equivalent to an SOA of 1,400 
ms) served as a long interval in which we expected the greatest modulation of effects to occur.   Different embodied theories of language predict such effects at different time inter-vals: strong embodied theories (e.g., Pulver-müller, 2005; Pulvermüller & Fadiga, 2010) predict effects in the early phase, but moder-ate and disembodied theories (e.g., Mahon & Caramazza, 2008) in the late phase. Hybrid theories such as LASS (e.g., Barsalou, 2008) and SIT (Louwerse, 2011) allow the involve-ment of both language-based and perceptual-based information, with more or less empha-sis on either depending on the task. The cur-rent study will provide detailed timing in-formation to help adjudicate between the competing theories.  In summary, we investigated priming in three distinct conditions: (1) associative semantic priming (e.g., 'bolt'—'screwdriver'), (2) fea-ture-based action priming (e.g., 'house key'—
'screwdriver'), and (3) feature-based visual form priming (e.g., 'soldering iron'—
'screwdriver'). By including three priming conditions within one experimental design, we investigated whether feature-based action and visual priming produce effects directly comparable to associative semantic priming. More importantly, by looking at priming at four ISIs, we assessed how long after presen-tation of a prime word, specific types of in-formation become available in order to affect processing of the target word. In this manner, we can draw conclusions about the relative timing of different types of feature-based semantic knowledge.    
M  a  t  e  r  i  a  l  s    &    m  e  t  h  o  d  s   
ParticipantsOne hundred and seventy-six right-handed native German speakers aged 18 – 25 years (136 females; mean age = 21 years) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision were recruited within the Radboud University Nijmegen. Participants were assigned to one of the four inter-stimulus interval (ISI) 
groups, consisting of 44 participants each. Participants gave informed consent and were offered course credit or monetary compensa-tion. This study was approved by the local Nijmegen Ethical Committee of the Faculty of Social Sciences (ECG2012-2711-05). 
 
 
 For the F1 analyses, subject-based means were submitted to a two-way Condition (Se-mantic, Action, Visual) * ISI (100-ms, 250-ms, 400-ms, 1,000-ms) ANOVA with Condition as a within-subject variable and ISI as a be-tween-subject variable. For the F2 analyses, item-based means were submitted to a two-way Condition * ISI ANOVA with Condition and ISI both as within-subject variables. We also report complementary F1 and F2 analyses using only the factors Action and Visual for Condition to verify that the two main effects of interest indeed differ in time course. We report Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p-
values whenever the sphericity assumption is violated.  For each ISI group, paired samples t-tests were conducted for the three critical pairwise comparisons. All p-values resulting from the 
t-tests have been controlled for multiple comparisons using the Benjamini and Hochberg False Discovery Rate (FDR) proce-dure (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). Effect sizes reported reflect Cohen’s d using pooled variance. See Table 4 for an overview of mean RTs. 
 
Table 4.  The sample size, mean reaction times, and standard deviation values (within parentheses) of the four conditions across the four inter-stimulus interval manipulations. 
 100 ms n=34 250 ms n=35 400 ms n=41 1,000 ms n=37 
unrelated 547 (87) 560 (71) 558 (87) 553 (67) 
semantic 525 (84) 543 (68) 542 (87) 534 (67) 
action 536 (69) 550 (70) 554 (84) 542 (70) 
visual 552 (95) 554 (72) 553 (83) 543 (70)    
Interactions and main effects A summary of the ANOVA analyses is shown in Table 5. Table 6 lists the priming scores of the three conditions; asterisks denote signifi-cant effects at FDR-corrected p-values < .05. 
The presence of a (nearly) significant interac-tion between Condition and ISI allowed us to consider the effects in each of the ISIs sepa-rately.  
  
ISI = 100 ms A statistically reliable semantic priming effect was present using this ISI: Mean RTs were faster to semantically related target words (525 ms) than to unrelated target words (547 ms), t(33) = 5.33, p <  .01, d = .253. An action priming effect was also statistically reliable: Mean RTs were faster to action-related target 
words (536 ms) relative to unrelated target words, t(33) = 2.00, p <  .05, d = .143. There was no statistically reliable visual priming effect, however. Mean RTs to visual-related target words (552 ms) were not distinguish-able from those to unrelated target words, 
t(33) = -0.91, p = .19, d = .060.  
 
 
Table 3.  Mean word frequency and length of primes and targets for the four con-ditions. Standard deviation values within parentheses. Note that the same targets are used across conditions. 
 prime word target word 
 frequency length frequency length 
unrelated 1.08 (0.6) 10.8 (2.8) 
1.36 (0.5) 10.3 (2.9) semantic 1.28 (0.7) 10.4 (3.4) 
action 1.20 (0.6) 11.7 (2.9) 
visual 1.17 (0.7) 9.5 (2.6)   
Design Participants were presented with a total of 140 trials: 96 critical trials containing 24 target words paired with four different prime words, 24 catch trials containing one or two pseudowords, and another 20 filler trials similar to critical and catch trials. The trials were divided into four blocks of 35 trials each, with five dummy trials at the beginning 
of each block. Crucially, target words ap-peared only once per block and lists were pseudo-randomised to ensure that no more than three consecutive trials were from the same condition. In result, four lists were generated and one version was randomly assigned to each participant. 
 
Procedure Participants sat approximately 80 cm in front of the computer screen. Button presses were recorded from a response box. The start of a trial was indicated by an asterisk positioned at the centre for 2,000 ms. Next, prime and target words were each presented for 400 ms. Depending on group assignment, the interval of the intervening blank screen – the inter-stimulus interval (ISI) – was 100, 250, 400, or 1,000 ms. A black blank screen was presented for an inter-trial interval of 2,000 ms.  Participants were instructed to press the 
response button (‘Go’) with their right index finger whenever a trial consisted only of German words (i.e., both prime and target words). Otherwise, they were instructed to withhold their response (‘NoGo’) – thus, catch trials (containing pseudowords) did not require a button press.   A short break was given between blocks of trials. Participants were first presented with a practice block of 12 trials that did not con-tain any critical stimuli but reflected the experimental conditions. In total, the experi-ment lasted about 20 minutes. 
  
R  e  s  u  l  t  s  
 Data were excluded if (1) the overall mean reaction times (RTs) of a participant exceed-ed 800 ms, and if (2) the d-prime scores of at least three conditions were less than 2.9 out of a maximal possible score of 4.7. Of the remaining data, we excluded incorrect trials and trials containing RTs faster than 250 ms and slower than 1,800 ms, as well as those 
slower than 2.5 standard deviations of a participant’s mean. This resulted in the re-moval of 3% trials. Priming scores were cal-culated by subtracting each of the three Re-lated conditions (Semantic, Action, and Visu-al) from the Unrelated condition.   
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 For the F1 analyses, subject-based means were submitted to a two-way Condition (Se-mantic, Action, Visual) * ISI (100-ms, 250-ms, 400-ms, 1,000-ms) ANOVA with Condition as a within-subject variable and ISI as a be-tween-subject variable. For the F2 analyses, item-based means were submitted to a two-way Condition * ISI ANOVA with Condition and ISI both as within-subject variables. We also report complementary F1 and F2 analyses using only the factors Action and Visual for Condition to verify that the two main effects of interest indeed differ in time course. We report Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p-
values whenever the sphericity assumption is violated.  For each ISI group, paired samples t-tests were conducted for the three critical pairwise comparisons. All p-values resulting from the 
t-tests have been controlled for multiple comparisons using the Benjamini and Hochberg False Discovery Rate (FDR) proce-dure (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). Effect sizes reported reflect Cohen’s d using pooled variance. See Table 4 for an overview of mean RTs. 
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unrelated 547 (87) 560 (71) 558 (87) 553 (67) 
semantic 525 (84) 543 (68) 542 (87) 534 (67) 
action 536 (69) 550 (70) 554 (84) 542 (70) 
visual 552 (95) 554 (72) 553 (83) 543 (70)    
Interactions and main effects A summary of the ANOVA analyses is shown in Table 5. Table 6 lists the priming scores of the three conditions; asterisks denote signifi-cant effects at FDR-corrected p-values < .05. 
The presence of a (nearly) significant interac-tion between Condition and ISI allowed us to consider the effects in each of the ISIs sepa-rately.  
  
ISI = 100 ms A statistically reliable semantic priming effect was present using this ISI: Mean RTs were faster to semantically related target words (525 ms) than to unrelated target words (547 ms), t(33) = 5.33, p <  .01, d = .253. An action priming effect was also statistically reliable: Mean RTs were faster to action-related target 
words (536 ms) relative to unrelated target words, t(33) = 2.00, p <  .05, d = .143. There was no statistically reliable visual priming effect, however. Mean RTs to visual-related target words (552 ms) were not distinguish-able from those to unrelated target words, 
t(33) = -0.91, p = .19, d = .060.  
 
 
Table 3.  Mean word frequency and length of primes and targets for the four con-ditions. Standard deviation values within parentheses. Note that the same targets are used across conditions. 
 prime word target word 
 frequency length frequency length 
unrelated 1.08 (0.6) 10.8 (2.8) 
1.36 (0.5) 10.3 (2.9) semantic 1.28 (0.7) 10.4 (3.4) 
action 1.20 (0.6) 11.7 (2.9) 
visual 1.17 (0.7) 9.5 (2.6)   
Design Participants were presented with a total of 140 trials: 96 critical trials containing 24 target words paired with four different prime words, 24 catch trials containing one or two pseudowords, and another 20 filler trials similar to critical and catch trials. The trials were divided into four blocks of 35 trials each, with five dummy trials at the beginning 
of each block. Crucially, target words ap-peared only once per block and lists were pseudo-randomised to ensure that no more than three consecutive trials were from the same condition. In result, four lists were generated and one version was randomly assigned to each participant. 
 
Procedure Participants sat approximately 80 cm in front of the computer screen. Button presses were recorded from a response box. The start of a trial was indicated by an asterisk positioned at the centre for 2,000 ms. Next, prime and target words were each presented for 400 ms. Depending on group assignment, the interval of the intervening blank screen – the inter-stimulus interval (ISI) – was 100, 250, 400, or 1,000 ms. A black blank screen was presented for an inter-trial interval of 2,000 ms.  Participants were instructed to press the 
response button (‘Go’) with their right index finger whenever a trial consisted only of German words (i.e., both prime and target words). Otherwise, they were instructed to withhold their response (‘NoGo’) – thus, catch trials (containing pseudowords) did not require a button press.   A short break was given between blocks of trials. Participants were first presented with a practice block of 12 trials that did not con-tain any critical stimuli but reflected the experimental conditions. In total, the experi-ment lasted about 20 minutes. 
  
R  e  s  u  l  t  s  
 Data were excluded if (1) the overall mean reaction times (RTs) of a participant exceed-ed 800 ms, and if (2) the d-prime scores of at least three conditions were less than 2.9 out of a maximal possible score of 4.7. Of the remaining data, we excluded incorrect trials and trials containing RTs faster than 250 ms and slower than 1,800 ms, as well as those 
slower than 2.5 standard deviations of a participant’s mean. This resulted in the re-moval of 3% trials. Priming scores were cal-culated by subtracting each of the three Re-lated conditions (Semantic, Action, and Visu-al) from the Unrelated condition.   
 
Table 6.  Priming scores (in ms) of the three conditions and standard error of dif-ferences values (within parentheses) across the four inter-stimulus interval ma-nipulations. Asterisks denote significant effects at FDR-corrected p-values < .05. 
 semantic action visual 
100 ms 22 (4.1) * 11 (5.6) *  -5 (5.9)  
250 ms 17 (4.5) *   9 (4.4) *   6 (4.8)  
400 ms 16 (4.4) *   4 (4.7)         5 (4.2)  
1,000 ms 19 (4.2) * 12 (4.8) * 10 (4.7) * 
 
D  i  s  c  u  s  s  i  o  n  
 In this study, we investigated the time course of activation for different modality-specific features using a 'Go/NoGo' priming paradigm with varying inter-stimulus intervals (ISIs). Four groups of participants performed lexical decisions to word pairs from three priming conditions: (1) associative semantic priming (e.g., ‘bolt’—‘screwdriver’), (2) feature-based action priming (e.g., ‘house key’—‘screwdriver’), (3) feature-based visual prim-ing (e.g., ‘soldering iron’—‘screwdriver’), and we compared these to a fourth unrelated condition (e.g., ‘charger’—‘screwdriver’). By varying the amount of time between presen-tation of the prime word and of the target word (i.e., ISI), we assessed how soon the activation of semantically relevant (i.e., fea-ture-based) information became effectively available after prime word presentation.  Our results showed that the activation of feature-based information within the repre-sentation of the prime word facilitates recog-nition of subsequent target words (i.e., prim-
ing takes place). Importantly, the relative timing at which feature-based information becomes activated varies between modalities. Feature-based action relationships elicited priming effects at ISIs of 100 ms, 250 ms, and 1,000 ms. Feature-based visual relationships, by contrast, elicited priming effects only at ISI of 1,000 ms. Differently, associative semantic relationships elicited priming effects at all four ISIs.   In the following, we will first discuss the time course of activation of semantic, action, and visual features individually. We will argue that the finding of different time course of activation for different modality-specific features requires a reassessment of current opposing views on embodied representa-tions, moving to views that highlight the flexible recruitment of feature activations (e.g., Hoenig et al., 2008; Kiefer & Pulvermül-ler, 2012) and a combination of amodal and embodied representations (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Louwerse, 2011). 
 
Associative semantic priming effects are activated at all ISIs We observed associative semantic priming effects at all four ISIs. These effects show that the experiment is sensitive to our manipula-tions and able to elicit priming effects at all four intervals tested. The findings agree with the literature on semantic priming wherein 
reports of semantic priming effects have been shown using very short and very long ISIs (e.g., Chiarello, Liu, Shears, Quan, & Kacinik, 2003; Hutchison, Neely & Johnson,  2001; Perea & Gotor, 1997; Perea & Rosa, 2002; see Hutchison, 2003 for a review).  
 
 
ISI = 250 ms A similar pattern of results was found. A statistically reliable semantic priming effect was present: Mean RTs were significantly faster to semantically related target words (543 ms) than to unrelated target words (560 ms), t(34) = 3.75, p <  .01, d = .242. A statisti-cally significant action priming effect indicat-ed that mean RTs were significantly faster to 
action-related target words (550 ms) than to unrelated target words, t(34) = 2.09, p < .05, d = .132. However, the visual priming effect was not statistically reliable: Mean RTs were not significantly faster to visual-related target words (554 ms) than to unrelated target words, t (34) = 1.25, p =  .12, d = .086. 
 
ISI = 400 ms Only a semantic priming effect was obtained: Mean RTs were significantly faster to seman-tically related target words (542 ms) than to unrelated target words (558 ms), t(40) = 3.51, p < .05, d = .178. Action and visual prim-ing effects, however, were not statistically reliable. Mean RTs were not significantly 
faster to action-related target words (554 ms) than to unrelated target words, t(40) = 0.81, p = .22, d = .045. Similarly, mean RTs were not significantly faster to visual-related target words (553 ms) than to unrelated target words, t(40) = 1.23, p =  .17, d = .061.  
 
ISI = 1,000 ms All three priming effects were statistically significant. Mean RTs were significantly fast-er to semantically related target words (534 ms) than to unrelated target words (553 ms), 
t(36) = 4.55, p <  .01, d = .283. Mean RTs were faster to action-related target words (542 
ms) than to unrelated target words, t(36) = 2.39, p <  .05, d = .169. Finally, mean RTs were faster to visual-related target words (543 ms) than to unrelated target words, t(36) = 2.14, p <  .05, d = .146.   
 
Table 5.  The ANOVA summary of F1 and F2 results using all three priming condi-tions and only the two main conditions of interest. 
 condition (semantic, action, visual) condition (action, visual) 
condition * ISI F1(5.691, 271.255) = 2.079; p = .059 F2(6,138) = 2.667; p = .018 F1(3,143) = 2.309; p = .079 F2(3,69) = 3.321; p = .025 
condition F1(2,286) = 19.261; p = .000 F2(2,46) = 5.927; p = .005 F1(1,143) = 3.794; p = .053 F2(1,23) = .776; p = .388 
ISI F1(3,143) = .366; p = .778 F2(3,69) = .187; p = .905 F1(3,143) = .684; p = .563 F2(3,69) = .515; p = .673  
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 (simulation) representations. Unlike LASS, SIT places greater emphasis on linguistic representations because “language encodes perceptual information” (Louwerse, 2011, p. 279); thus meaning can be derived already from linguistic representations.  The current findings very generally support the distinction between early and late stages of feature activation described by both LASS and SIT. Although both theories attribute early and late effects to different systems (linguistic and simulation, respectively), our results suggest that both systems are in play already at an ISI of 100 ms (equal to an SOA of 500 ms). Associative semantic priming effects across all ISIs show that the linguistic system is continuously activated, whereas action and visual priming effects at different ISIs show differential involvement of the simulation system. We attribute action and visual priming effects to the simulation sys-tem, because it is unclear how statistical interdependencies that drive the linguistic system can pick up, for example, shared ma-nipulation features between ‘house key’ and ‘screwdriver’ that do not co-occur to any regularity. In our view both associative se-mantic and action priming effects demon-strate the parallel activation of the linguistic 
and simulation systems (but see Louwerse & Hutchinson, 2012; Hutchinson et al., 2014), thus demonstrating the fast and dynamic nature of the overall conceptual system.  From a theoretical standpoint, the current findings can be interpreted as support for both LASS and SIT. Whether meaning is de-rived from (or, "resides" in) either the lin-guistic or simulation system requires further experimentation, but we suspect that both systems are involved and interdependent through flexible feature activation (e.g., Hoe-nig et al., 2008; Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012) and consist of a combination of amodal and embodied representations (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Louwerse, 2011). Indeed, we argue that a more beneficial pursuit for embodied theories of language is to describe how the time course of feature activation relates to the way knowledge is acquired, represented, and retrieved given that these theories em-phasise how conceptual representations are deeply rooted in interactions of the body and the world. Furthermore, future studies should chart changes in time courses as a function of task and context to clarify how the brain makes available different kinds of in-formation according to present needs (e.g., Hoenig et al., 2008). 
C  o  n  c  l  u  s  i  o  n  s   To summarise, our results support the fol-lowing account of the time course of visual word recognition. Feature activation is both fast and slow (e.g., Barsalou et al., 2008; Louwerse, 2011; Pulvermüller et al., 2005; Zwaan, 2003), and once a feature is activated, it can affect relatively early aspects of subse-quent word recognition (i.e., priming effects 
do occur). Much empirical support has been offered in support of either the early or late 
activation of embodied representations (e.g., Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010; for a review, see Meteyard, Cuadrado, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 2010), but by comparing different ISIs within one study, we were able to determine that different modality-specific information is activated at different time points during visual word recognition. 
 
 
 
Different time courses of activation: Action precedes visual feature activation The results show that words referring to manipulable objects can indeed elicit action priming effects, as reported in the object representation literature (e.g., Ellis & Tucker, 2000; for a review, see Martin, 2007). In a similar action priming study (Myung et al., 2006, Experiment 1), participants made lexi-cal decisions to primes and targets (e.g., ‘pi-
ano’—‘typewriter’) presented over head-phones. Another study (Kiefer et al., 2011) showed that picture targets preceded by word primes elicited effects relatively late in processing, namely in the N400 time window. By contrast, picture targets preceded by picture primes showed effects sooner in the N1 time window. Kiefer and colleagues ar-gued that pictorial stimuli make certain fea-tures more salient, thus generating more detailed representations. However, retrieving more detailed representations does not nec-essarily lead to early feature activation be-cause such retrieval may be more time-consuming and effortful. Regardless, our results demonstrate that visually presented word pairs can elicit action priming effects in time windows subsequent to the N400.  We also observed priming effects of visually related word pairs in the longest ISI of 1,000 ms. Unlike action features, visual features do not appear to be activated as quickly as ac-tion features. Seen alongside the semantic and action priming results, this suggests that different features may have different activa-tion profiles.  Certain visual features may be particularly difficult to elicit using word stimuli. Using pairs of perceptually related stimuli that share shape or colour features, Schreuder and colleagues (Schreuder, Flores d’Arcais, & Glazenborg, 1984; Flores d’Arcais, Schreuder, & Glazenborg, 1985) reported priming effects 
using the lexical decision task. Subsequent studies, however, failed to replicate these effects unless these features were made ex-plicit for the task, such as the use of a preced-ing activation task (Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Raaijmakers, 1998; SOA 350 ms, ISI = 50 ms).  A possible clarifying factor is that the percep-tual priming effect in Schreuder et al. (1984; also Flores d’Arcais et al., 1985) is not strictly visual priming in the sense used here and elsewhere (e.g., Kellenbach, Wijers, & Mulder, 2000). Their perceptual condition was pre-dominantly composed of visually and colour-related stimuli. Though colour-related items made up a small part of the stimuli, the ef-fects may have largely originated from these items. Colour has been shown to be a promi-nent component of an object’s representa-tion, more so than action features for certain classes of object nouns (e.g., van Dam, van Dijk, Bekkering & Rueschemeyer, 2012). Similarly, the perceptual stimuli used in Pecher et al. (1998) differ from ours. Nouns referring to a range of categories like food, body part, animals, etc. were used and could thus have confounded the results.  Using pictorial stimuli as targets, a recent study has indeed reported early visual effects (Yee et al., 2011) but, as is the case in the Kiefer et al. (2011) study with action features and pictorial targets, these early effects may appear sooner when pictorial stimuli are used (see also Huettig & McQueen, 2007). There is suggestive evidence that pictures are processed faster and yield larger effects than words across a range of tasks (e.g., Glaser, 1992). Future studies are needed to explicitly test different stimulus types using multiple ISIs, or even a combination of different exper-imental methods (e.g., RT and EEG as in Kel-lenbach et al., 2000; ISI = 150 ms).   
Implications for embodied theories of language With the Language and Situated Simulation (LASS) theory, Barsalou et al. (2008) pro-posed that linguistic and situated simulation systems interact continuously. The fast lin-guistic system processes linguistic forms, not meaning, and thus allows for quick and effec-tive performance in many cases. Meaning is 
derived by the slower and more central simu-lation system when the task at hand requires the retrieval of detailed representations. Similarly, the Symbol Interdependency Theo-ry (SIT; Louwerse, 2011) makes explicit pre-dictions in terms of early and late contribu-tions of symbolic (linguistic) and embodied 
033
CHAPTER II
 (simulation) representations. Unlike LASS, SIT places greater emphasis on linguistic representations because “language encodes perceptual information” (Louwerse, 2011, p. 279); thus meaning can be derived already from linguistic representations.  The current findings very generally support the distinction between early and late stages of feature activation described by both LASS and SIT. Although both theories attribute early and late effects to different systems (linguistic and simulation, respectively), our results suggest that both systems are in play already at an ISI of 100 ms (equal to an SOA of 500 ms). Associative semantic priming effects across all ISIs show that the linguistic system is continuously activated, whereas action and visual priming effects at different ISIs show differential involvement of the simulation system. We attribute action and visual priming effects to the simulation sys-tem, because it is unclear how statistical interdependencies that drive the linguistic system can pick up, for example, shared ma-nipulation features between ‘house key’ and ‘screwdriver’ that do not co-occur to any regularity. In our view both associative se-mantic and action priming effects demon-strate the parallel activation of the linguistic 
and simulation systems (but see Louwerse & Hutchinson, 2012; Hutchinson et al., 2014), thus demonstrating the fast and dynamic nature of the overall conceptual system.  From a theoretical standpoint, the current findings can be interpreted as support for both LASS and SIT. Whether meaning is de-rived from (or, "resides" in) either the lin-guistic or simulation system requires further experimentation, but we suspect that both systems are involved and interdependent through flexible feature activation (e.g., Hoe-nig et al., 2008; Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012) and consist of a combination of amodal and embodied representations (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Louwerse, 2011). Indeed, we argue that a more beneficial pursuit for embodied theories of language is to describe how the time course of feature activation relates to the way knowledge is acquired, represented, and retrieved given that these theories em-phasise how conceptual representations are deeply rooted in interactions of the body and the world. Furthermore, future studies should chart changes in time courses as a function of task and context to clarify how the brain makes available different kinds of in-formation according to present needs (e.g., Hoenig et al., 2008). 
C  o  n  c  l  u  s  i  o  n  s   To summarise, our results support the fol-lowing account of the time course of visual word recognition. Feature activation is both fast and slow (e.g., Barsalou et al., 2008; Louwerse, 2011; Pulvermüller et al., 2005; Zwaan, 2003), and once a feature is activated, it can affect relatively early aspects of subse-quent word recognition (i.e., priming effects 
do occur). Much empirical support has been offered in support of either the early or late 
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 The current EEG study investigated the relationship between the motor and (language) comprehension systems by simul-taneously measuring mu and N400 effects. Specifically, we examined whether the pattern of motor activation elicited by verbs depends on the larger sentential context. A robust N400 congruence effect confirmed the contextual manipula-tion of action plausibility, a form of semantic congruency. Importantly, this study showed that: (1) Action verbs elicited more mu power decrease than non-action verbs when sen-tences described plausible actions. Action verbs thus elicited more motor activation than non-action verbs. (2) In contrast, when sentences described implausible actions, mu activity was present but the difference between the verb types was not observed. The increased processing associated with a larger N400 thus coincided with mu activity in sentences describing implausible actions. Altogether, context-dependent motor activation appears to play a proactive role in deriving context-sensitive meaning. 
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 ci, 2007). These context-dependent effects do highlight that the meaning of a word is an emergent property, tailored according to what needs to be understood (Federmeier & Laszlo, 2009; Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). Thus, the action plausibility manipulation offers a unique test of the motor system’s functional role because implausible actions do not have meaning in the strictest sense. However, in order to arrive at that interpreta-tion, the meaning of the words within the context must first be derived. In this regard, differences in motor activation are expected between contexts describing plausible and implausible actions.   Context-dependent activation can be seen clearly in studies making explicit use of a particular conceptual attribute for a given task. In one such study using visually pre-sented words (Hoenig, Sim, Bochev, Herrn-berger, & Kiefer, 2008), participants judged the semantic fit of either a visual or an action attribute with an object (e.g., ‘elongated’ for a knife, or ‘round’ for an orange). The pro-
cessing of natural objects and artifacts places different emphasis on visual and action at-tributes. In result, an attribute is more or less dominant for the processing of a given object. The most striking observation is that the brain area corresponding to a less dominant feature (e.g., the elongated shape of a knife) shows a higher level of activation when it is task-relevant. In other words, bringing the feature into focus elicits more activation of the relevant area. This finding highlights the flexible recruitment of modality-specific brain areas for current goals. Complementary EEG measures showed that these effects occur early. An fMRI study (van Dam, van Dijk, Bekkering, & Rueschemeyer, 2012) further showed that similar effects can be observed even for objects with dominant action and visual features (e.g., the colour and shape of a tennis ball). Altogether, the studies using verbs and nouns in different contexts suggest that the brain makes efficient use of the necessary neural structures according to the contextual demands.  
The present study In this chapter, we assessed whether a verb’s action specificity (factor: Action; levels: ac-tion vs. non-action) changes according to plausibility (factor: Plausibility; levels: plau-sible vs. implausible). Crucially, the motor activation patterns to plausible and implausi-ble action contexts are key to describing the function of the motor system. In a plausible action context, sentences such as “The trol-leys that she pushes are broken” and “The trolleys that she delivers are broken” will elicit more or less motor activation, respec-tively (e.g., van Dam, Rueschemeyer, & Bek-kering, 2010 for fMRI evidence). This com-parison of action specificity allowed for a clear difference in motor activation patterns. Whether such patterns persist in an implau-sible action context were determined using sentences such as “The trolleys that she sews are broken” and “The trolleys that she heals are broken”. Moreover, reader’s sensitivity to the plausibility manipulation was assessed with the N400 ERP component, an index of meaning processing.  
To measure the brain’s response in terms of motor activation and language comprehen-sion, we recorded scalp EEG with focus on two specific signals. Firstly, mu oscillations reflect on-going dynamics from the motor cortex with a clear directionality of the ex-pected effects (e.g., Neuper, Wörtz, & Pfurtscheller, 2006; Pfurtscheller & Neuper, 2001; Pineda, 2005; Salenius, Schnitzler, Salmelin, Jousmäki, & Hari, 1997; Salmelin & Hari, 1994). In particular, motor activation shows up as a decrease in power within the 
mu-frequency band (8-12 Hz; Hari, 2006). However, unlike posterior alpha effects which also occur within the same frequency band and have been associated with atten-tional and visual processing (e.g., Bastiaansen & Brunia, 2001; Klimesch, Sauseng Hanslmayr, Gruber, & Freunberger, 2007), the topography of mu effects occurs around central sites. The locus specificity of the pre-dicted effects thus prevents conflation and more importantly, directs discussion of the results to a motoric interpretation. Moreover, a previous report by van Elk, van Schie, Zwaan, and Bekkering (2010) showed that 
 Hagoort, & Brown, 1997; 1998; 1999). We also included associative-semantically related stimuli to elicit standard semantic priming effects as a verification measure (see Gomez, Ratcliff, & Perea, 2007 for a comparison of the Go/NoGo and standard two-choice tasks).   Thirdly, we systematically varied the time between presentation of the prime word and the target word; that is, the inter-stimulus interval, or ISI, which is the interval between the offset of the prime and the onset of the target. Participants in the pilot phase report-ed that they could not always identify the prime and target stimuli if a presentation duration of less than 400 ms was used (mean word length no less than 9.5 letters). Conse-quently, we used a fixed prime and target duration of 400 ms and varied the ISIs ac-cordingly. The ISI factor was thus a manipula-tion of preview time between prime and target word presentation to determine the relative timing of and processing differences between different features. We assume that activation is a dynamic process, thus there is likely no single ISI value that can capture all features. The use of multiple ISI values there-fore was intended to sample feature activa-tion over time (see Hauk, Coutout, Holden, & Chen, 2012 and Moss, Ostrin, Tyler, & Marslen-Wilson, 1995 for similar arguments). Previous relevant priming studies (Kiefer et 
al., 2011; Myung et al., 2006) have used ISIs of 50 ms and 70 ms, with SOAs ranging be-tween 370 ms and 1,250 ms. In line with those earlier studies, we employed three ISIs in 150 ms-increments: 100 ms, 250 ms and 400 ms (corresponding to SOAs of 500 ms, 650 ms, and 800 ms, respectively). The fourth ISI of 1,000 ms (equivalent to an SOA of 1,400 
ms) served as a long interval in which we expected the greatest modulation of effects to occur.   Different embodied theories of language predict such effects at different time inter-vals: strong embodied theories (e.g., Pulver-müller, 2005; Pulvermüller & Fadiga, 2010) predict effects in the early phase, but moder-ate and disembodied theories (e.g., Mahon & Caramazza, 2008) in the late phase. Hybrid theories such as LASS (e.g., Barsalou, 2008) and SIT (Louwerse, 2011) allow the involve-ment of both language-based and perceptual-based information, with more or less empha-sis on either depending on the task. The cur-rent study will provide detailed timing in-formation to help adjudicate between the competing theories.  In summary, we investigated priming in three distinct conditions: (1) associative semantic priming (e.g., 'bolt'—'screwdriver'), (2) fea-ture-based action priming (e.g., 'house key'—
'screwdriver'), and (3) feature-based visual form priming (e.g., 'soldering iron'—
'screwdriver'). By including three priming conditions within one experimental design, we investigated whether feature-based action and visual priming produce effects directly comparable to associative semantic priming. More importantly, by looking at priming at four ISIs, we assessed how long after presen-tation of a prime word, specific types of in-formation become available in order to affect processing of the target word. In this manner, we can draw conclusions about the relative timing of different types of feature-based semantic knowledge.    
M  a  t  e  r  i  a  l  s    &    m  e  t  h  o  d  s   
ParticipantsOne hundred and seventy-six right-handed native German speakers aged 18 – 25 years (136 females; mean age = 21 years) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision were recruited within the Radboud University Nijmegen. Participants were assigned to one of the four inter-stimulus interval (ISI) 
groups, consisting of 44 participants each. Participants gave informed consent and were offered course credit or monetary compensa-tion. This study was approved by the local Nijmegen Ethical Committee of the Faculty of Social Sciences (ECG2012-2711-05). 
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 The four experimental conditions were as follows (see Table 1 for examples of each; see Appendix 2 for complete stimulus materials): Plausible Action Verb, Plausible Non-Action Verb, Implausible Action Verb, and Implausi-ble Non-Action Verb. To clarify, Plausibility refers to a manipulation of semantic congru-ency that describes an action that could be performed or not. Action Verb refers to a verb that defines the action to be performed on the objects (i.e., pushing trolleys refers to 
the act of extending both arms slightly in front of the body). By contrast, a Non-Action Verb does a poor job at defining the action (e.g., one can deliver trolleys by transporting them in a truck, shipped by cargo, etc.). A separate group of participants (n = 10) that did not participate in the EEG experiment provided ratings for each condition on se-mantic congruency and action specificity, confirming the intended manipulations. 
 
Table 1 Example stimuli of the four conditions in Dutch with English translations provided. Critical verbs are in bold type. 
plausible 
action verb 
De winkelkarretjes/kinderwagens/maaiers/deuren die hij wegduwt zijn gebroken. 
The trolleys/strollers/lawnmowers/doors that he pushes (away) are broken. 
plausible 
non-action verb 
De winkelkarretjes/kinderwagens/maaiers/deuren die hij levert zijn gebroken. 
The trolleys/strollers/lawnmowers/doors that he delivers are broken. 
implausible 
action verb 
De winkelkarretjes/kinderwagens/maaiers/deuren die zij aannaait zijn gebroken. 
The trolleys/strollers/lawnmowers/doors that she sews (on) are broken. 
implausible 
non-action verb 
De winkelkarretjes/kinderwagens/maaiers/deuren die zij geneest zijn gebroken. 
The trolleys/strollers/lawnmowers/doors that she heals are broken.   Each condition contained 24 sentences. We used non-particle verbs like ‘levert’ (delivers) primarily, but to reduce the variation in word length, particle verbs like ‘weg+duwt’ (pushes away) were also used; a previous study re-ported that particle verbs are processed as a single lexical unit (Cappelle, Shtyrov, & Pul-vermüller, 2010; but see Piai, Meyer, Schreuder, & Bastiaansen, 2013). Verbs were matched for length and frequency based on SUBTLEX-NL (Keuleers, Brysbaert, & New, 2010; see Table 2), and each verb was paired with four different object nouns to reduce systematic effects due to nouns such as word frequency, word length, familiarity, and cloze probability. Participants only read one pair of the four possible combinations; no stimuli were repeated. 
Because the N400 component is sensitive to differences in frequency, we avoided making comparisons in the following cases where frequency could not be matched: Plausible Action Verb and Plausible Non-Action Verb, and Implausible Action Verb and Implausible Non-Action.   After the experiment, participants rated all sentences for semantic congruency, action specificity, and imageability. The order of their ratings was counterbalanced. The statis-tical results confirmed our manipulations of semantic congruency and action specificity (see Table 3). We also collected imageability ratings as an additional measure. 
Procedure A practice block of 10 trials similar to the experimental stimuli was first administered and repeated when necessary. Each partici-pant read 106 sentences across 2 blocks: 53 trials per block, of which the first 5 were 
dummy trials similar to critical items. The order of the sentences was pseudo-randomised so that no more than 3 consecu-tive trials were from the same condition. As a result, four experimental lists were generated 
 motor activation elicited by linguistic stimuli can indeed be measured using mu oscillations (also see Moreno, de Vega & León, 2013; Moreno et al. 2015; Vukovic & Shtyrov, 2014).  Secondly, the N400 component is a negative deflection that is maximal over central sites around 400 ms post-word onset (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980; 1984). For example, a larger N400 component appears when a sentence ends with an incongruent word relative to a congruent one (“She spread her bread with socks/butter”). The N400 congruence effect is the difference of the N400 amplitude be-tween the two sentences, thus a measure of comprehension (for a review, see Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). Various theories have been put forward to interpret the N400, ranging from pre-lexical (e.g., Deacon, Dy-nowska, Ritter, & Grose-Fifer, 2004) to post-lexical (integration; e.g., Hagoort, Baggio, & Willems, 2009), or somewhere in between (e.g., Lau, Phillips, & Poeppel, 2008; also see Brouwer, Fitz, & Hoeks, 2012; Frenzel, Schlesewsky, & Bornkessel-Schlesewsky, 2011). In any case, the N400 is a robust find-ing that reflects the process of meaning ac-cess and is thus a reliable index for tracking such activity. The dual-view approach of simultaneously measuring online indices of comprehension processes (N400) and motor activity (mu) during sentence processing can thus help elucidate the interaction between 
language and motor areas with greater preci-sion.   We predicted that action verbs will elicit more motor activation relative to non-action verbs describing plausible actions; that is, a larger decrease in mu power for action verbs than non-action ones (e.g., ‘pushes’ vs. ‘deliv-
ers’). We also predicted a main effect of Plau-sibility: An N400 congruence effect in the form of a larger negative-going N400 compo-nent to verbs in an implausible context rela-tive to verbs in a plausible one (e.g., “The trolleys that he sews...” vs. “The trolleys that he pushes...”). We further explored the pat-tern of motor activation to verbs in sentences describing implausible actions (e.g., “The trolleys that he sews...” and “The trolleys that he heals...”) by formulating two conditional predictions: (1) A main effect of Action is predicted if motor activation of the verb per 
se is context-independent. Thus, mu patterns will reflect the verb’s action specificity re-gardless of plausibility (for suggestive behav-ioural evidence, see Marino, Gallese, Buccino, & Riggio, 2010); (2) A Plausibility * Action interaction is predicted if context modulates the pattern of motor activation elicited by verbs (e.g., van Dam, van Dijk, Bekkering & Rueschemeyer, 2012; Hoenig et al., 2008). Thus, mu patterns will reflect the verb’s ac-tion specificity only in sentences describing plausible actions. 
 
M  a  t  e  r  i  a  l  s    &    m  e  t  h  o  d  s  
Participants Twenty-nine healthy right-handed native speakers of Dutch between ages 18 – 28 years (20 females; mean age = 20.6 years) participated in exchange for course credit or monetary compensation.  All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and provided their informed consent. This study was approved by the local 
Nijmegen Ethical Committee of the Faculty of Social Sciences (ECG2012-2711-05). After excluding participants with excessive movement artefacts, we conducted the fol-lowing analyses on the remaining 25 partici-pants (21 females; mean age = 20.8 years), all of whom performed with a mean accuracy of 95% on catch trials (mean RT = 1,109 ms). 
Stimulus materials We created 96 sentence stimuli in Dutch, each containing a verb belonging to one of four experimental conditions (24 items per condition). Every sentence contained an object noun in the second position and the 
critical verb in the fifth; sentences were be-tween seven to nine words long. We avoided wrap-up effects in the ERPs by not placing the verb at the end of the sentence (Hagoort, Brown, & Osterhout, 1999). 
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critical verb in the fifth; sentences were be-tween seven to nine words long. We avoided wrap-up effects in the ERPs by not placing the verb at the end of the sentence (Hagoort, Brown, & Osterhout, 1999). 
 channel BrainAmp DC EEG amplifiers to amplify the signals. The EEG and EOG signals were sampled at 500 Hz with a 100 Hz high cut-off filter and a 10s time constant. 
Analysis We analysed the EEG data in Brain Vision Analyzer (Brain Products GmbH, Munich, Germany) and in Matlab 7.10 (MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA) using the FieldTrip open source toolbox (Oostenveld, Fries, Maris, & Schoffelen, 2011). Importantly, we analysed both the N400 and mu signals on the verb (1) because, having encountered the object- and agent-nouns, it represents the first moment at which sufficient information is available to establish whether an action is plausible or not to elicit an N400 congruence effect, and (2) because we are interested in whether concurrent motor activation occurs at this point to directly relate it to the N400 effect. The EEG segments were made from -1400 to 1400 ms relative to the verb onset. We re-moved artifacts using a semi-automatic visual inspection procedure.  For the time-frequency (TF) analysis, we used a 500 ms Hanning window with a 3 Hz frequency-smoothing window to compute power changes in frequency steps of 2 Hz and time steps of 10 ms. After acquiring the TF representations for single trials, we averaged the power estimates over trials; this was done for each condition at the subject-level. Then, we calculated the mean mu power between 8 – 12 Hz on the basis of the litera-ture and our data set. To compare the mu and the N400 effects, we used the 300 – 500 ms time window. The resulting subject-averaged power changes in the post-verb onset inter-val were expressed as an absolute change from the baseline interval (from – 150 ms to 0 ms). For the event-related potential (ERP) analysis, we applied a baseline correction to each trial from -150 ms to verb onset.  Then, 
to obtain the N400 ERP, we calculated the mean amplitude per condition between 300 – 500 ms after verb onset. We made statistical comparisons between conditions by using a cluster-based random permutation test (Maris & Oostenveld, 2007). This approach controls the Type-1 error rate in a situation involving multiple comparisons. The cluster-based random permutation test controls for interactions between time points, electrodes, and frequency bins by identifying clusters of significant differences between conditions in the fixed time-frequency win-dow (300 – 500 ms, 8 – 12 Hz). The proce-dure for the TF analysis is briefly described below. The procedure for the ERP analysis is similar except that we look for changes in the time and space dimensions. First, for every data point (electrode by time by frequency) of two conditions, a simple dependent-samples t test is performed (giv-ing uncorrected p values). All data points adjacent in the three dimensions exceeding a pre-set significance level (5%) are grouped into clusters. For each cluster, the sum of the 
t statistics is used in the cluster-level test statistic. Next, a null distribution that as-sumes no difference between conditions is created. This distribution is obtained by randomly assigning the conditions 1000 times in every participant’s data and calculat-ing the largest cluster-level statistic for each randomization. Finally, the actual observed cluster-level test statistics are compared against the null distribution, and clusters falling in the highest or lowest 2.5th percentile are considered significant.  
R  e  s  u  l  t  s  
TF Analyses: Mu power reflects motor activation to verbsThere was no main effect of Congruency (no clusters found), indicating that mu activity was not primarily driven by the manipulation of plausibility. A main effect of Action ap-proached significance (cluster statistic = -6.24; p = .06), indicating larger mu activity for 
Action Verbs relative to Non-Action Verbs when collapsed across Plausibility. Im-portantly, in line with the prediction that motor activation should reflect differences in verb action specificity depending on the contextual plausibility, we observed a statis-
 using the Latin square design and randomly assigned to participants. Twenty catch trials ensured participants attended to each word of the sentence. Every 3 to 5 trials, partici-pants responded with a button press using 
their index fingers (right button for ‘yes’, left button for ‘no’) to indicate whether or not they saw the displayed word in the preceding sentence. 
 
Table 2 Mean length and frequency of verbs in each experimental condition (standard deviation in parentheses).  plausible 
action verb 
plausible 
non-action verb 
implausible 
action verb 
implausible 
non-action verb length 7.4 (1.9) 7.6 (1.6) 7.0 (1.5) 7.1 (1.6) frequency 1.8 (0.8) 2.3 (0.7) 1.5 (0.8) 2.1 (0.4)   Participants sat approximately 80 cm away from the computer screen in a dimly lit sound- and electrically-shielded booth. We presented the sentence stimuli using a PC running Presentation software (Neurobehav-ioural Systems, Albany, NY, USA). Button presses with the index fingers of each hand were recorded using a response box placed under each hand. We displayed each word at the centre for 350 ms, followed by a blank screen for another 350 ms, yielding a 700 ms presentation duration per word. The last word of the sentence was presented together 
with a period. On catch trials, the sentence was followed by a memory probe which remained on the screen until participants responded. Trials were separated by an aster-isk at the centre for 3,000 ms and we encour-aged participants to blink only during this time. Words were presented on a black back-ground using a white Arial font with size 20. Each of the two blocks lasted approximately 20 minutes. The total duration of a session was approximately two hours including set-up and clean-up. 
 
 
Table 3 Mean sentence ratings for semantic congruency, action specificity, and imageability on a 5-point Likert scale (e.g., “Does the sentence clearly describe a particular action to perform?” 1 = No, not at all, 5 = Yes, absolutely). Standard de-viation is given in parentheses.  plausible 
action verb 
plausible 
non-action verb 
implausible 
action verb 
implausible 
non-action verb semantic congruency 4.18 (0.4) 4.16 (0.5) 1.53 (0.4) 1.51 (0.6) action specificity 4.24 (0.4) 2.20 (0.4) 4.13 (0.3) 2.04 (0.6) imageability 4.39 (0.3) 4.29 (0.4) 1.81 (0.5) 1.63 (0.6) 
 
Recording We recorded the electroencephalogram (EEG) from 60 active electrodes placed in an actiCAP (Brain Products GmbH, Munich, Germany), as used in van Elk et al. (2010). The electrode positions conform to the M-10 Equidistant 61-Channel-Arrangement (i.e., an 
inter-electrode distance of 37 ± 3 mm given a head circumference of 58 cm). During record-ing, electrodes were referenced to the left mastoid but re-referenced offline to the aver-age of left and right mastoids. We kept im-
pedance levels below 10 kΩ and used two 32-
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 channel BrainAmp DC EEG amplifiers to amplify the signals. The EEG and EOG signals were sampled at 500 Hz with a 100 Hz high cut-off filter and a 10s time constant. 
Analysis We analysed the EEG data in Brain Vision Analyzer (Brain Products GmbH, Munich, Germany) and in Matlab 7.10 (MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA) using the FieldTrip open source toolbox (Oostenveld, Fries, Maris, & Schoffelen, 2011). Importantly, we analysed both the N400 and mu signals on the verb (1) because, having encountered the object- and agent-nouns, it represents the first moment at which sufficient information is available to establish whether an action is plausible or not to elicit an N400 congruence effect, and (2) because we are interested in whether concurrent motor activation occurs at this point to directly relate it to the N400 effect. The EEG segments were made from -1400 to 1400 ms relative to the verb onset. We re-moved artifacts using a semi-automatic visual inspection procedure.  For the time-frequency (TF) analysis, we used a 500 ms Hanning window with a 3 Hz frequency-smoothing window to compute power changes in frequency steps of 2 Hz and time steps of 10 ms. After acquiring the TF representations for single trials, we averaged the power estimates over trials; this was done for each condition at the subject-level. Then, we calculated the mean mu power between 8 – 12 Hz on the basis of the litera-ture and our data set. To compare the mu and the N400 effects, we used the 300 – 500 ms time window. The resulting subject-averaged power changes in the post-verb onset inter-val were expressed as an absolute change from the baseline interval (from – 150 ms to 0 ms). For the event-related potential (ERP) analysis, we applied a baseline correction to each trial from -150 ms to verb onset.  Then, 
to obtain the N400 ERP, we calculated the mean amplitude per condition between 300 – 500 ms after verb onset. We made statistical comparisons between conditions by using a cluster-based random permutation test (Maris & Oostenveld, 2007). This approach controls the Type-1 error rate in a situation involving multiple comparisons. The cluster-based random permutation test controls for interactions between time points, electrodes, and frequency bins by identifying clusters of significant differences between conditions in the fixed time-frequency win-dow (300 – 500 ms, 8 – 12 Hz). The proce-dure for the TF analysis is briefly described below. The procedure for the ERP analysis is similar except that we look for changes in the time and space dimensions. First, for every data point (electrode by time by frequency) of two conditions, a simple dependent-samples t test is performed (giv-ing uncorrected p values). All data points adjacent in the three dimensions exceeding a pre-set significance level (5%) are grouped into clusters. For each cluster, the sum of the 
t statistics is used in the cluster-level test statistic. Next, a null distribution that as-sumes no difference between conditions is created. This distribution is obtained by randomly assigning the conditions 1000 times in every participant’s data and calculat-ing the largest cluster-level statistic for each randomization. Finally, the actual observed cluster-level test statistics are compared against the null distribution, and clusters falling in the highest or lowest 2.5th percentile are considered significant.  
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Fig. 2 Left: Mean amplitude waveforms for the Plausible and Implausible condi-tions measured on the critical verbs of a representative channel indicated with an asterisk on difference topography plot. Negative values are plotted downwards. Shaded area indicates time window (300 – 500 ms) used in analyses. Right: Dif-ference topography. 
 
 
D  i  s  c  u  s  s  i  o  n   The current study assessed the relationship between the motor and (language) compre-hension systems by simultaneously measur-ing mu and N400 effects. Specifically, we investigated whether the pattern of motor activation elicited by verbs depends on the larger sentential context. A robust N400 congruence effect confirmed our contextual manipulation of action plausibility. Beyond this, two main results can be taken from the study: (1) Action verbs elicited more mu power decrease than non-action verbs when sentences described plausible actions. This result confirmed that action verbs elicited more motor activation than non-action verbs. (2) In contrast, when sentences described implausible actions, mu activity was present but the difference between the verb types was not observed. The increased processing associated with a larger N400 thus coincided with mu activity in sentences describing implausible actions. Context-dependent mo-tor activation appears to play a proactive role in deriving context-sensitive meaning. Verbal descriptions of implausible actions led to motor activation rather than an absence of it. This observation underscores how the brain makes use of available resources to make sense of input lacking plausibility. A recent behavioural study (Marino, Gallese, Buccino, & Riggio, 2012) demonstrated evi-dence of simulation (and thus motor activa-
tion) in sensibility judgements of implausible actions. Participants determined whether visually presented verbs and nouns in Italian formed a sensible pair (e.g., “to sign the cheque” vs. “to squeeze the sunset”). Verbs also differed by specificity in terms of degrees of freedom (DoF), similar to our manipulation of action specificity. In line with our results, there was a difference in the processing of these two verb types; RTs were faster to low relative to high DoF verbs. The finding sug-gested a difference in time course of pro-cessing for the two verb types. Low DoF verbs elicited not only the implied actions but the corresponding set of objects on which the actions can be applied. Thus, the subsequent processing of the object noun was facilitated or made unnecessary. Notably, both sensible and non-sensible pairs yielded the RT ad-vantage for low DoF verbs, indicating that simulation was also part of processing non-sensible content. Our study provides converg-ing evidence that motor activation does play a proactive role in making sense of linguistic input regardless of plausibility. However, action-specific and non-specific verbs did not show different time courses as measured directly on the verb. Motor activation also occurs when attempt-ing to process pseudo-verbs in an action-setting context (Experiment 2, Aravena et al., 2014). In terms of a “situation model” – a 
 tically reliable Plausibility * Action interac-tion (cluster statistic = -155.61; p = .028).  In the Plausible context, Action Verbs elicited more mu power decrease between 300 – 500 ms after verb onset relative to Non-Action Verbs, as indicated by a statistically signifi-cant cluster (cluster statistic = -41.03; p = .034; see left side of Figure 1). This effect was slightly right-lateralised around the central scalp region, as expected for mu effects, and thus ruling out influences of posterior alpha. 
By contrast, in the Implausible context, Ac-tion and Non-Action Verbs did not statistical-ly differ in mu power (no clusters found; see right side of Figure 1). The presence of mu activity in both conditions, as depicted in the time frequency representations, indicates that motor activation was involved during the processing of both sets of sentence stimuli. The previous analyses were also repeated using the time window 100 – 300 ms to de-termine if these effects were already present; none of the comparisons yielded clusters. 
ERP Analyses: N400 effect reflects differences in semantic congruency Between 300 – 500 ms after verb onset, verbs in the Implausible context elicited a larger N400 negativity relative to verbs in the Plau-sible context (Figure 2, left). The statistically significant cluster (cluster statistic = -1,653.4, 
p = .043) showed a centro-parietal distribu-tion commonly reported for N400 effects 
(Figure 2, right; Kutas & Hillyard, 1980; 1984). Also, we did not observe a statistically significant Plausibility * Action interaction (cluster statistic = 471.87, p = .121) indicating that the N400 measure was sensitive only to the manipulation of plausibility, as predicted. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Time-frequency (TF) representations for the four conditions and the two main comparisons measured on the critical verbs. The averaged channels repre-senting the effects in the TF representations are indicated with asterisks. Boxed area indicates time window (300 – 500 ms) used to calculate power differences for the mu-frequency band (8 – 12 Hz). Difference topographies for the two com-parisons are shown at bottom for these time and frequency windows.  
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Fig. 1 Time-frequency (TF) representations for the four conditions and the two main comparisons measured on the critical verbs. The averaged channels repre-senting the effects in the TF representations are indicated with asterisks. Boxed area indicates time window (300 – 500 ms) used to calculate power differences for the mu-frequency band (8 – 12 Hz). Difference topographies for the two com-parisons are shown at bottom for these time and frequency windows.  
 
 tions of mu oscillations to other types of motor meaning can expand its scope of use (e.g., Moody & Gennari, 2010 on implied physical effort by which greater or lesser 
effort might be expected to modulate mu accordingly). 
 
 
C  o  n  c  l  u  s  i  o  n  s  When people read action verbs, the motor system becomes activated (e.g., Kemmerer & Gonzalez-Castillo, 2010; Pulvermüller, 1999; 2003; 2012). In sentences describing plausi-ble actions, motor activation reflects the verb’s meaning. Verbs with more action spec-ificity elicited more motor activation, as shown by a larger mu power decrease with action verbs than with non-action verbs. Moreover, motor activation is also sensitive to context (in particular, action plausibility). Rather than a lack of motor activation, action and non-action verbs in sentences describing implausible actions elicited comparable mu 
power decreases. The reader’s effort in pro-cessing implausible actions shows the flexible interaction between the language and motor areas (for a review, see Kiefer & Pulvermül-ler, 2011; also see Mahon, 2015) and high-lights one mechanism that is used during sentence comprehension. This manner of interaction between language and modality-specific areas of the brain supports embodied theories of language that predict context-sensitive motor activation when people read verbs in sentences (for reviews, see Borghi & Cimatti, 2010; Fischer & Zwaan, 2008). 
  
 mental scene incorporating various pieces of information to represent the described event (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan & Radvan-sky, 1998; Zwaan & Madden, 2004) – the authors construed motor activation during pseudo-verb processing as the on-going at-tempt to yield coherence. A preceding phrase functioned to set up an action context fol-lowed by a target action verb, non-action verb, or pseudo-verb (e.g., “With his black pen, Paul signs the contract”, “With his black pen, Paul plans to sign the contract”, and “With his black pen, Paul griles the contract”, respectively). In the given example, the con-text guided participants toward the most plausible action associated with using a pen. Encountering either an action or non-action verb completes the situation model. Accord-ingly, action verbs elicited a significant in-crease in grip-force amplitudes, whereas non-action verbs showed otherwise. A pseudo-verb, however, does not fulfil the expectation nor provides sufficient evidence to discount it. Nonetheless, pseudo-verbs showed an activation profile similar to that found for action verbs; i.e., the underspecified situation model is maintained through motor activa-tion. The demonstration of sustained motor activity as a means to find coherence finds support in the current study. The concurrent measures of N400 and mu presented here go further to show the online interaction be-tween semantic processing and motor activa-tion.  Furthermore, the functional use of motor activation during attempts to derive meaning provides an alternative explanation for the results of a previous mu study. A sentence-reading study in Dutch (van Elk, van Schie, Zwaan, & Bekkering, 2010) showed more motor activation for actions performed by an animal than by a human (e.g., “The duck/girl swims in the pond”). The result contradicts the embodied view in that actions performed by humans should be the easiest to under-stand. At least part of the explanation relates to the high cloze probability between the animal-noun and the upcoming verb, as of-fered by the authors. The relatively limited motor repertoire of animals limits the scope of possible actions to ease the understanding of such descriptions. We propose, however, that unfamiliarity with a non-human body, 
and consequently the action performed by that said body, limits the reader’s ability to understand easily. As the mu evidence sug-gests, readers resort to motor activation to derive meaning. Across different descriptions of implausible actions, readers recruit the motor system to generate an interpretation of the input. Con-trary to a theoretical position that non-motoric meaning obviates motor activation, motor activation indeed serves as a mecha-nism to derive meaning, even if in the end, no plausible meaning is available. There are clearly many instances in which the literal interpretation of individual words and phrases is anomalous, yet the utterance is meaningful due to linguistic context and societal norms (e.g., reading figurative lan-guage, see review by Coulson, 2006; or pro-cessing the description of imaginary events, Nieuwland & van Berkum, 2006). If the brain were to prematurely dismiss such anomalous input, comprehension would be sub-optimal. A language comprehension system that main-tains different possible interpretations for a longer time is well-suited to a generative human language. In the current and cited studies, reading about implausible actions leads readers to recruit the motor system to try to enact the implied action or entertain alternatives. In this manner, the motor sys-tem does serve a functional role in deriving meaning. The concurrent measure of meaning pro-cessing (N400) and motor activation (mu) revealed that reading descriptions of implau-sible actions coincided with motor involve-ment. Thus, motor activation not only reflect-ed the meaning of words, it also served as a means to derive meaning. This dual-view on motor activation during online language processing opens up a new approach to in-vestigate how motor activation contributes to meaning. Future studies may consider other functional contributions of the motor system to comprehension. Comparing motor activa-tion patterns across tasks can clarify the relative involvement of motor activation in fulfilling various task demands (e.g., Hauk & Tschentscher, 2013; Louwerse, Hutchinson, Tillman, & Recchia, 2015; Willems & Casasan-to, 2011). Other ways of showing modula-
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   In line with embodied theories of language, evidence shows that conceptual knowledge activates modality-specific infor-mation. The functional role of the activation, however, has not been well-characterised. In the current EEG study, we compared two language tasks (letter-search vs. sensibility judgement) that placed different emphasis on meaning to measure the pattern of motor involvement in each task. Sen-tences differed in action specificity and plausibility to modu-late motor activation (mu) and semantic processing (N400), respectively. Both tasks elicited N400 congruence effects to indicate sensitivity to differences in plausibility, with larger effects in the sensibility judgement task. Mu activity indicated that motor activation was indeed present in both tasks. Re-markably, however, the activation patterns did not show differences in meaning and plausibility. These N400 and mu results therefore contrast with a proactive role of the motor system in deriving meaning (Chapter III; see also Lam, Bas-tiaansen, Dijkstra, & Rueschemeyer, 2016). Rather, the lack of sensitivity to meaning and plausibility suggests a more reac-tive role, revealing a shallow form of motor involvement during language processing. 
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 Based on: Lam, K. J. Y. & Dijkstra, T. (under review). Non-varying motor activation patterns to verb meaning and action plausibility during letter-search and sesnsibility judgements.
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   In line with embodied theories of language, evidence shows that conceptual knowledge activates modality-specific infor-mation. The functional role of the activation, however, has not been well-characterised. In the current EEG study, we compared two language tasks (letter-search vs. sensibility judgement) that placed different emphasis on meaning to measure the pattern of motor involvement in each task. Sen-tences differed in action specificity and plausibility to modu-late motor activation (mu) and semantic processing (N400), respectively. Both tasks elicited N400 congruence effects to indicate sensitivity to differences in plausibility, with larger effects in the sensibility judgement task. Mu activity indicated that motor activation was indeed present in both tasks. Re-markably, however, the activation patterns did not show differences in meaning and plausibility. These N400 and mu results therefore contrast with a proactive role of the motor system in deriving meaning (Chapter III; see also Lam, Bas-tiaansen, Dijkstra, & Rueschemeyer, 2016). Rather, the lack of sensitivity to meaning and plausibility suggests a more reac-tive role, revealing a shallow form of motor involvement during language processing. 
 
 
 
C  H  A  P  T  E  R  
 
sensitivity of motor activation to depth of processing 
comparing the letter-search & sensibility judgement tasks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Based on: Lam, K. J. Y. & Dijkstra, T. (under review). Non-varying motor activation patterns to verb meaning and action plausibility during letter-search and sesnsibility judgements.
 of the motor system during action-related language processing. In an fMRI study (To-masino, Werner, Weiss, & Fink, 2007), partic-ipants read motoric (e.g., “I hammer”) and non-motoric (e.g., “I admire”) phrases, while either imagining the implied movements or searching for a given letter. Explicit imagery led to differences in motor activation meas-ured on the left motor cortex that was absent in the letter-search task designed to prevent imagery. Although no difference in activation between motoric and non-motoric phrases was observed in the latter task, motor activa-tion was nevertheless present.  Tasks also modulate behavioural responses accordingly. In two tasks, Sato, Mengarelli, Riggio, Gallese, and Buccino (2008) measured response times to auditorily and visually presented verbs related to actions (e.g., hand ‘applaud’ and foot ‘walk’ actions)  and ab-stract content (e.g., ‘love’). In a semantic deci-sion task, participants pressed a response button to verbs expressing a concrete action; otherwise, they were asked to refrain from responding. In a lexical decision task, re-sponses were made only to real words. A ‘Go’ signal presented either early or late during verb processing (e.g., 150 ms or 1,150 ms post-stimulus for the visual modality) cued participants to respond. In the semantic deci-sion task, hand action-related verbs elicited slower RTs relative to foot action-related verbs (Experiment 1). This RT difference was specific to responses cued by an early ‘Go’ signal (Experiment 2). The slowing of RTs was attributed to competing resources be-tween motor response and language pro-cessing. The lexical decision task, however, did not result in RT effects for the different action verbs (Experiment 3; but see Bouleng-er et al., 2006). The combined results indicat-
ed that, regardless of presentation modality, motor involvement is task-dependent and time-locked to semantic processing. Using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to stimulate the hand area in the left motor cortex, Papeo, Vallesi, Isaja, and Rumi-ati (2009) measured RTs and motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) on the hand while partici-pants performed either a semantic categori-sation task (whether a verb implies a physical act) or a syllable-counting task to visually presented verbs. TMS was applied at three intervals (170, 350, and 500 ms post-stimulus) to coincide with early and late stages of lexical semantic processing. Task differences were found in the form of faster RTs (Experiments 1-3) and higher MEPs (Experiment 3) for hand verbs (e.g., ‘stir’) in the semantic task; notably, this advantage was not found in the syllable-counting task. Also, motor activation elicited by non-hand action (‘jump’) and non-action (‘wonder’) verbs were similar in both tasks. These re-sults, likes those reported before, suggested a task-dependent involvement of the motor system during language processing.  Although the studies provide converging results in showing greater motor activation in a semantic task than in a non-semantic task, a confound remains. Namely, the semantic tasks in these studies made explicit reference to the motor content of the stimuli – e.g., imagining the actions, or deciding if the verbs refer to actions or imply a physical act (see also Hoenig et al., 2008; van Dam, van Dijk, Bekkering, & Rueschemeyer, 2012). Thus, there may have been (greater) reliance on the motor system when making explicit semantic decisions, because the task instructions en-couraged motor involvement. 
The present study The study presented here tested whether motor activation is differently involved in two language tasks (i.e., letter-search and sensibility judgement), each of which is as-sumed to emphasise word- or meaning-level processes. Crucially, participants were in-structed without any mention of motor-related meaning.     The letter-search task places focus on the 
individual letters making up a letter string, thus positioning processing demands at the orthographic level. Evidence suggests that semantic processing still occurs at a shallow level of processing (e.g., Connolly, Stewart, & Phillips, 1990; Dombrowski & Heil, 2006; Heil, Rolke, & Pecchinenda, 2004; Hutchison & Bosco, 2007; Küper & Heil, 2009; Marí-Beffa, Fuentes, Catena, & Houghton, 2000; Marí-Beffa, Houghton, Estévez, & Fuentes, 
 
I  n  t  r  o  d  u  c  t  i  o  n  Embodied theories of language hold the view that concepts (and thus meaning) are repre-sented in the brain’s motor and perceptual systems (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; 2008; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Kemmerer & Gonzalez-Castillo, 2010; Pul-vermüller & Fadiga, 2010; Zwaan, 2003). According to some theorists, language com-prehension is the result of simulation (Pul-vermüller & Fadiga, 2010; Pulvermüller, 1999; 2003; 2012; see review by Fischer & Zwaan, 2008). Words become meaningful through fast and automatic re-enactment of perceptual states that were experienced in conjunction with specific word forms. For example, reading action verbs like ‘kick’, ‘pick’, and ‘lick’ somatotopically activated brain areas involved in coordinating leg, arm, and face movements, respectively (Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 2004, but see Postle et al., 2008). Remarkably, somatotopic activation occurred also while participants watched a silent movie that distracted them from processing action words (Pulvermüller, Shtyrov & Ilmoniemi, 2005). These results suggested that the recruitment of sensorimo-tor areas during (inadvertent) language pro-cessing can be highly automatic (but see, for example, Raposo et al., 2009 and Rueschemeyer, Brass, & Friederici, 2007, for counter-evidence). In the current study, we assessed whether meaning can be derived more “economically”. That is, we investigated if different ways of engaging with text actually lead to different degrees of meaning activation in the brain. A reader may either skim through a text to decide if it compels a closer read, focus on each letter of a word when performing a spell-check, or scrutinise and parse each written word to evaluate for textual coher-ence. Depending on their aims and task at hand, readers may focus on more superficial or elaborate processing. If we assume that the meaning of a word is represented in terms of a complex network of different brain areas, we may consider if all of these necessarily come into play. Amongst the literate, reading is second na-ture and largely beyond one’s control. In line 
with this observation, reading has been con-sidered a mandatory act that activates some degree of meaning automatically (e.g., Heil, Rolke, & Pecchinenda, 2004; Hutchison & Bosco, 2007; Tse & Neely, 2007). This is well-illustrated by the so-called Stroop effect (1935; see MacLeod, 1991, for a review). When asked to name the colour in which a word is displayed, people take longer to iden-tify the colour blue to the word GREEN print-ed in blue than to BLUE printed in blue. This suggests that the retrieval of a colour word’s meaning cannot be avoided; otherwise, there would be no response time difference be-tween the two situations.  Yet, some researchers have argued that meaning is not always automatically activat-ed, but depends instead on whether or not there is a need to read for meaning, or if a simultaneous task is competing for resources (e.g., Dishon-Berkovits & Algom, 2000; Marí-Beffa, Valdés, Cullen, Catena, & Houghton, 2005; Stolz & Besner, 1999). This latter stance is supported by studies showing that people typically understand and process language superficially (e.g., Ferreira & Patson, 2007; Sanford & Sturt, 2002). Whereas read-ers are often quick to recognise blatant se-mantic anomalies such as “He spread his bread with socks” (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980), a striking example called the Moses illusion (Erickson & Matteson, 1981) illustrates that an approximate meaning may be retrieved and considered by the reader. When asked “How many animals of each sort did Moses put on the Ark?’, many participants respond-ed with ‘two’ when in fact, the answer is ‘none’ because it was Noah, not Moses, who built the Ark. Because Moses is closely related to Noah, people were unaware of the anoma-ly. This and other cases of under-specification indicate that people typically engage in shal-low “good enough” processing (Ferreira & Patson, 2007). In short, language processing may not always result in elaborate compre-hension. Accordingly, embodied effects are also likely subject to similar processing predispositions. Several studies have compared different tasks to determine the relative involvement 
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M  a  t  e  r  i  a  l    &    m  e  t  h  o  d  s  
Participants Fifty healthy right-handed native speakers of Dutch between ages 18 – 28 years (18 males; mean age = 22.1 years) participated in ex-change for course credit or monetary com-pensation. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and provided their informed consent.  After excluding participants with excessive movement artefacts, the following analyses 
were conducted on the remaining 48 partici-pants. Twenty-five participants remained in the letter-search task (mean accuracy of 95%; mean RT = 575 ± 130 ms) and twenty-three in the sensibility judgement task (mean accuracy of 86%; mean RT = 687 ± 289 ms). This study was approved by the local Nijme-gen Ethical Committee of the Faculty of Social Sciences (ECG2012-2711-05). 
Stimulus materials The four experimental conditions were as follows (see Table 1 for examples of each; see Appendix 3 for complete stimulus materials): Plausible Action Verb, Plausible Non-Action Verb, Implausible Action Verb, and Implausi-ble Non-Action Verb. To clarify, Plausibility refers to a manipulation of semantic congru-ency that describes an action that could be performed or not. Action Verb refers to a verb that defines the action to be performed on the objects (i.e., pushing trolleys refers to 
the act of extending both arms slightly in front of the body). By contrast, a Non-Action Verb does a poor job at defining the action (e.g., one can deliver trolleys by transporting them in a truck, shipped by cargo, etc.). A separate group of participants (n = 10) that did not participate in the EEG experiment provided ratings for each condition on se-mantic congruency and action specificity, confirming the intended manipulations. 
Table 1 Example stimuli of the four conditions in Dutch with English translations provided. Critical verbs are in bold type. 
plausible 
action verb 
De winkelkarretjes/kinderwagens/maaiers/deuren die hij wegduwt zijn gebroken. 
The trolleys/strollers/lawnmowers/doors that he pushes (away) are broken. 
plausible 
non-action verb 
De winkelkarretjes/kinderwagens/maaiers/deuren die hij levert zijn gebroken. 
The trolleys/strollers/lawnmowers/doors that he delivers are broken. 
implausible 
action verb 
De winkelkarretjes/kinderwagens/maaiers/deuren die zij aannaait zijn gebroken. 
The trolleys/strollers/lawnmowers/doors that she sews (on) are broken. 
implausible 
non-action verb 
De winkelkarretjes/kinderwagens/maaiers/deuren die zij geneest zijn gebroken. 
The trolleys/strollers/lawnmowers/doors that she heals are broken.  The stimulus materials from Chapter III were revised and expanded such that each condi-tion now contained 36 sentences in Dutch. Every sentence contained an object noun in the second position and the critical verb in the fifth; sentences were between seven to nine words long. We avoided wrap-up effects in the ERPs by not placing the verb at the end of the sentence (Hagoort, Brown, & Oster-hout, 1999). 
We used non-particle verbs like ‘levert’ (de-livers) primarily, but to reduce the variation in word length, particle verbs like ‘weg+duwt’ (pushes away) were also used; a previous study reported that particle verbs are pro-cessed as a single lexical unit (Cappelle, Shtyrov, & Pulvermüller, 2010; but see Piai, Meyer, Schreuder, & Bastiaansen, 2013). Verbs were matched for length and frequency based on SUBTLEX-NL (Keuleers, Brysbaert, 
 2000; also see review by Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). However, it is unclear to what degree motor activation persists when meaning is orthogonal to the task. Beyond the simple observation of motor activation, the proactive interpretive heuristic account presented in Chapter III (see also Lam, Bastiaansen, Dijks-tra, & Rueschemeyer, 2016) predicts motor activation patterns that reflect the specific meaning of the implied actions and the con-text (namely, plausible vs. implausible ac-tions). Positive evidence from a shallow let-ter-search task would strongly support the view that motor activation is indeed a com-ponent of (inadvertent) action-related lan-guage processing, in line also with the results of Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, and Ilmoniemi (2005). By contrast, the sensibility judgement task focuses processing demands on the meaning of the word. Behavioural evidence suggests that the motor system underlies such judge-ments when processing action-related sen-tences (e.g., Borghi & Scorolli, 2009; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Scorolli et al., 2012; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). In one study, participants were asked to decide whether the sentence “Jane started the car” makes sense by rotating a response knob (Experiment 2 in Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). Notably, rotating the response knob in a clockwise direction was faster because the implied and executed actions matched. However, there is evidence that these effects depend on the initial prepara-tion of potentially compatible responses in parallel with sentence processing (Borreg-gine & Kaschak, 2006). Thus, whether the requirement to understand the word necessi-tates the activation of its motoric meaning remains untested. In the current sensibility judgement task, participants were asked to judge whether the combination of the object noun and verb makes sense. Importantly, there was no explicit mention of motoric plausibility in the instructions and no concur-rent manual responses were required, unlike in the cited studies. This allowed for an unbi-ased assessment of whether motor activation is indeed crucial for such judgements in the absence of instructional bias. The EEG study in Chapter III served as the basis for our predictions in which we demon-
strated the proactive contribution of the motor system during sentence processing. N400 congruence effects indicated that read-ers were sensitive to descriptions of plausible and implausible actions. Crucially, motor activation indexed by mu activity also showed context-sensitivity to these two types of descriptions. Mu differences reflected the verb’s motoric meaning in sentences describ-ing plausible actions: Greater motor activa-tion coincided with more specific action de-scriptions than to non-specific ones (e.g., “The trolleys that she pushes/delivers are bro-ken”). Interestingly, readers also showed motor activation when reading about implau-sible actions, although differences in verb meaning were not found. This latter outcome suggested that motor activation was involved in the resolution of implausible content be-yond just simulating the verb’s meaning. The motor system thus appeared to serve as an interpretive heuristic in deriving meaning.  Using the experimental paradigm in Chapter III, we tested if the proactive interpretive heuristic account extends to the proposed task comparison; i.e., whether the N400 and 
mu oscillations are differently affected by depth of processing (Sanford & Graesser, 2006; Sanford & Sturt, 2002). EEG studies have shown systematic modulations of the N400 component to task demands (e.g., Ben-tin, Kutas, & Hillyard, 1993; Chwilla, Brown, Hagoort, 1995; Hohlfeld & Sommer, 2005; Kiefer, 2002; Marí-Beffa, Valdés, Cullen, Cate-na, & Houghton, 2005; Relander, Rämä, & Kujala, 2009). We therefore predicted larger N400 amplitudes and congruence effects in the sensibility judgement task than in the letter-search task, reflecting the (greater) involvement of semantic processing in the former task. Motor activity was expected on the basis of previous task comparisons dis-cussed earlier, but whether the precise pat-terns of motor activity as reported in Chapter III will replicate is unclear. Replicating con-text-sensitive motor activation would be evidence of a strong functional role of motor activation in tasks not inclined towards such involvement. Finding motor activation that is not context-sensitive, however, would imply an alternative role of the motor system. 
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mu oscillations are differently affected by depth of processing (Sanford & Graesser, 2006; Sanford & Sturt, 2002). EEG studies have shown systematic modulations of the N400 component to task demands (e.g., Ben-tin, Kutas, & Hillyard, 1993; Chwilla, Brown, Hagoort, 1995; Hohlfeld & Sommer, 2005; Kiefer, 2002; Marí-Beffa, Valdés, Cullen, Cate-na, & Houghton, 2005; Relander, Rämä, & Kujala, 2009). We therefore predicted larger N400 amplitudes and congruence effects in the sensibility judgement task than in the letter-search task, reflecting the (greater) involvement of semantic processing in the former task. Motor activity was expected on the basis of previous task comparisons dis-cussed earlier, but whether the precise pat-terns of motor activity as reported in Chapter III will replicate is unclear. Replicating con-text-sensitive motor activation would be evidence of a strong functional role of motor activation in tasks not inclined towards such involvement. Finding motor activation that is not context-sensitive, however, would imply an alternative role of the motor system. 
 in front of the participant. We displayed each word at the centre for 350 ms, followed by a blank screen for another 350 ms, yielding a 700 ms inter-stimulus interval. The last word of the sentence was presented together with a period. At the end of each trial, a screen with ‘Ja/Nee?’ (Yes/No) prompted partici-pants to respond according to their task instructions. Trials were separated by an asterisk at the centre for 3,000 ms and we encouraged participants to blink only during this time. Words were presented on a black background using a white Arial font with size 20. Each of the three blocks lasted approxi-
mately 20 minutes separated by breaks last-ing about 1 minute. The total duration of a session was approximately two hours includ-ing set-up and clean-up.  In the letter-search task, participants decided whether a given letter presented at the be-ginning of a trial was present in both the object noun and verb. In the sensibility judgement task, participants decided whether the combination of the object noun and verb made sense; importantly, no explicit refer-ence to the action content was made. 
 
Recording We recorded the electroencephalogram (EEG) from 64 active electrodes placed in an actiCAP using Brain Vision Recorder (Brain Products GmbH, Munich, Germany); the elec-trode positions conform to the International 10-20 system. During recording, electrodes were referenced to the left mastoid but re-
referenced offline to the average of left and right mastoids. We kept impedance levels 
below 10 kΩ and used two 32-channel Brain-Amp DC EEG amplifiers to amplify the signals. The EEG and EOG signals were sampled at 500 Hz with a 100 Hz high cut-off filter and a 10s time constant. 
 
Analysis We performed pre-processing of the EEG data in Brain Vision Analyzer (Brain Products GmbH, Munich, Germany). As described in Chapter III, we analysed both the N400 and 
mu signals on the verb (1) because, having encountered the object- and agent-nouns, it represents the first moment at which suffi-cient information is available to establish whether an action is plausible or not to elicit an N400 congruence effect, and (2) because we are interested in whether concurrent motor activation occurs at this point to di-rectly relate it to the N400 effect. The EEG segments were made from -200 to 700 ms relative to the verb onset. We removed arti-facts using a semi-automatic visual inspection procedure; no more than 5% of trials were removed for each condition in both tasks.  For the N400 ERP analysis, the dependent variable is the mean amplitude between 300 – 500 ms. A baseline correction was applied to each trial from -150 ms to verb onset. To establish that an N400 congruence effect obtains in our design, we conducted the anal-yses on the Cz electrode typically reported as a representative channel in N400 studies (e.g., Chwilla, Brown, & Hagoort, 1995; Hald, Bastiaansen, & Hagoort, 2006; Lam, Bastiaan-
sen, Dijkstra, & Rueschemeyer, 2016; Wang, Bastiaansen, Yang, & Hagoort, 2011; also see Chapter III). The effect is also verified by its centroparietal scalp distribution which in-cludes Cz (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). Given that the N400 is sensitive to task demands related to meaning processing, we expected a larger N400 amplitude for the more demand-ing sensibility judgement task. This predic-tion is tested in a Plausibility * Task analysis of variance with Task as a between-subjects factor. For the mu frequency analysis, the dependent variable is the mean absolute mu power between 300 – 500 ms for the frequency range 8 – 12 Hz measured from channels C3 (left-hemisphere) and C4 (right-hemisphere). These channels were selected based on pre-vious studies measuring mu activity (e.g., Moreno, de Vega, & León, 2013; Moreno et al., 2015; Muthukumaraswamy & Johnson, 2004; Oberman et al., 2005) including the EEG study in Chapter III which showed lateralisa-tion of the effects (also see e.g., Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 2004; Tomasino, Werner, Weiss, & Fink, 2007). Thus, these channels allow us to include the factor Hemi-sphere to test for possible lateralisation of 
 & New, 2010; see Table 2), and each verb was paired with four different object nouns to reduce systematic effects due to nouns such as word frequency, word length, familiarity, and cloze probability. Participants only read one pair of the four possible combinations.  After the experiment, participants rated all sentences for semantic congruency, action specificity, and imageability in separate blocks. The presentation order of the rating blocks was counterbalanced. The statistical 
results confirmed our manipulations of se-mantic congruency and action specificity (see Table 3). We also collected imageability rat-ings as an additional measure. The instruc-tions for the Semantic, Action, and Imageabil-ity ratings are as follows: Does the sentence make sense? Does the sentence describe an event that consists of a series of movements? Does the sentence describe a situation that is easy to imagine?  
 
 
Table 2 Mean length (characters) and frequency (per million) of verbs in each experimental condition (standard deviation in parentheses).   plausible 
action verb 
plausible 
non-action verb 
implausible 
action verb 
implausible 
non-action verb length 7.4 (1.7) 7.7 (1.6) 7.3 (1.5) 7.2 (1.5) frequency 1.7 (0.7) 1.9 (0.9) 1.6 (0.7) 1.8 (0.6) 
 
 
Table 3 Mean sentence ratings for semantic congruency, action specificity, and imageability on a 5-point Likert scale (e.g., “Does the sentence clearly describe a particular action to perform?” 1 = No, not at all, 5 = Yes, absolutely). Standard de-viation is given in parentheses.  plausible 
action verb 
plausible 
non-action verb 
implausible 
action verb 
implausible 
non-action verb semantic congruency 4.14 (0.8) 4.12 (0.6) 1.47 (0.5) 1.43 (0.6) action specificity 3.94 (0.5) 2.80 (0.7) 3.12 (0.4) 2.11 (0.6) imageability 4.24 (0.7) 4.17 (0.5) 1.81 (0.6) 1.63 (0.7) 
 
Design Each participant read 195 sentences across 3 blocks: 65 trials per block, of which the first 5 were dummy trials similar to critical items. The order of the sentences was pseudo-randomised so that no more than 3 consecu-tive trials were from the same condition. As a 
result, eight experimental lists were generat-ed using the Latin square design and random-ly assigned to participants. A practice block of 10 trials similar to the experimental stimuli was first administered and repeated when necessary. 
 
Procedure Participants sat approximately 80 cm away from the computer screen in a dimly lit sound- and electrically-shielded booth. We presented the sentence stimuli using a PC 
running Presentation software (Neurobehav-ioural Systems, Albany, NY, USA). Button presses with the index fingers of each hand were recorded using a response box centred 
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 in front of the participant. We displayed each word at the centre for 350 ms, followed by a blank screen for another 350 ms, yielding a 700 ms inter-stimulus interval. The last word of the sentence was presented together with a period. At the end of each trial, a screen with ‘Ja/Nee?’ (Yes/No) prompted partici-pants to respond according to their task instructions. Trials were separated by an asterisk at the centre for 3,000 ms and we encouraged participants to blink only during this time. Words were presented on a black background using a white Arial font with size 20. Each of the three blocks lasted approxi-
mately 20 minutes separated by breaks last-ing about 1 minute. The total duration of a session was approximately two hours includ-ing set-up and clean-up.  In the letter-search task, participants decided whether a given letter presented at the be-ginning of a trial was present in both the object noun and verb. In the sensibility judgement task, participants decided whether the combination of the object noun and verb made sense; importantly, no explicit refer-ence to the action content was made. 
 
Recording We recorded the electroencephalogram (EEG) from 64 active electrodes placed in an actiCAP using Brain Vision Recorder (Brain Products GmbH, Munich, Germany); the elec-trode positions conform to the International 10-20 system. During recording, electrodes were referenced to the left mastoid but re-
referenced offline to the average of left and right mastoids. We kept impedance levels 
below 10 kΩ and used two 32-channel Brain-Amp DC EEG amplifiers to amplify the signals. The EEG and EOG signals were sampled at 500 Hz with a 100 Hz high cut-off filter and a 10s time constant. 
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mu signals on the verb (1) because, having encountered the object- and agent-nouns, it represents the first moment at which suffi-cient information is available to establish whether an action is plausible or not to elicit an N400 congruence effect, and (2) because we are interested in whether concurrent motor activation occurs at this point to di-rectly relate it to the N400 effect. The EEG segments were made from -200 to 700 ms relative to the verb onset. We removed arti-facts using a semi-automatic visual inspection procedure; no more than 5% of trials were removed for each condition in both tasks.  For the N400 ERP analysis, the dependent variable is the mean amplitude between 300 – 500 ms. A baseline correction was applied to each trial from -150 ms to verb onset. To establish that an N400 congruence effect obtains in our design, we conducted the anal-yses on the Cz electrode typically reported as a representative channel in N400 studies (e.g., Chwilla, Brown, & Hagoort, 1995; Hald, Bastiaansen, & Hagoort, 2006; Lam, Bastiaan-
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Fig. 1 The averaged ERP waveforms showing the two main comparisons of plau-sibility as measured on the critical verbs in the letter-search task (top) and the sensibility judgement task (bottom). The ERP waveform plots are based on the Cz channel indicated with asterisk. The N400 effect was measured between the 300 – 500 ms time window. Note that negative values are plotted downwards. Differ-ence topographies for the between-condition comparisons are shown on the right. 
 
 
Mu analysis: Letter-search task A Plausibility * Action * Hemisphere analysis yielded a significant Action * Hemisphere interaction, F(1,24) = 4.932, p = .018. This interaction indicated that the mu effects were lateralised on C3 (Figure 2, left). A planned t-test comparison on this channel, however, did not yield a significant difference between Action Specific (-1.04 ± 2.0) and Non-Action Specific (-0.83 ± 1.17) verbs, t(49) = -0.879, p = .19. Contrary to our previous finding, there was neither a significant Plausibility * Action interaction, F(1,24) = 1.498, p = .12, nor a significant Plausibility * Action * Hemisphere interaction, F(1,24) = .736, p = .20, to suggest that the mu effects differed by action plausi-bility in a lateralised manner.  Still, an Action * Baseline analysis yielded a main effect of Baseline, F(1,49) = 20.657, p < .001. This result confirmed that there was a power decrease on the verb (ActSpec = -1.04 
± 1.99; NonAct = -0.83 ± 1.17) relative to the preceding word (preActSpec = -0.07 ± 0.14 ; preNonAct = -0.06 ± 0.16).   Also, a two-tailed Area (C3, O1) * Action anal-ysis partially supported the claim that mu activity can be dissociated from concurrent posterior alpha activity in a significant main effect of Area, F(1,49) = 15.036, p < .001. However, a non-significant Area * Action interaction, F(1,49) = 0.090, p = .765, left open the possibility that both areas respond-ed similarly to the Action manipulation. To address this, two post-hoc analyses (two-tailed) were conducted. Firstly, a two-tailed Plausibility * Action * Hemisphere analyses on O1 and O2 did not replicate any of the effects reported for C3 and C4. There was neither an Action * Hemisphere interaction, 
F(1,24) = 0.688, p = .422, nor a main effect of Action, F(1,24) = 0.490, p = 0.491. Secondly, a 
 the mu effects. The resulting subject-averaged power changes in the post-verb onset interval were expressed as an absolute change from the baseline interval (-150 ms to verb onset).  First, a Hemisphere (C3, C4) * Plausibility (Plausible, Implausible) * Action (Action Specific, Non-Action Specific) repeat-ed-measures analysis of variance with Task as a between-subjects factor tested whether one or more lower-level interactions differed by task. Second, the predicted mu difference was tested in a Plausibility * Action * Hemi-sphere analysis. Third, to establish whether 
mu frequency power was at all modulated by 
verb comprehension, an Action * Baseline (pre-verb, verb) analysis was conducted.  Concerns about the overlapping frequency range between mu and alpha were addressed post-hoc by performing an Area * Action analyses to determine that the predicted effects occur exclusively in the motor chan-nels (e.g., C3 vs. O1 or C4 vs. O2 depending on the lateralisation of the effects). Also, a Plau-sibility * Action * Hemisphere was conducted on O1 and O2 to verify that the effects do not replicate in these channels. All p-values are one-tailed, unless otherwise noted. 
R  e  s  u  l  t  s  
N400 analysis A Plausibility * Task analysis yielded a signifi-cant main effect of Task, F(1,94) = 48.053, p < .001, indicating that the tasks differed accord-ingly. A significant main effect of Plausibility, 
F(1,94) = 48.939, p < .001, confirmed our manipulation of semantic plausibility in elicit-ing an N400 congruence effect. More im-portantly, we found a significant Plausibility * Task interaction, F(1,94) = 3.315, p = .036, indicating that the size of the N400 congru-ence effect differed by task.   
Separate simple t-tests (Table 4) confirmed that the mean amplitude in the Implausible condition was more negative-going than the Plausible condition (Figure 1). These results indicated that each task elicited an N400 congruence effect differing in magnitude. Also, the more demanding sensibility judge-ment task elicited not only a larger difference between the Plausible and Implausible condi-tions, it also generated mean values in the negative range.  
 
 
Table 4 Mean amplitude and standard deviation values for the manipulation of plausibility for each task. Accompanying t-test results in rightmost column.  
 plausible implausible  
letter-search 3.05 ± 3.14 µV 1.78 ± 3.33 µV t(49)=3.787 p<.001 
sensibility judgement -1.20 ± 3.57 µV -3.37 ± 4.05 µV t(45)=6.024, p<.001 
 
 
Mu analysis: Conjoint Task Analysis 
 A Hemisphere * Plausibility * Action repeat-ed-measures analysis of variance with Task as a between-subjects factor yielded a mar-ginally significant four-way interaction, 
F(1,46) = 2.594, p = 0.057, suggesting that one or more lower-level interactions differed by task. A non-significant main effect of Task, 
F(1,46) = 0.163, p = .34, indicated that task demands did not modulate the mu measure independently of the manipulations of inter-est (i.e., Plausibility and Action). We then conducted further analyses for each of the two tasks separately. 
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Fig. 1 The averaged ERP waveforms showing the two main comparisons of plau-sibility as measured on the critical verbs in the letter-search task (top) and the sensibility judgement task (bottom). The ERP waveform plots are based on the Cz channel indicated with asterisk. The N400 effect was measured between the 300 – 500 ms time window. Note that negative values are plotted downwards. Differ-ence topographies for the between-condition comparisons are shown on the right. 
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 above; there was neither an Action * Hemi-sphere interaction, F(1,22) = 0.073, p = 0.790, nor a main effect of Action, F(1,22) = 0.38, p = .544. 
D  i  s  c  u  s  s  i  o  n   In this study, we set out to better characterise the involvement of the motor system during action-related language processing. In partic-ular, we examined whether motor activation patterns were modulated by verb meaning and context in two language tasks. One group of participants merely searched for a given letter in the sentence’s object noun and verb, while another group decided whether the object noun and verb combined to form a sensible pair.  The EEG results indicated that both groups processed the sentences for meaning, as 
indexed by an N400 effect of semantic con-gruency, with a larger effect in the sensibility judgement task, as expected. More important-ly, motor activation was present in both tasks, but the activation patterns did not reflect differences in verb meaning or contex-tual plausibility. The absence of context-sensitive motor activation indicates a passive, reactive role of the motor system. Under-standing action-related language may there-fore not necessarily entail full involvement of the motor system.  
Letter-search task The letter-search task did not fully impede access to meaning (see also Hutchison & Bosco, 2007; Marí-Beffa, Fuentes, Catena, & Houghton, 2000; and Marí-Beffa, Houghton, Estévez, & Fuentes, 2000). This finding con-verges with several studies on N400 priming effects that reported semantic effects in tasks not requiring meaning processing (e.g., Con-nolly, Stewart, & Phillips, 1990; Dombrowski & Heil, 2006; Heil, Rolke, & Pecchinenda, 2004; Küper & Heil, 2009; but see Chwilla, Brown, & Hagoort, 1995; Marí-Beffa, Valdés, Cullen, Catena, & Houghton, 2005) or when words are imperceptible (e.g., Kiefer, 2002; but see Deacon & Shelley-Tremblay, 2000).  In a typical letter-search task, both the letter and the word are presented simultaneously. The current study presented the to-be-detected letter prior to sentence presentation (similar to Marí-Beffa, Fuentes et al., 2000, and Marí-Beffa, Houghton et al., 2000). De-spite the different experimental setup, our results support the view that meaning is 
indeed accessed during this type of shallow processing.  Notably, though motor activation was pre-sent, the predicted numeric difference in mu power between verb conditions was not statistically supported. This indicates that motor activation, particularly for descriptions of plausible actions, did not reflect verb meaning. In this respect, the mu results do not conform to a functional role of the motor system as a proactive interpretive heuristic (cf. Chapter III; Lam, Bastiaansen, Dijkstra, & Rueschemeyer, 2016). This account attrib-utes such a role to the motor system if activa-tion patterns show differences in meaning (e.g., specific vs. non-specific actions) and context (e.g., plausible vs. implausible ac-tions). Still, the finding that motor activation persisted indicates some minimal form of involvement – a reactive or passive role – during language processing. The lack of sensi-tivity towards meaning and context precludes any substantive contribution to meaning. 
Sensibility judgement task Compared to the letter-search task, the sensi-bility judgement task led to larger N400 am-plitudes and congruence effects, as expected. These findings confirm that readers were more engaged with the stimuli for the more demanding task (e.g., Chen, Davis, Pulvermül-ler, & Hauk, 2013). Nevertheless, motor acti-
vation patterns reflecting the specific mean-ing of the sentences were not concomitantly larger. Though a numeric mu difference be-tween conditions in the predicted direction is discernible, this difference was not statistical-ly supported. Combining the mu data from both tasks for a two-tailed t-test on C3 did 
 two-tailed t-test comparison between the Action conditions was performed on O1 to replicate the comparison performed on C3. The comparison yielded a non-significant 
difference, t(49) = -1.257, p = .215, thus ex-cluding the possibility of a confluence be-tween alpha and mu activity. 
 
Fig. 2 The time-frequency representations of the manipulation of action specifici-ty in both tasks based on channel C3 indicated with an asterisk. Boxed area indi-cates time window (300 – 500 ms) used to calculate power differences for the 
mu-frequency band (8 – 12 Hz). Top. The time-frequency representations for the Action Specific and Non-Action Specific Verb conditions and the difference be-tween these conditions, as measured on the critical verbs. Bottom. Difference to-pographies for the between-condition comparison for the indicated time and fre-quency windows.  
 
 
 
Mu analysis: Sensibility judgement task A Plausibility * Action * Hemisphere analysis yielded a significant Action * Hemisphere interaction, F(1,22) = 3.609, p = .035, indicat-ing a lateralisation of the mu effects on C3 (Figure 2, right). However, a planned t-test comparison did not yield a significant differ-ence between Action Specific (-1.26 ± 2.0) and Non-Action Specific (-0.8 ± 2.35) verbs, 
t(45) = -1.153, p = .13. The lack of a Plausibil-ity * Action interaction, F(1,22) = 1.5, p = .117, contrary to our previous study, as well as a non-significant Plausibility * Action * Hemisphere interaction, F(1,22) = 1.793, p = .098, suggested that mu effects did not differ by action plausibility and that the interaction was not lateralised. 
Still, an Action * Baseline analysis confirmed that a power decrease on the verb (ActSpec = -1.26 ± 2.00; NonAct = -0.8 ± 2.35) obtained relative to the preceding word (preActSpec = -0.06 ± 0.19; preNonAct= -0.05 ± 0.26) in a main effect of Baseline, F(1,45) = 16.543, p < .001.  Also a two-tailed Area * Action analysis veri-fied that the effect of the Action manipulation is to be found only in C3. An Area * Action interaction, F(1,45) = 4.316, p = .04 and a main effect of Area, F(1,45) = 19.366, p < .001 supported this prediction. A further post-hoc two-tailed Plausibility * Action * Hemisphere analysis on O1 and O2 substantiated the 
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 above; there was neither an Action * Hemi-sphere interaction, F(1,22) = 0.073, p = 0.790, nor a main effect of Action, F(1,22) = 0.38, p = .544. 
D  i  s  c  u  s  s  i  o  n   In this study, we set out to better characterise the involvement of the motor system during action-related language processing. In partic-ular, we examined whether motor activation patterns were modulated by verb meaning and context in two language tasks. One group of participants merely searched for a given letter in the sentence’s object noun and verb, while another group decided whether the object noun and verb combined to form a sensible pair.  The EEG results indicated that both groups processed the sentences for meaning, as 
indexed by an N400 effect of semantic con-gruency, with a larger effect in the sensibility judgement task, as expected. More important-ly, motor activation was present in both tasks, but the activation patterns did not reflect differences in verb meaning or contex-tual plausibility. The absence of context-sensitive motor activation indicates a passive, reactive role of the motor system. Under-standing action-related language may there-fore not necessarily entail full involvement of the motor system.  
Letter-search task The letter-search task did not fully impede access to meaning (see also Hutchison & Bosco, 2007; Marí-Beffa, Fuentes, Catena, & Houghton, 2000; and Marí-Beffa, Houghton, Estévez, & Fuentes, 2000). This finding con-verges with several studies on N400 priming effects that reported semantic effects in tasks not requiring meaning processing (e.g., Con-nolly, Stewart, & Phillips, 1990; Dombrowski & Heil, 2006; Heil, Rolke, & Pecchinenda, 2004; Küper & Heil, 2009; but see Chwilla, Brown, & Hagoort, 1995; Marí-Beffa, Valdés, Cullen, Catena, & Houghton, 2005) or when words are imperceptible (e.g., Kiefer, 2002; but see Deacon & Shelley-Tremblay, 2000).  In a typical letter-search task, both the letter and the word are presented simultaneously. The current study presented the to-be-detected letter prior to sentence presentation (similar to Marí-Beffa, Fuentes et al., 2000, and Marí-Beffa, Houghton et al., 2000). De-spite the different experimental setup, our results support the view that meaning is 
indeed accessed during this type of shallow processing.  Notably, though motor activation was pre-sent, the predicted numeric difference in mu power between verb conditions was not statistically supported. This indicates that motor activation, particularly for descriptions of plausible actions, did not reflect verb meaning. In this respect, the mu results do not conform to a functional role of the motor system as a proactive interpretive heuristic (cf. Chapter III; Lam, Bastiaansen, Dijkstra, & Rueschemeyer, 2016). This account attrib-utes such a role to the motor system if activa-tion patterns show differences in meaning (e.g., specific vs. non-specific actions) and context (e.g., plausible vs. implausible ac-tions). Still, the finding that motor activation persisted indicates some minimal form of involvement – a reactive or passive role – during language processing. The lack of sensi-tivity towards meaning and context precludes any substantive contribution to meaning. 
Sensibility judgement task Compared to the letter-search task, the sensi-bility judgement task led to larger N400 am-plitudes and congruence effects, as expected. These findings confirm that readers were more engaged with the stimuli for the more demanding task (e.g., Chen, Davis, Pulvermül-ler, & Hauk, 2013). Nevertheless, motor acti-
vation patterns reflecting the specific mean-ing of the sentences were not concomitantly larger. Though a numeric mu difference be-tween conditions in the predicted direction is discernible, this difference was not statistical-ly supported. Combining the mu data from both tasks for a two-tailed t-test on C3 did 
 two-tailed t-test comparison between the Action conditions was performed on O1 to replicate the comparison performed on C3. The comparison yielded a non-significant 
difference, t(49) = -1.257, p = .215, thus ex-cluding the possibility of a confluence be-tween alpha and mu activity. 
 
Fig. 2 The time-frequency representations of the manipulation of action specifici-ty in both tasks based on channel C3 indicated with an asterisk. Boxed area indi-cates time window (300 – 500 ms) used to calculate power differences for the 
mu-frequency band (8 – 12 Hz). Top. The time-frequency representations for the Action Specific and Non-Action Specific Verb conditions and the difference be-tween these conditions, as measured on the critical verbs. Bottom. Difference to-pographies for the between-condition comparison for the indicated time and fre-quency windows.  
 
 
 
Mu analysis: Sensibility judgement task A Plausibility * Action * Hemisphere analysis yielded a significant Action * Hemisphere interaction, F(1,22) = 3.609, p = .035, indicat-ing a lateralisation of the mu effects on C3 (Figure 2, right). However, a planned t-test comparison did not yield a significant differ-ence between Action Specific (-1.26 ± 2.0) and Non-Action Specific (-0.8 ± 2.35) verbs, 
t(45) = -1.153, p = .13. The lack of a Plausibil-ity * Action interaction, F(1,22) = 1.5, p = .117, contrary to our previous study, as well as a non-significant Plausibility * Action * Hemisphere interaction, F(1,22) = 1.793, p = .098, suggested that mu effects did not differ by action plausibility and that the interaction was not lateralised. 
Still, an Action * Baseline analysis confirmed that a power decrease on the verb (ActSpec = -1.26 ± 2.00; NonAct = -0.8 ± 2.35) obtained relative to the preceding word (preActSpec = -0.06 ± 0.19; preNonAct= -0.05 ± 0.26) in a main effect of Baseline, F(1,45) = 16.543, p < .001.  Also a two-tailed Area * Action analysis veri-fied that the effect of the Action manipulation is to be found only in C3. An Area * Action interaction, F(1,45) = 4.316, p = .04 and a main effect of Area, F(1,45) = 19.366, p < .001 supported this prediction. A further post-hoc two-tailed Plausibility * Action * Hemisphere analysis on O1 and O2 substantiated the 
 requirement to do so (the letter-search task). However, the resultant meaning is not neces-sarily detailed, suggesting that there are different levels of understanding. Evidently, these diverse reports show that there are different levels of meaning. Non-native speakers, in particular, exemplify the case that understanding a non-native language can proceed with subtler "embodied effects" (e.g., Bergen, Lau, Narayan, Stojanovic, & Wheeler, 2010; Foroni, 2015; Vukovic & Shtyrov, 2014; but see de Grauwe, Willems, Rueschemeyer, Lemhöfer, & Schriefers, 2014; also see Chap-ter V). The finding that both shallow and deeper processing of action-related content were successfully performed without extensive motor activation involvement shows different levels of motor contribution to understanding action-related language. In our view, these 
results best fit the Symbol Interdependency Theory (Louwerse, 2011) because “language encodes perceptual information” (Louwerse, 2011, p. 279); that is, meaning can be derived already from linguistic representations. By contrast, although the Language and Situated Simulation theory (LASS; Barsalou, Santos, Simmons, & Wilson, 2008) similarly accords the contribution of both the linguistic and situated simulation systems in language processing, meaning is derived by the slower and more central simulation system accord-ing to task demands. The results neither fit with LASS nor with the view that motor acti-vation patterns always reflect verb meaning (Pulvermüller, 2005). Similarly, the results complement the view that language pro-cessing relies on fast and frugal heuristics, capitalising on the minimal effort principle (e.g., Ferreira, Bailey, & Ferraro; 2002; Fer-reira & Patson, 2007; Sanford & Sturt, 2002).  
C  o  n  c  l  u  s  i  o  n  s  In summary, this is the first task-based study to demonstrate context-sensitive meaning processing in the absence of context-sensitive effects in concomitant motor activity. Though motor activation persists during language comprehension at different processing 
depths, the lack of an interaction with mean-ing and context implies a shallow form of motor contribution to comprehension. Cru-cially, then, making sense of action-related content may not fully lead to or rely on so-called embodied effects. 
 
  
 not help to yield a significant difference, t(95) = -1.452, p = .150. Thus, the absence of mu differences for each task cannot be attributed to insufficient statistical power. At best, the results point to a weak involvement of motor activation in both tasks.  As discussed in the Introduction, several studies have reported task-dependent motor activation. Notably, these studies have one common feature; namely, participants were explicitly asked to attend to the action prop-erty of words. For example, participants either imagined the implied actions (Tomasi-no, Werner, Weiss, & Fink, 2007), were asked 
to respond only when a verb expressed a concrete action (Sato, Mengarelli, Riggio, Gallese, & Buccino, 2008), or decided wheth-er verbs implied a physical act (Papeo, Val-lesi, Isaja, & Rumiati, 2009). When no such explicit focus was placed on action meaning as in the sensibility judgement task employed here, motor activation persisted, but the patterns observed did not correspond to implied meaning or contextual plausibility (as reported in Chapter III; Lam et al., 2016). On the one hand, language-based motor acti-vation is indeed persistent. On the other hand, the activation may not always reflect full engagement of the motor system. 
General Assessment The combined results reveal an important consideration when interpreting the role of motor activation. Characterising the func-tional role of the motor system during lan-guage processing cannot be based solely on indiscriminate motor activation (see also Papeo, Rumiati, Cecchetto, & Tomasino, 2012). As shown here and in Chapter III, the role of the motor system can be better as-sessed by considering whether the activation reflects sensitivity to meaning and context.  In Chapter III, the finding of context sensitivi-ty and verb specificity in the mu measure suggested a proactive interpretive heuristic role for the motor system. When participants read sentences describing plausible actions, the observed motor activation reflected the implied verb meaning: Greater motor activa-tion occurred in response to more specific actions, less to non-specific actions. When sentences described implausible actions, differences in motor activation were no long-er observed, but motor activation persisted. This suggested that attempts at yielding coherence through simulation may have occurred. By contrast, the current results depict a non-interpretive reactive role for the motor system. An interaction with context in the N400 measure and in combination with the lack of an interaction with context in the 
mu measure showed that meaning processing proceeded with minimal motor involvement.  Whereas undifferentiated motor activation to plausible and implausible actions is expected when little attention is directed to meaning 
(e.g., in our letter-search task), it is notewor-thy that deep and elaborate processing of action-related content did not fully involve the motor system for simulation (e.g., in our sensibility judgement task that did not em-phasise motor meaning). Greater engagement with meaning may not necessarily entail an increase in motor activity (also see Scorolli, Jacquet, Binkofski, Nicoletti, Tessari, & Bor-ghi, 2012). This leads to the conclusion that understanding language may not routinely involve an extensive neural network. Sanford and Sturt (2002) suggested that comprehen-sion is underspecified, precisely because many of the language processes that are involved take time and neural resources. Thus, a more economical route to compre-hension is characterised by shallow pro-cessing -- though interpretations may not be as elaborate, they are nevertheless sufficient.  Likewise, Ferreira, Bailey, and Ferraro (2002) argued that incomplete but “good enough” representations during language comprehen-sion are sufficient in most scenarios to yield meaning. In apparent opposition, there are others who argued that meaning retrieval or access is a natural consequence of reading (e.g., Heil, Rolke, & Pecchinenda, 2004; Hutchison & Bosco, 2007; Marí-Beffa, Fuentes 
et al., 2000; Marí-Beffa, Houghton et al., 2000).  Our results suggest that both theoretical views are equally valid. Meaning retrieval appears to be an automatic product of read-ing words even when there is no explicit 
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 Embodied theories of language claim that conceptual knowledge activates modality-specific information, but few studies have tested this view for non-native (L2, or second language) language processing. At the same time, models of bilingual processing do not make explicit inferences about sensorimotor involvement. Critically, linguistic experiences associated with L2 acquisition and use could alter the rele-vance of and reliance on the motor system for comprehen-sion. In this chapter, we examined whether L2 readers are sensitive to action meaning and plausibility by measuring motor activation (mu) and semantic processing (N400). In-deed, L2 readers showed sensitivity to descriptions of plausi-ble and implausible actions, as revealed by an N400 congru-ence effect. Importantly, though motor activation was found, the mu patterns did not reflect sensitivity to meaning and plausibility. This combination of N400 and mu results sug-gests that understanding action-related language in the L2 may not require extensive contribution from the motor sys-tem, in contrast to native language understanding (Chapter III; Lam, Bastiaansen, Dijkstra, & Rueschemeyer, 2016). The findings inform embodied theories of language and models of bilingual processing by further characterising the interaction between language and sensorimotor brain regions. 
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 Interestingly, recent studies suggest that L2 processing does involve motor activation. In a word-picture matching task, participants determined whether a verb like ‘run’ was correctly depicted in a picture of a stick-man figure (Bergen, Lau, Narayanan, Stojanovic, & Wheeler, 2010). Both L1 and L2 participants showed interference effects (i.e., longer re-sponse times) whenever the action denoted by the verb and the picture shared the same effector. Notably, greater L2 proficiency was correlated with more L1-like interference effects.  Similarly, a recent EEG study measuring mu activity as an index of motor activation con-firmed motor involvement during L1 and L2 verb processing in a within-subjects design (Vukovic & Shtyrov, 2014). In a cross-linguistic priming paradigm, participants passively read action (e.g., ‘drawing’, ‘run-
ning’) and abstract (e.g., ‘helping’, ‘choosing’) verbs in German and English. When preceded by an action prime verb, action target verbs elicited more motor activation than abstract verbs (e.g., ‘chewing’—‘kissing’ vs. ‘knowing’—‘running’) in the left hemisphere. The authors argued that prior motor activation from prime word processing resulted in enhanced motor activation elicited by a subsequent action verb. Importantly, this effect was larg-er in the L1 than in the L2. Thus, in line with Bergen et al. (2010), meaning-related motor activation is part of L1 and L2 processing but differences in the relative strength of these embodied effects likely reflect weaker L2 links or activation levels.  
More recently, de Grauwe, Willems, Rueschemeyer, Lemhöfer, and Schriefers (2014) compared L1 and L2 speakers of Dutch in an fMRI study. Participants read Dutch motor and non-motor verbs in a lexical decision task and were asked to respond only when they encountered pseudowords. Both groups showed motor activation to motor verbs (e.g., ‘nemen’, take) relative to non-motor verbs (e.g., ‘dienen’, serve). This finding obtained also for non-cognate verbs (e.g., Dutch ‘gooien’ and German ‘werpen’, throw) where there is little to no overlap in the word form; the effects are therefore not specific to cognates (e.g., ‘dienen’ for Dutch and Ger-man). These fMRI results suggest that L1 and L2 representations involve similar motor substrates. However, contrary to the previous two studies discussed, there did not appear to be differences in motor activation between the L1 and L2.  Altogether, these recent studies at the single-word level suggest that motor activation occurs during action word processing in the L2. Differences, however, may exist between L1 and L2 processing in the relative degree of motor involvement (Bergen et al., 2010; Vukovic & Shtyrov, 2014; but see de Grauwe 
et al., 2014). To clarify the functional contri-bution of motor involvement, the current study examined L2 sentence processing by manipulating contextual plausibility. This manipulation can reveal how L2 readers make sense of action descriptions and whether the motor system is involved in ways similar to L1 processing, as described below. 
Contextual plausibility and motor activation during L1 sentence processing In Chapter III, L1 readers demonstrated dif-ferential motor activation patterns in pro-cessing and resolving contextual plausibility (see also Lam, Bastiaansen, Dijkstra, & Rueschemeyer, 2016). Online indices of com-prehension processes (N400) and motor activity (mu) were measured simultaneously during silent reading of sentences. The N400 component is a negative deflection that is maximal over central sites around 400 post-word onset (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980; 1984). For instance, a larger N400 component ap-pears when a sentence ends with an incon-gruent word relative to a congruent one ("She 
spread her bread with socks/butter"). The N400 congruence effect is the difference of the N400 amplitude between the two sen-tences and serves as a measure of compre-hension (for a review, see Kutas & Federmei-er, 2011; for theoretical perspectives, see Brouwer, Fitz, & Hoeks, 2012; Deacon, Dy-nowska, Ritter, & Grose-Fifer, 2004; Frenzel, Schlesewsky, & Bornkessel-Schlesewsky, 2011; Hagoort, Baggio, & Willems, 2009; Lau, Philips, & Poeppel, 2008).  
 
Mu oscillations (8 – 12 Hz) reflect on-going dynamics from the motor cortex with a clear 
 
I  n  t  r  o  d  u  c  t  i  o  n  A considerable amount of empirical evidence has accumulated in favour of an embodied view of language processing (for a review, see Meteyard, Cuadrado, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 2010). For instance, reading sentences such as “He opened the drawer” while concurrent-ly performing a compatible action (e.g., mov-ing arm toward the body) appears to facili-tate the understanding of such sentences (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). These reports are in line with embodied theories of lan-guage that posit that concepts are represent-ed in the brain’s motor and perceptual sys-tems (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; 2008; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Kemmerer & Gonzalez-Castillo, 2010; Louwerse, 2011; Pulvermüller & Fadiga, 2010; Zwaan, 2003). Understanding language in this view entails co-activation of non-language brain areas that contribute to the meaning implied by the words.  In the current study, we assessed whether such motor involvement takes place in non-native language or second language (L2) processing. There are several reasons why L2 processing might differ from native language (L1, or first language) processing. New lan-guages are often learned in language courses that are impoverished with respect to mean-ing and in which utterances may be less con-textually embedded. As a consequence, an L2 might be weakly entrenched, especially in less proficient bilinguals, and lead to smaller or delayed motor activation during action-related language processing. Alternatively, L2 processing could rely more on motor activa-tion to derive meaning by making concepts more concrete, at least during the early phas-es of acquisition or when the proficiency level is still low. Child language acquisition studies do show that children strongly rely on sen-sorimotor information to obtain meaning (Bloom, 2000; Gentner, 2006). Moreover, children acquire nouns sooner than verbs through interactions with tangible objects (e.g., Gillette, Gleitman, Gleitman, & Lederer, 1999). Accordingly, greater motor involve-ment could be expected if similar mecha-nisms are in place during late L2 acquisition.   
Critically, current models of bilingual pro-cessing do not address the embodied aspect of language processing. These models, how-ever, do describe how meaning is differently retrieved in the two languages. According to the Revised Hierarchical Model (RHM, Kroll & Stewart, 1994), words in the L2 do not have direct access to meaning. Meaning is indirect-ly accessed via words in the L1. More direct links between L2 words and the semantic system are established as L2 proficiency increases (Talamas, Kroll, & Dufour, 1999).   In contrast to RHM’s predictions, beginning L2 learners can already exhibit semantic effects on word retrieval, thus implying that L2 words are mapped to meaning already at the beginning stages (e.g., Altaribba & Mathis, 1997; Brenders, van Hell, & Dijkstra, 2011; de Groot & Poot, 1997; Ferré, Sánchez-Casas, & Guasch, 2006; Guo, Misra, Tam, & Kroll, 2012; McLaughlin, Osterhout, & Kim, 2004; Palmer, van Hooff, & Havelka, 2010; Vigil-Colet, Pé-rez-Ollé, & Garcia-Albea, 2000). Such results are in line with the extended Bilingual Inter-active Activation model (BIA+, Dijkstra & van Heuven, 2002). The BIA+ explains asymme-tries in language dominance and other bilin-gual effects not as due to strength differences in links as described in RHM, but as a conse-quence of the generally lower and slower activation of lexical representations in the L2. Still, even if L1 and L2 words access shared meaning, this does not imply that both lan-guages make use of the same neural struc-tures to the same extent. Indeed, studies have reported overlap during L1 and L2 pro-cessing (e.g., Buchweitz, Shinkareva, Mason, Mitchell, & Just, 2012; Correia et al., 2014), but non-overlapping brain areas were also involved (e.g, Kim, Relkin, Lee, & Hirsch, 1997; Rueschemeyer, Fiebach, Kempe, & Friederici, 2005; Rueschemeyer, Zysset, & Friederici, 2006; for a review, see Indefrey, 2006). Crucially, whether or not L2 pro-cessing entails motor activation for action-related language is unspecified. The goal of the current study was to clarify whether L2 processing leads to embodied effects as in the L1.  
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et al., 2014). To clarify the functional contri-bution of motor involvement, the current study examined L2 sentence processing by manipulating contextual plausibility. This manipulation can reveal how L2 readers make sense of action descriptions and whether the motor system is involved in ways similar to L1 processing, as described below. 
Contextual plausibility and motor activation during L1 sentence processing In Chapter III, L1 readers demonstrated dif-ferential motor activation patterns in pro-cessing and resolving contextual plausibility (see also Lam, Bastiaansen, Dijkstra, & Rueschemeyer, 2016). Online indices of com-prehension processes (N400) and motor activity (mu) were measured simultaneously during silent reading of sentences. The N400 component is a negative deflection that is maximal over central sites around 400 post-word onset (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980; 1984). For instance, a larger N400 component ap-pears when a sentence ends with an incon-gruent word relative to a congruent one ("She 
spread her bread with socks/butter"). The N400 congruence effect is the difference of the N400 amplitude between the two sen-tences and serves as a measure of compre-hension (for a review, see Kutas & Federmei-er, 2011; for theoretical perspectives, see Brouwer, Fitz, & Hoeks, 2012; Deacon, Dy-nowska, Ritter, & Grose-Fifer, 2004; Frenzel, Schlesewsky, & Bornkessel-Schlesewsky, 2011; Hagoort, Baggio, & Willems, 2009; Lau, Philips, & Poeppel, 2008).  
 
Mu oscillations (8 – 12 Hz) reflect on-going dynamics from the motor cortex with a clear 
 
I  n  t  r  o  d  u  c  t  i  o  n  A considerable amount of empirical evidence has accumulated in favour of an embodied view of language processing (for a review, see Meteyard, Cuadrado, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 2010). For instance, reading sentences such as “He opened the drawer” while concurrent-ly performing a compatible action (e.g., mov-ing arm toward the body) appears to facili-tate the understanding of such sentences (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). These reports are in line with embodied theories of lan-guage that posit that concepts are represent-ed in the brain’s motor and perceptual sys-tems (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; 2008; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Kemmerer & Gonzalez-Castillo, 2010; Louwerse, 2011; Pulvermüller & Fadiga, 2010; Zwaan, 2003). Understanding language in this view entails co-activation of non-language brain areas that contribute to the meaning implied by the words.  In the current study, we assessed whether such motor involvement takes place in non-native language or second language (L2) processing. There are several reasons why L2 processing might differ from native language (L1, or first language) processing. New lan-guages are often learned in language courses that are impoverished with respect to mean-ing and in which utterances may be less con-textually embedded. As a consequence, an L2 might be weakly entrenched, especially in less proficient bilinguals, and lead to smaller or delayed motor activation during action-related language processing. Alternatively, L2 processing could rely more on motor activa-tion to derive meaning by making concepts more concrete, at least during the early phas-es of acquisition or when the proficiency level is still low. Child language acquisition studies do show that children strongly rely on sen-sorimotor information to obtain meaning (Bloom, 2000; Gentner, 2006). Moreover, children acquire nouns sooner than verbs through interactions with tangible objects (e.g., Gillette, Gleitman, Gleitman, & Lederer, 1999). Accordingly, greater motor involve-ment could be expected if similar mecha-nisms are in place during late L2 acquisition.   
Critically, current models of bilingual pro-cessing do not address the embodied aspect of language processing. These models, how-ever, do describe how meaning is differently retrieved in the two languages. According to the Revised Hierarchical Model (RHM, Kroll & Stewart, 1994), words in the L2 do not have direct access to meaning. Meaning is indirect-ly accessed via words in the L1. More direct links between L2 words and the semantic system are established as L2 proficiency increases (Talamas, Kroll, & Dufour, 1999).   In contrast to RHM’s predictions, beginning L2 learners can already exhibit semantic effects on word retrieval, thus implying that L2 words are mapped to meaning already at the beginning stages (e.g., Altaribba & Mathis, 1997; Brenders, van Hell, & Dijkstra, 2011; de Groot & Poot, 1997; Ferré, Sánchez-Casas, & Guasch, 2006; Guo, Misra, Tam, & Kroll, 2012; McLaughlin, Osterhout, & Kim, 2004; Palmer, van Hooff, & Havelka, 2010; Vigil-Colet, Pé-rez-Ollé, & Garcia-Albea, 2000). Such results are in line with the extended Bilingual Inter-active Activation model (BIA+, Dijkstra & van Heuven, 2002). The BIA+ explains asymme-tries in language dominance and other bilin-gual effects not as due to strength differences in links as described in RHM, but as a conse-quence of the generally lower and slower activation of lexical representations in the L2. Still, even if L1 and L2 words access shared meaning, this does not imply that both lan-guages make use of the same neural struc-tures to the same extent. Indeed, studies have reported overlap during L1 and L2 pro-cessing (e.g., Buchweitz, Shinkareva, Mason, Mitchell, & Just, 2012; Correia et al., 2014), but non-overlapping brain areas were also involved (e.g, Kim, Relkin, Lee, & Hirsch, 1997; Rueschemeyer, Fiebach, Kempe, & Friederici, 2005; Rueschemeyer, Zysset, & Friederici, 2006; for a review, see Indefrey, 2006). Crucially, whether or not L2 pro-cessing entails motor activation for action-related language is unspecified. The goal of the current study was to clarify whether L2 processing leads to embodied effects as in the L1.  
 showed sensitivity to semantic anomalies comparable to the L1 (e.g., Hahne, 2001; Hahne & Friederici, 2001; Weber-Fox & Ne-ville, 1996). Though motor activation can be expected to arise during L2 processing (e.g., Bergen et al., 2010; de Grauwe et al., 2014; Vukovic & Shtyrov, 2014), it is unknown if L2 readers rely on motor activation as an inter-pretive heuristic like they do in silent L1 reading (Chapter III). If so, motor activation effects should exhibit an interaction of con-text and verb meaning. This interaction would be evidence that the motor system not 
only represents the meaning of words, but is also recruited to help make sense of implau-sible descriptions. In contrast, the presence of motor activation without the expected inter-action would suggest a reactive role of the motor system (Chapter IV). This latter out-come would imply that understanding does not necessarily entail full embodied effects. To clarify similarities and differences be-tween L1 and L2, we also performed and reported a between-group comparison using the L1 data from Chapter III.  
 
M  a  t  e  r  i  a  l  s    &    m  e  t  h  o  d  s  
Participants  Twenty-six healthy right-handed German learners of Dutch between ages 21 – 41 years (17 females; mean age = 26.4 years) partici-pated in exchange for course credit or mone-tary compensation. All participants had nor-mal or corrected-to-normal vision and pro-vided their informed consent. At the end of the testing session, proficiency in Dutch was assessed using the Dutch version of LexTALE (Lemhöfer & Broersma, 2012), an un-speeded visual lexical decision task consist-ing of 60 items. The mean score was 79.4 ± 7.6% which we consider as high proficiency 
(comparable to de Grauwe et al., 2014 with a mean score of 78.9 ± 8.03% using partici-pants from the same pool).  After excluding participants with excessive movement artefacts, we conducted analyses on the data from the remaining 24 partici-pants, all of whom performed with a mean accuracy of 94% on catch trials (mean RT = 1,190 ± 323 ms). This study was approved by the local Nijmegen Ethical Committee of the Faculty of Social Sciences (ECG2012-2711-05). 
Stimulus materials The four experimental conditions were as follows (see Table 1 for examples of each; see Appendix 4 for complete stimulus materials): Plausible Action Verb, Plausible Non-Action Verb, Implausible Action Verb, and Implausi-ble Non-Action Verb. To clarify, Plausibility refers to a manipulation of semantic congru-ency that describes an action that could be performed or not. Action Verb refers to a verb that defines the action to be performed on the objects (i.e., pushing trolleys refers to the act of extending both arms slightly in front of the body). By contrast, a Non-Action Verb does a poor job at defining the action (e.g., one can deliver trolleys by transporting them in a truck, shipped by cargo, etc.). A separate group of participants (n = 10) that did not participate in the EEG experiment provided ratings for each condition on se-mantic congruency and action specificity, confirming the intended manipulations.  
Identical stimulus materials from Chapter IV were used. Each condition consisted of 36 sentences in Dutch. Every sentence contained an object noun in the second position and the critical verb in the fifth; sentences were be-tween seven to nine words long. We avoided wrap-up effects in the ERPs by not placing the verb at the end of the sentence (Hagoort, Brown, & Osterhout, 1999). We primarily used non-particle verbs like ‘levert’ (delivers), but to reduce the variation in word length, particle verbs like ‘weg+duwt’ (pushes away) were also used; a previous study reported that particle verbs are pro-cessed as a single lexical unit (Cappelle, Shtyrov, & Pulvermüller, 2010, but see Piai, Meyer, Schreuder, & Bastiaansen, 2013). Verbs were matched for length and frequency based on SUBTLEX-NL (Keuleers, Brysbaert, & New, 2010; see Table 2), and each verb was 
 directionality of the expected effects; in par-ticular, a decrease in mu power measured around central sites is taken to reflect greater motor activation (e.g., Neuper, Wörtz, & Pfurtscheller, 2006; Pfurtscheller & Neuper, 2001; Pineda, 2005; Salenius, Schnitzler, Salmelin, Jousmäki, & Hari, 1997; Salmelin & Hari, 1994). This locus specificity prevents conflation with posterior alpha effects which occur within the same frequency band and have been associated with attentional and visual processing (e.g., Bastiaansen & Brunia, 2001; Klimesch, Sauseng, Hanslmayr, Gruber, & Freunberger, 2007). Indeed, in addition to Chapters III and IV, other recent EEG studies indicate that linguistic stimuli can elicit mo-tor activation as indexed by mu oscillations (van Elk, van Schie, Zwaan, & Bekkering, 2010; Moreno, de Vega, & León, 2013; More-no et al., 2015; Vukovic & Shtyrov, 2014).  As expected, implausible descriptions elicited a larger N400 component relative to plausi-ble descriptions, thus yielding an N400 con-gruence effect. Notably, sentences describing plausible actions elicited motor activation patterns according to implied verb meaning (e.g., “The trolleys that she pushes/delivers are broken”; see Figure 1, left, in Chapter III), as measured by mu activity (8 - 12 Hz) on the critical verbs (see supporting fMRI evidence using single words by van Dam, Rueschemey-er, & Bekkering, 2010; and behavioural evi-dence using verb-noun pairs by Marino, Gallese, Buccino, & Riggio, 2012). Interesting-ly, sentences describing implausible actions also elicited motor activation patterns. How-ever, the patterns did not reflect verb mean-ing, as in the plausible context (e.g., “The trolleys that she sews/heals are broken”; see Figure 1, right, in Chapter III). The differenti-ated patterns of motor involvement accord-ing to contextual plausibility depicted the 
motor system as a proactive interpretive heuristic: Beyond representing the meaning of words, the motor system was also recruit-ed to help make sense of implausible descrip-tions. This finding may help explain how readers make sense of novel or unconven-tional actions (e.g., “drumming with branch-es” in Chwilla, Kolk, & Vissers, 2007)   At the same time, the motor system does not always function as an interpretive heuristic. As reported in Chapter IV, one group of par-ticipants actively searched for a letter within the object noun and action verb of a sentence. This task was intended to direct attention away from meaning. Another group was asked to judge whether the combination of the object noun and action verb made sense. This task was intended to assess whether motor activation necessarily accompanies explicit evaluation of semantic properties. Importantly, however, no explicit mention of 
motor meaning was made in the instructions to avoid biasing, nor was any concurrent manual response required.  Remarkably, though N400 congruence effects indexing access to meaning were observed in both tasks, neither group exhibited context-sensitive motor activation patterns consistent with the interpretive heuristic account (Chap-ter III). Instead, the undifferentiated motor activation patterns to meaning and context suggested a reactive motor involvement in such tasks. Importantly, understanding ac-tion-related language does not necessarily entail full involvement of the motor system, even for explicit semantic decisions.   Based on these findings in the L1, the current investigation aims to specify the form of motor involvement (i.e., proactive vs. reac-tive) during silent reading in the L2.  
The present study Bilingual studies suggest that L1 and L2 pro-cessing can differ due to the acquisition his-tories of the two languages. Still, it is unclear if the motor system plays a similar functional role in the L2 as in the L1. To examine this issue, the contextual manipulation of plausi-bility and differences in verb specificity pre-viously tested with L1 readers (Chapters III and IV) constitute an ideal test for L2 readers 
as well. The current study therefore again implemented the silent reading task de-scribed in Chapter III, which resulted in con-text-sensitive motor activation in L1 readers, to see if a similar outcome in the L2 can be found.  For the L2, we predicted an N400 congruence effect, in line with previous L2 studies that 
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 showed sensitivity to semantic anomalies comparable to the L1 (e.g., Hahne, 2001; Hahne & Friederici, 2001; Weber-Fox & Ne-ville, 1996). Though motor activation can be expected to arise during L2 processing (e.g., Bergen et al., 2010; de Grauwe et al., 2014; Vukovic & Shtyrov, 2014), it is unknown if L2 readers rely on motor activation as an inter-pretive heuristic like they do in silent L1 reading (Chapter III). If so, motor activation effects should exhibit an interaction of con-text and verb meaning. This interaction would be evidence that the motor system not 
only represents the meaning of words, but is also recruited to help make sense of implau-sible descriptions. In contrast, the presence of motor activation without the expected inter-action would suggest a reactive role of the motor system (Chapter IV). This latter out-come would imply that understanding does not necessarily entail full embodied effects. To clarify similarities and differences be-tween L1 and L2, we also performed and reported a between-group comparison using the L1 data from Chapter III.  
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Participants  Twenty-six healthy right-handed German learners of Dutch between ages 21 – 41 years (17 females; mean age = 26.4 years) partici-pated in exchange for course credit or mone-tary compensation. All participants had nor-mal or corrected-to-normal vision and pro-vided their informed consent. At the end of the testing session, proficiency in Dutch was assessed using the Dutch version of LexTALE (Lemhöfer & Broersma, 2012), an un-speeded visual lexical decision task consist-ing of 60 items. The mean score was 79.4 ± 7.6% which we consider as high proficiency 
(comparable to de Grauwe et al., 2014 with a mean score of 78.9 ± 8.03% using partici-pants from the same pool).  After excluding participants with excessive movement artefacts, we conducted analyses on the data from the remaining 24 partici-pants, all of whom performed with a mean accuracy of 94% on catch trials (mean RT = 1,190 ± 323 ms). This study was approved by the local Nijmegen Ethical Committee of the Faculty of Social Sciences (ECG2012-2711-05). 
Stimulus materials The four experimental conditions were as follows (see Table 1 for examples of each; see Appendix 4 for complete stimulus materials): Plausible Action Verb, Plausible Non-Action Verb, Implausible Action Verb, and Implausi-ble Non-Action Verb. To clarify, Plausibility refers to a manipulation of semantic congru-ency that describes an action that could be performed or not. Action Verb refers to a verb that defines the action to be performed on the objects (i.e., pushing trolleys refers to the act of extending both arms slightly in front of the body). By contrast, a Non-Action Verb does a poor job at defining the action (e.g., one can deliver trolleys by transporting them in a truck, shipped by cargo, etc.). A separate group of participants (n = 10) that did not participate in the EEG experiment provided ratings for each condition on se-mantic congruency and action specificity, confirming the intended manipulations.  
Identical stimulus materials from Chapter IV were used. Each condition consisted of 36 sentences in Dutch. Every sentence contained an object noun in the second position and the critical verb in the fifth; sentences were be-tween seven to nine words long. We avoided wrap-up effects in the ERPs by not placing the verb at the end of the sentence (Hagoort, Brown, & Osterhout, 1999). We primarily used non-particle verbs like ‘levert’ (delivers), but to reduce the variation in word length, particle verbs like ‘weg+duwt’ (pushes away) were also used; a previous study reported that particle verbs are pro-cessed as a single lexical unit (Cappelle, Shtyrov, & Pulvermüller, 2010, but see Piai, Meyer, Schreuder, & Bastiaansen, 2013). Verbs were matched for length and frequency based on SUBTLEX-NL (Keuleers, Brysbaert, & New, 2010; see Table 2), and each verb was 
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as well. The current study therefore again implemented the silent reading task de-scribed in Chapter III, which resulted in con-text-sensitive motor activation in L1 readers, to see if a similar outcome in the L2 can be found.  For the L2, we predicted an N400 congruence effect, in line with previous L2 studies that 
 
Procedure Participants sat approximately 80 cm away from the computer screen in a dimly lit sound- and electrically-shielded booth. We presented the sentence stimuli using a PC running Presentation software (Neurobehav-ioural Systems, Albany, NY, USA). Button presses with the index fingers of each hand were recorded using a response box centred in front of the participant. We displayed each word at the centre for 350 ms, followed by a blank screen for another 350 ms, yielding a 700 ms inter-stimulus interval. The last word of the sentence was presented together with 
a period. On catch trials, the sentence was followed by a memory probe that remained on the screen until participants responded. Trials were separated by an asterisk at the centre for 3,000 ms and we encouraged par-ticipants to blink only during this time. Words were presented on a black back-ground using a white Arial font with size 20. Each of the three blocks lasted approximately 20 minutes separated by breaks of about 1 minute. The total duration of a session was approximately two hours including set-up and clean-up. 
Recording We recorded the electroencephalogram (EEG) from 64 active electrodes placed in an actiCAP using Brain Vision Recorder (Brain Products GmbH, Munich, Germany); the elec-trode positions conform to the International 10-20 system. During recording, electrodes were referenced to the left mastoid but re-
referenced offline to the average of left and right mastoids. We kept impedance levels 
below 10 kΩ and used two 32-channel Brain-Amp DC EEG amplifiers to amplify the signals. The EEG and EOG signals were sampled at 500 Hz with a 100 Hz high cut-off filter and a 10s time constant. 
 
 
Table 3 Mean sentence ratings for semantic congruency, action specificity, and imageability on a 5-point Likert scale (e.g., “Does the sentence clearly describe a particular action to perform?” 1 = No, not at all, 5 = Yes, absolutely). Standard de-viation is given in parentheses.  plausible 
action verb 
plausible 
non-action verb 
implausible 
action verb 
implausible 
non-action verb semantic congruency 4.14 (0.8) 4.10 (0.7) 1.87 (0.7) 1.68 (0.7) action specificity 4.13 (0.5) 2.95 (0.8) 3.24 (0.5) 2.18 (0.7) imageability 4.20 (0.6) 3.90 (0.8) 2.14 (0.6) 1.88 (0.6) 
Analysis We performed pre-processing of the EEG data in Brain Vision Analyzer (Brain Products GmbH, Munich, Germany). Importantly, as described in Chapters III and IV, both the N400 and mu signals on the verb were ana-lysed (1) because, to elicit an N400 congru-ence effect, it represents the first moment at which sufficient information is available to establish whether an action is plausible or not having encountered the object- and agent-nouns, and (2) to directly relate con-current motor activation with the N400 ef-fect. The EEG segments were made from -200 to 700 ms relative to the verb onset. We re-
moved artifacts using a semi-automatic visual inspection procedure; no more than 4% of trials were removed for each condition in both tasks.  For the N400 ERP analysis, the dependent variable is the mean amplitude between 300 and 500 ms. A baseline correction was ap-plied to each trial from -150 ms to verb onset. To establish that an N400 congruence effect obtained, analyses were performed on the Cz electrode typically reported as a representa-tive channel in N400 studies (e.g., Chwilla, Brown, & Hagoort, 1995; Hald, Bastiaansen, & 
 paired with four different object nouns to reduce systematic effects due to nouns such as word frequency, word length, familiarity, and cloze probability. Participants only read one pair of the four possible combinations. Because the N400 component is sensitive to differences in frequency, we avoided making comparisons in the following cases where frequency could not be matched: Congruent Action Verb and Congruent Non-Action Verb, and Incongruent Action Verb and Incongru-ent Non-Action.  
After the experiment, participants rated all sentences for semantic congruency, action specificity, and imageability. The order of their ratings was counterbalanced. The statis-tical results confirmed our manipulations of semantic congruency and action specificity (see Table 3). We also collected imageability ratings as an additional measure. The instruc-tions for the Semantic, Action, and Imageabil-ity ratings were as follows: Does the sentence make sense? Does the sentence describe an event that consists of a series of movements? Does the sentence describe a situation that is easy to imagine?  
 
Table 1 Example stimuli of the four conditions in Dutch with English translations provided. Critical verbs are in bold type. 
plausible 
action verb 
De winkelkarretjes/kinderwagens/maaiers/deuren die hij wegduwt zijn gebroken. 
The trolleys/strollers/lawnmowers/doors that he pushes (away) are broken. 
plausible 
non-action verb 
De winkelkarretjes/kinderwagens/maaiers/deuren die hij levert zijn gebroken. 
The trolleys/strollers/lawnmowers/doors that he delivers are broken. 
implausible 
action verb 
De winkelkarretjes/kinderwagens/maaiers/deuren die zij aannaait zijn gebroken. 
The trolleys/strollers/lawnmowers/doors that she sews (on) are broken. 
implausible 
non-action verb 
De winkelkarretjes/kinderwagens/maaiers/deuren die zij geneest zijn gebroken. 
The trolleys/strollers/lawnmowers/doors that she heals are broken. 
Design Each participant read 195 sentences across three blocks: 65 trials per block, of which the first five were dummy trials similar to critical items. The order of the sentences was pseu-do-randomised so that no more than three consecutive trials were from the same condi-tion. As a result, eight experimental lists were generated using the Latin square design and randomly assigned to participants. On catch trials, after a sentence was presented, partic-
ipants responded with a button press using their index fingers (right button for ‘yes’, left button for ‘no’) to indicate whether or not they saw the displayed word in the preceding sentence. Forty-eight such memory probes appeared once every three to five trials. A practice block of 10 trials similar to the ex-perimental stimuli was first administered and repeated when necessary. 
 
Table 2 Mean length (characters) and frequency (per million) of verbs in each experimental condition (standard deviation in parentheses).   plausible 
action verb 
plausible 
non-action verb 
implausible 
action verb 
implausible 
non-action verb length 7.4 (1.7) 7.7 (1.6) 7.3 (1.5) 7.2 (1.5) frequency 1.7 (0.7) 1.9 (0.9) 1.6 (0.7) 1.8 (0.6) 
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Procedure Participants sat approximately 80 cm away from the computer screen in a dimly lit sound- and electrically-shielded booth. We presented the sentence stimuli using a PC running Presentation software (Neurobehav-ioural Systems, Albany, NY, USA). Button presses with the index fingers of each hand were recorded using a response box centred in front of the participant. We displayed each word at the centre for 350 ms, followed by a blank screen for another 350 ms, yielding a 700 ms inter-stimulus interval. The last word of the sentence was presented together with 
a period. On catch trials, the sentence was followed by a memory probe that remained on the screen until participants responded. Trials were separated by an asterisk at the centre for 3,000 ms and we encouraged par-ticipants to blink only during this time. Words were presented on a black back-ground using a white Arial font with size 20. Each of the three blocks lasted approximately 20 minutes separated by breaks of about 1 minute. The total duration of a session was approximately two hours including set-up and clean-up. 
Recording We recorded the electroencephalogram (EEG) from 64 active electrodes placed in an actiCAP using Brain Vision Recorder (Brain Products GmbH, Munich, Germany); the elec-trode positions conform to the International 10-20 system. During recording, electrodes were referenced to the left mastoid but re-
referenced offline to the average of left and right mastoids. We kept impedance levels 
below 10 kΩ and used two 32-channel Brain-Amp DC EEG amplifiers to amplify the signals. The EEG and EOG signals were sampled at 500 Hz with a 100 Hz high cut-off filter and a 10s time constant. 
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Analysis We performed pre-processing of the EEG data in Brain Vision Analyzer (Brain Products GmbH, Munich, Germany). Importantly, as described in Chapters III and IV, both the N400 and mu signals on the verb were ana-lysed (1) because, to elicit an N400 congru-ence effect, it represents the first moment at which sufficient information is available to establish whether an action is plausible or not having encountered the object- and agent-nouns, and (2) to directly relate con-current motor activation with the N400 ef-fect. The EEG segments were made from -200 to 700 ms relative to the verb onset. We re-
moved artifacts using a semi-automatic visual inspection procedure; no more than 4% of trials were removed for each condition in both tasks.  For the N400 ERP analysis, the dependent variable is the mean amplitude between 300 and 500 ms. A baseline correction was ap-plied to each trial from -150 ms to verb onset. To establish that an N400 congruence effect obtained, analyses were performed on the Cz electrode typically reported as a representa-tive channel in N400 studies (e.g., Chwilla, Brown, & Hagoort, 1995; Hald, Bastiaansen, & 
 paired with four different object nouns to reduce systematic effects due to nouns such as word frequency, word length, familiarity, and cloze probability. Participants only read one pair of the four possible combinations. Because the N400 component is sensitive to differences in frequency, we avoided making comparisons in the following cases where frequency could not be matched: Congruent Action Verb and Congruent Non-Action Verb, and Incongruent Action Verb and Incongru-ent Non-Action.  
After the experiment, participants rated all sentences for semantic congruency, action specificity, and imageability. The order of their ratings was counterbalanced. The statis-tical results confirmed our manipulations of semantic congruency and action specificity (see Table 3). We also collected imageability ratings as an additional measure. The instruc-tions for the Semantic, Action, and Imageabil-ity ratings were as follows: Does the sentence make sense? Does the sentence describe an event that consists of a series of movements? Does the sentence describe a situation that is easy to imagine?  
 
Table 1 Example stimuli of the four conditions in Dutch with English translations provided. Critical verbs are in bold type. 
plausible 
action verb 
De winkelkarretjes/kinderwagens/maaiers/deuren die hij wegduwt zijn gebroken. 
The trolleys/strollers/lawnmowers/doors that he pushes (away) are broken. 
plausible 
non-action verb 
De winkelkarretjes/kinderwagens/maaiers/deuren die hij levert zijn gebroken. 
The trolleys/strollers/lawnmowers/doors that he delivers are broken. 
implausible 
action verb 
De winkelkarretjes/kinderwagens/maaiers/deuren die zij aannaait zijn gebroken. 
The trolleys/strollers/lawnmowers/doors that she sews (on) are broken. 
implausible 
non-action verb 
De winkelkarretjes/kinderwagens/maaiers/deuren die zij geneest zijn gebroken. 
The trolleys/strollers/lawnmowers/doors that she heals are broken. 
Design Each participant read 195 sentences across three blocks: 65 trials per block, of which the first five were dummy trials similar to critical items. The order of the sentences was pseu-do-randomised so that no more than three consecutive trials were from the same condi-tion. As a result, eight experimental lists were generated using the Latin square design and randomly assigned to participants. On catch trials, after a sentence was presented, partic-
ipants responded with a button press using their index fingers (right button for ‘yes’, left button for ‘no’) to indicate whether or not they saw the displayed word in the preceding sentence. Forty-eight such memory probes appeared once every three to five trials. A practice block of 10 trials similar to the ex-perimental stimuli was first administered and repeated when necessary. 
 
Table 2 Mean length (characters) and frequency (per million) of verbs in each experimental condition (standard deviation in parentheses).   plausible 
action verb 
plausible 
non-action verb 
implausible 
action verb 
implausible 
non-action verb length 7.4 (1.7) 7.7 (1.6) 7.3 (1.5) 7.2 (1.5) frequency 1.7 (0.7) 1.9 (0.9) 1.6 (0.7) 1.8 (0.6) 
 
 
Fig. 2 The time-frequency representations of the manipulation of action specifici-ty based on channel C4 indicated with an asterisk. Boxed area indicates time win-dow (300 – 500 ms) used to calculate power differences for the mu-frequency band (8 – 12 Hz). Left. The time-frequency representations for the Action Specific and Non-Action Specific Verb conditions and the difference between these condi-tions, as measured on the critical verbs. Right. Difference topography for the be-tween-condition comparison is shown for these time and frequency windows.  
 
N400 analysis A simple t-test confirmed that the Incongru-ent condition elicited a larger negative mean amplitude than the Congruent condition, 
t(47) = 3.62, p < .001 (Table 4). This result showed that L2 readers elicited an N400 
congruence effect while reading in the L2 (Figure 1). The topography of the effect is similar to that reported in L1 readers (e.g., Chapters III and IV; Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). 
Mu analysis In the previous L1 variants of the study (Chapters III and IV), we found interactions between Congruency, Action, and Hemi-sphere, or the lack thereof, that characterised the motor system according to one of two roles. Thus, we expected particular effects to be replicated if the motor system also con-tributes similarly in L2 processing. To this end, we conducted a Congruency * Action * Hemisphere analysis. No significant effects were found. Namely, the following interac-tions of interest did not yield statistically significant effects: Congruency * Action * Hemisphere, F(1,23) < 1, p = .909; Congruen-cy * Action, F(1,23) < 1, p = .995; and Action * Hemisphere, F(1,23) < 1, p = .426.  These results indicate that a mu difference in the form of the Congruency * Action interac-tion reported in L1 (Chapter III) was not found. However, it is important to determine if there is nevertheless motor activation during verb processing in L2 readers. To this end, we performed a Hemisphere * Action * 
Baseline analysis to test whether there was a decrease in mu power (i.e., motor activation) on the verb relative to the preceding word. A significant main effect of Baseline, F(1,47) = 9.547; p = .003, indeed confirmed the pres-ence of motor activation (see blue regions in left panel of Figure 2).  A two-tailed Area (C3, O1) * Action analysis partially supported the claim that mu activity can be dissociated from concurrent posterior 
alpha activity in a significant main effect of Area, F(1,49) = 15.036, p < .001. However, a non-significant Area * Action interaction, 
F(1,49) = 0.090, p = .765, left open the possi-bility that both areas responded similarly to the Action manipulation. To address this, two post-hoc analyses (two-tailed) were conduct-ed. Firstly, a two-tailed Plausibility * Action * Hemisphere analyses on O1 and O2 did not replicate any of the effects reported for C3 and C4. There was neither an Action * Hemi-sphere interaction, F(1,24) = 0.688, p = .422, nor a main effect of Action, F(1,24) = 0.490, p 
 Hagoort, 2006; Wang, Bastiaansen, Yang, & Hagoort, 2011) and on the basis of Chapters III and IV. The effect was also verified by its centroparietal scalp distribution which in-cludes Cz (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011).  For the mu frequency analysis, the dependent variable was mean absolute mu power be-tween 300 and 500 ms for the frequency range 8 – 12 Hz measured from channels C3 (left-hemisphere) and C4 (right-hemisphere). These channels were selected based on pre-vious studies measuring mu activity (e.g., Moreno, de Vega, León, 2013; Muthukumar-aswamy & Johnson, 2004; Oberman et al., 2005) including Chapters III and IV. Thus the factor Hemisphere was included to test for possible lateralisation of the mu effects. The 
resulting subject-averaged power changes in the post-verb onset interval were expressed as an absolute change from the baseline in-terval from -150 ms to verb onset.   Concerns about the overlapping frequency range between mu and alpha were addressed post-hoc by performing an Area * Action analyses to determine that the predicted effects occur exclusively in the motor chan-nels (e.g., C3 vs. O1 or C4 vs. O2 depending on the lateralisation of the effects). Also, a Plau-sibility * Action * Hemisphere was conducted on O1 and O2 to verify that the effects do not replicate in these channels. All p-values are two-tailed; only statistically significant and predicted effects are reported.  
R  e  s  u  l  t  s  
Within-group comparison: L2 data L2 readers’ sensitivity to differences in con-textual plausibility was assessed with a sim-ple t-test performed on N400 ERP data. Spe-cifically, the mean amplitude in the Incongru-ent condition was compared to the Congruent condition. To assess motor activation, the predicted mu difference was tested in a Con-
gruency * Action * Hemisphere analysis. Furthermore, to establish whether mu fre-quency power was at all modulated by verb comprehension (i.e., if motor activation was present), an Action * Baseline (pre-verb, verb) analysis was conducted.  
 
Fig. 1 Left. The averaged ERP waveforms for the four conditions showing the two main comparisons of semantic congruency as measured on the critical verbs. The ERP waveform plots are based on the Cz channel indicated with asterisk. The N400 effect was measured between the 300 – 500 ms time window. Note that negative values are plotted downwards. Right. Difference topography for the be-tween-condition comparison. 
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Fig. 2 The time-frequency representations of the manipulation of action specifici-ty based on channel C4 indicated with an asterisk. Boxed area indicates time win-dow (300 – 500 ms) used to calculate power differences for the mu-frequency band (8 – 12 Hz). Left. The time-frequency representations for the Action Specific and Non-Action Specific Verb conditions and the difference between these condi-tions, as measured on the critical verbs. Right. Difference topography for the be-tween-condition comparison is shown for these time and frequency windows.  
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Within-group comparison: L2 data L2 readers’ sensitivity to differences in con-textual plausibility was assessed with a sim-ple t-test performed on N400 ERP data. Spe-cifically, the mean amplitude in the Incongru-ent condition was compared to the Congruent condition. To assess motor activation, the predicted mu difference was tested in a Con-
gruency * Action * Hemisphere analysis. Furthermore, to establish whether mu fre-quency power was at all modulated by verb comprehension (i.e., if motor activation was present), an Action * Baseline (pre-verb, verb) analysis was conducted.  
 
Fig. 1 Left. The averaged ERP waveforms for the four conditions showing the two main comparisons of semantic congruency as measured on the critical verbs. The ERP waveform plots are based on the Cz channel indicated with asterisk. The N400 effect was measured between the 300 – 500 ms time window. Note that negative values are plotted downwards. Right. Difference topography for the be-tween-condition comparison. 
  
 
 
Mu analysis In Chapter III, a Congruency * Action interac-tion was found for the L1 group; thus, we expected to find either a Congruency * Action interaction for the combined L1-L2 analysis if there are no group differences, or a Congru-ency * Action * Language Group interaction if the effect is specific to the L1. The combined results suggested that the L2 group was quantitatively, but not qualitatively different from the L1 group. Specifically, there was only a trend towards a significant Congruen-cy * Action * Language Group interaction, 
F(1,47) = 3.293, p = .076. Furthermore, there was a non-significant Congruency * Action interaction, F(1,47) = 3.306, p = .075, imply-ing that the L2 diminished the L1 effects when both datasets were combined. Thus, although some trends were noted, the anal-yses did not result in any significant differ-ences between the L1 and L2 groups.  
When Hemisphere was considered, no fur-ther differences were found either: The four-way interaction between Congruency * Action * Hemisphere * Language Group was not significant, F(1,47) = 1.318, p = .257, and likewise for the Hemisphere * Language Group interaction, F(1,47) = 2.432, p = .126.  Thus, the combined dataset did not show lateralised effects of contextual plausibility and verb meaning (Table 5). None of the other effects were significant, F’s < 3.00. Altogether, the present analyses suggest similar N400 results in the L1 and L2, but quantitatively different mu results with re-spect to contextual plausibility and verb meaning.  
D  i  s  c  u  s  s  i  o  n  The goal of the current study was to test whether and to what extent an embodied view of language applies to L2 readers. Spe-cifically, we examined how L2 readers make sense of action descriptions and whether the motor system is involved during L2 pro-cessing in ways similar to L1 processing (Chapters III and IV). As expected, sentences describing implausible actions elicited a larger negative N400 amplitude relative to sentences describing plausible actions. This result confirmed that L2 readers processed these sentences meaningfully in a silent read-ing task. However, although motor activation was indeed present, there was no interaction of context and verb meaning in mu activity. Crucially, the undifferentiated motor activa-tion patterns to meaning and plausibility suggest a passive form of motor involvement during L2 processing, contrary to a previous study with L1 readers with a similar experi-mental setup (Chapter III; Lam, Bastiaansen, Dijkstra, & Rueschemeyer, 2016). Rather, silently reading action-related language in the L2 can take place without extensive contribu-tion from the motor system.  On the one hand, the current finding of motor activation is in line with L2 studies discussed previously and extends previous work on 
single-word processing at the behavioural (Bergen et al., 2010), neuroanatomical (de Grauwe et al., 2014), and neurophysiological levels (Vukovic & Shtyrov, 2014). For exam-ple, participants in a word-picture matching task had to determine whether a verb like ‘run’ was correctly depicted in a picture of a stick-man figure (Bergen, Lau, Narayanan, Stojanovic, & Wheeler, 2010). Whenever the action denoted by the verb and the picture shared the same effector, participants showed interference effects (i.e., longer re-sponse times). Both L1 and L2 English speak-ers exhibited this pattern of results, although greater L2 proficiency led to more L1-like interference effects. In this regard, a recent EEG priming study (Vukovic & Shtyrov, 2014) confirmed that the effects may be weaker in the L2, because L2 words and their meanings are less integrated than in the L1. A recent fMRI study (de Grauwe et al., 2014) also showed motor activation during verb reading in the L2 and further ruled out the effect as dependent on cognates (i.e., words similar in form and meaning between two languages).  On the other hand, the current finding pre-sents an alternative form of motor involve-ment. In Chapter III, L1 readers exhibited context-sensitivity in the form of an N400 
 = 0.491. Secondly, a two-tailed t-test compar-ison between the Action conditions was per-formed on O1 to replicate the comparison performed on C3. The comparison yielded a 
non-significant difference, t(49) = -1.257, p = .215, thus excluding the possibility of a con-fluence between alpha and mu activity.  
Between-group comparison: L1 vs. L2 data The current L2 results and those presented in Chapter III for L1 indicated the presence of similar N400 effects in each language group, but differences in interactions for mu. If the differences between language groups in N400 effects and in mu interactions are quantita-tive rather than qualitative, one would expect only small and possibly non-significant inter-actions with the factor Language Group. Thus, to clarify to what extent aspects of L1 and L2 processing are similar or different, the data from Chapter III were included in a Congru-
ency * Language Group analysis with Lan-guage Group as a between-subjects factor on the N400 data. In addition, a Congruency * Action * Hemisphere * Language Group anal-ysis was performed on the mu data. Note that the L1 study consisted of 21 critical sentences per condition (vs. 36 in the current study); nonetheless, the manipulations are identical. Importantly, the observation of interest is whether the L2 also reveals the interaction of contextual plausibility and meaning with mu data. 
 
Table 4 Mean amplitude and standard deviation values measured on Cz for the manipulation of plausibility for the L1 and the L2.  
plausible implausible  L1 -2.45 ± 3.51 µV -3.41 ± 3.61 µV  L2 -0.98 ± 3.12 µV -2.29 ± 3.50 µV  
 
Table 5 Mean power (µV2) and standard deviation values measured on C4 for the manipulations of plausibility and action verb (i.e., verb meaning) for the L1 and the L2.  plausible 
action verb 
plausible 
non-action verb 
implausible 
action verb 
implausible 
non-action verb L1 -1.56 ± 4.9 0.91 ± 4.2 -0.77 ± 2.6 -1.35 ± 3.6 L2 -0.55 ± 2.4 -0.35 ± 1.1 -0.80 ± 2.6 -0.56 ± 1.3 
 
N400 analysis A Congruency * Language Group analysis did not yield a significant interaction, F(1,96) = .421, p = .52. However, a significant main effect of Congruency, F(1,96) = 17.821, p < .001, confirmed that both groups elicited N400 congruence effects (Table 4). There was also a trend towards a main effect of Lan-guage Group, F(1,96) = 3.547, p = .063. This may reflect inherent differences between L1 
and L2 participants. To verify that the Con-gruency effect holds, a univariate test on the difference values between the congruent and incongruent stimuli was performed to reduce inter-group variability. This analysis did not yield an effect of Language Group, F(1,96) = .419, p = .52, ruling out unexplained group differences as driving the Congruency effects.  
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 bilingual processing with regard to general differences between L1 and L2 processing (e.g., Dijkstra & van Heuven, 2002; Duyck & Brysbaert, 2004; Finkbeiner et al., 2004; Kroll & Stewart, 1994).   Critically, more theory-driven investigations can be conducted when bilingual models take explicit account of which (embodied) aspects of L1 and L2 representations are shared. As previously discussed, the RHM (Kroll & Stew-art, 1994) posits that L2 words access their meaning indirectly via L1 words, while the BIA+ model (Dijkstra & van Heuven, 2002) posits direct access to L2 meaning. Progress might be made if both models specify how and which non-language aspects of meaning (action, perceptual, emotion) contribute to L1 and L2 representation and processing. 
 Likewise, embodied theories of language do not make explicit predictions concerning L2 processing. An implicit assumption is that L1 and L2 representations and processes do not differ qualitatively. However, an L2 learned later in life is subject to different circum-stances with non-trivial consequences. An L2 learned in a formal classroom setting (involv-ing, for example, rote learning of word pairs) offers substantially different experiences from an L2 learned under immersion condi-
tions. In effect, conceptual representations of action words stored in the temporal and motor cortices (Papeo, Lingnau, Agosta, Pas-cual-Leone, & Caramazza, 2015) may be functionally less entrenched for the L2. The current study shows that motor activation is indeed present during L2 sentence pro-cessing but its contribution may be limited, at least in a silent reading task.   In this regard, the finding of minimal motor activation is consistent with the view that linguistic representations may be sufficient to provide meaning because “language encodes perceptual information” (Louwerse, 2011, p. 279). More generally, this finding is con-sistent with the observation that incomplete but “good enough” representations are suffi-cient to yield meaning (e.g., Ferreira, Bailey, & Ferraro, 2002; Ferreira & Patson, 2007). Such under-specifications in meaning are econom-ical because they may require fewer neural resources and less processing time (e.g., Sanford & Graesser, 2006; Sanford & Sturt, 2002). This is not to say that L2 readers can-not recruit the motor system in the same way as in L1, or that L2 comprehension is neces-sarily impoverished. Rather, partial motor involvement may highlight an alternative means to understanding. 
C  o  n  c  l  u  s  i  o  n  s  To summarise, this is the first study to show that action-related sentence processing in the L2 does result in motor activation alongside N400 effects. However, in contrast to L1 processing, the motor system is not proac-tively recruited so as to exhibit patterns reflective of the verb’s meaning, nor does motor involvement differ by context (cf. Chapter III). Bilingual models and embodied theories of language, therefore, need to con-sider the unique linguistic experiences of the bilingual because (1) sensorimotor contribu-
tions to each language may differ within the same speaker, and (2) such contributions may change dynamically with more or less exposure to the L1 and the L2, as well as the manner by which they were learned. Lan-guage users (L1 and L2 readers) may possess the same neural resources for understanding language, but the relative contribution of particular resources (e.g., the motor system) also reflects differences in embodied experi-ences tied to each language. 
 
 
 
 
 congruence effect while they silently read sentences describing plausible and implausi-ble actions. Reading sentences describing plausible actions elicited greater motor acti-vation to action-specific verbs relative to action non-specific verbs. In this regard, motor activation patterns reflected verb meaning. More importantly, the pattern of motor activation for sentences describing 
implausible actions led to a proactive inter-pretive heuristic account, according to which the motor system acts as a means to derive meaning. If motor activation reflects word meaning only, the same motor activation patterns should have been observed regard-less of contextual plausibility. Yet, the finding that motor activation persisted even for de-scriptions of implausible actions suggests that readers attempted to make sense of the input through motor simulation. The current results suggest that this account does not extend to L2 processing as implemented here. Specifically, though L2 readers were sensitive to contextual plausibility, the motor activa-tion patterns suggest that the motor system was not fully involved in making sense of the input. Understanding action-related language can indeed proceed with limited motor in-volvement.  Crucially, the lack of an interaction cannot be attributed to the absence of semantic pro-cessing in L2 readers, as substantiated by a robust N400 effect. Previous studies show that L2 users are sensitive to semantic anom-alies in comparable ways to L1 users (e.g., Hahne, 2001; Hahne & Friederici, 2001; Rueschemeyer, Fiebach, Kempe, & Friederici, 2005; Weber-Fox & Neville, 1996). Moreover, in the current study, the participants’ level of L2 proficiency was high as determined by an offline vocabulary test. Their scores were similar to those reported in de Grauwe et al. (2014) and Vukovic and Shtyrov (2014). In other words, the results cannot be attributed 
to weak semantic processing or low L2 profi-ciency.  Rather, the motor activation patterns report-ed here are reminiscient of those in Chapter IV in which we compared two language tasks in L1 readers. In spite of robust N400 effects, motor activation patterns were neither mod-ulated by verb meaning nor by context. To-gether, these results were taken as evidence of limited, or partial, motor involvement during action-related language processing. By extension, the current results suggest that silent reading in the L2 likewise does not fully engage the motor system.  Interestingly, the finding of “partial” motor involvement fits with a recent report on the processing of emotion words in the L2. In Foroni (2015), participants read positive and negative emotion sentences, but they were also engaged in a spatial-classification task on alternate trials. Muscle activity was measured on the left zygomatic major, a muscle that contracts on smiling. The sentences were presented in the affirmative and negated forms (e.g., “I am (not) smiling”, “I am (not) frowning”). Affirmative sentences in the L2 elicited activation of the relevant facial mus-cle (i.e., “I am smiling” contracts the zygomat-ic muscle; “I am frowning” does not), replicat-ing a similar effect in the L1 (Foroni & Semin, 2013). However, negated sentences in the L2 did not produce relaxation/inhibition of the same muscle as reported in the L1. Moreover, effects in the L2 were smaller and slower than in the L1. The cross-linguistic compari-son led the authors to suggest that the L2 produces only partial simulation. Likewise, the current results along with those of a previous study (Vukovic & Shtyrov, 2014) can be interpreted as partial motor simula-tion by which understanding action descrip-tions in the L2 involves only limited motor activity. 
Implications for bilingual models and embodied theories of language The current study raises new considerations for bilingual processing. As noted, bilingual models of language processing do not explic-itly address the issue of embodied represen-tations. Our results, along with those previ-ously discussed, indicate that embodied rep-resentations do play a role in L2 processing, 
revealing, in some instances, similarities between the L1 and the L2 in motor activa-tion (de Grauwe et al., 2014). At the same time, we found that L2 processing may also show weaker embodied effects (cf. Bergen et 
al., 2010; Vukovic & Shtyrov, 2014). These observations agree with various views on 
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 bilingual processing with regard to general differences between L1 and L2 processing (e.g., Dijkstra & van Heuven, 2002; Duyck & Brysbaert, 2004; Finkbeiner et al., 2004; Kroll & Stewart, 1994).   Critically, more theory-driven investigations can be conducted when bilingual models take explicit account of which (embodied) aspects of L1 and L2 representations are shared. As previously discussed, the RHM (Kroll & Stew-art, 1994) posits that L2 words access their meaning indirectly via L1 words, while the BIA+ model (Dijkstra & van Heuven, 2002) posits direct access to L2 meaning. Progress might be made if both models specify how and which non-language aspects of meaning (action, perceptual, emotion) contribute to L1 and L2 representation and processing. 
 Likewise, embodied theories of language do not make explicit predictions concerning L2 processing. An implicit assumption is that L1 and L2 representations and processes do not differ qualitatively. However, an L2 learned later in life is subject to different circum-stances with non-trivial consequences. An L2 learned in a formal classroom setting (involv-ing, for example, rote learning of word pairs) offers substantially different experiences from an L2 learned under immersion condi-
tions. In effect, conceptual representations of action words stored in the temporal and motor cortices (Papeo, Lingnau, Agosta, Pas-cual-Leone, & Caramazza, 2015) may be functionally less entrenched for the L2. The current study shows that motor activation is indeed present during L2 sentence pro-cessing but its contribution may be limited, at least in a silent reading task.   In this regard, the finding of minimal motor activation is consistent with the view that linguistic representations may be sufficient to provide meaning because “language encodes perceptual information” (Louwerse, 2011, p. 279). More generally, this finding is con-sistent with the observation that incomplete but “good enough” representations are suffi-cient to yield meaning (e.g., Ferreira, Bailey, & Ferraro, 2002; Ferreira & Patson, 2007). Such under-specifications in meaning are econom-ical because they may require fewer neural resources and less processing time (e.g., Sanford & Graesser, 2006; Sanford & Sturt, 2002). This is not to say that L2 readers can-not recruit the motor system in the same way as in L1, or that L2 comprehension is neces-sarily impoverished. Rather, partial motor involvement may highlight an alternative means to understanding. 
C  o  n  c  l  u  s  i  o  n  s  To summarise, this is the first study to show that action-related sentence processing in the L2 does result in motor activation alongside N400 effects. However, in contrast to L1 processing, the motor system is not proac-tively recruited so as to exhibit patterns reflective of the verb’s meaning, nor does motor involvement differ by context (cf. Chapter III). Bilingual models and embodied theories of language, therefore, need to con-sider the unique linguistic experiences of the bilingual because (1) sensorimotor contribu-
tions to each language may differ within the same speaker, and (2) such contributions may change dynamically with more or less exposure to the L1 and the L2, as well as the manner by which they were learned. Lan-guage users (L1 and L2 readers) may possess the same neural resources for understanding language, but the relative contribution of particular resources (e.g., the motor system) also reflects differences in embodied experi-ences tied to each language. 
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  The general aim of the thesis was to clarify the relevance of sensorimotor activation for language understanding. Two related issues formed the lines of enquiry for the thesis. First was a consideration of feature availability over time: Do action and visual features exhibit a similar time course of activation? Second, the finding that sensorimotor activation changes according to task and contextual relevance hints at different roles during language processing (i.e., activation occurs when it can contribute to meaning). This issue was further examined in non-native language users whose unique linguistic experience may modulate the reliance on sen-sorimotor activations differently.  In the following, a brief description of the three main theories and a summary of relevant background literature is provided (an expanded theoretical and empirical treatment can be found in Chapter I). Next, the two lines of inquiry are dis-cussed. Each section contains a summary and discussion of each empirical chapter. Thereafter, I offer some theoretical considerations before summarising the conclusions of the thesis. 
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 word processing and actual movement has been taken as strong evidence that these areas play a non-trivial role in language pro-cessing. Importantly, such activation illus-trates that the meaning activated by words can reveal some degree of motor specificity (see also Aziz-Zadeh, Wilson, Rizzolatti, & Iacoboni, 2006 using visually presented sen-tences and Tettamanti et al., 2005 using audi-torily presented sentences).   Whereas studies using fMRI show which brain areas are involved during language processing, time-sensitive methods such as EEG and MEG help clarify when these effects emerge. Pulvermüller, Härle, and Hummel (2001) showed that face-, arm- and leg-related verbs produced differential activation around 250 ms after visual word onset. Re-markably, somatotopic effects are also pre-sent without overt attention (e.g., Pulvermül-ler, Shtyrov, & Ilmoniemi, 2005; also see Hauk, Shtyrov and Pulvermüller, 2006 for similar evidence using sounds produced by finger and tongue movements).   Still, as others have argued (Mahon & Cara-mazza, 2008), early availability per se cannot clarify whether the activation is a necessary component of meaning or a downstream consequence of activation. Some studies have thus been conducted to assess disruptions of sensorimotor areas to language processing. In a lexical decision task, Pulvermüller, Hauk, Nikulin, and Ilmoniemi (2005) reported fast-er response times to arm-related words such as ‘pick’, ‘grasp’, and ‘write’ when TMS was applied to motor areas involved in arm movements. Likewise, faster response times were reported to words such as ‘kick’, ‘run’, and ‘step’ when stimulation was applied to areas involved in leg movements. The selec-tive modulation to response times suggests that motor activation serves a functional role in language comprehension (see also TMS studies by Gerfo et al., 2008, and Willems, Labruna, D’Esposito, Ivry, & Casasanto, 2011 using different stimulation protocols). How-ever, reports of task-dependent effects such as in a motor imagery task (e.g., Papeo, Val-lesi, Isaja, & Rumiati, 2009; Tomasino, Fink, Sparing, Dafotakis, & Weiss, 2008) suggest that motor activation is not automatic but may be task-specific. 
In general, the reviewed studies support the claim that sensorimotor activations are in-volved during language processing. However, the extent to which these activations contrib-ute to meaning remains speculative. This matter is further complicated by reports of activations to non-motor stimuli. For exam-ple, abstract words (e.g., ‘idea’) used in verb-noun phrases elicited motor activation meas-ured by MEPs in a sensibility judgement task (Scorolli et al., 2012). Pseudoverbs also showed motor involvement in several studies (e.g., Postle, McMahon, Ashton, Meredith, & de Zubicaray, 2008; Shapiro et al., 2005; Tomasino, Weiss, & Fink, 2010). When asked to decide whether imperative phrases such as “Do/Don’t grasp” made sense in terms of lexicality (i.e., real word or not; Tomasino, Weiss, & Fink, 2010), phrases containing pseudoverbs (e.g., “Do/Don’t gralp”) never-theless elicited motor activation. In this re-gard, motor activation is not a unique proper-ty of words with motor meaning. Crucially, then, the mere presence of motor activation cannot be considered evidence of its rele-vance to meaning.   More recent studies help to explain why activation patterns do not consistently occur across studies by manipulating the relevance of sensorimotor activations for meaning. For example, participants judged whether a word accurately described the visual or action attribute of a subsequently presented object noun (e.g., ‘elongated’ for a knife, or ‘round’ for an orange; Hoenig, Sim, Bochev, Herrn-berger, & Kiefer, 2008). Crucially, the brain area involved with processing the attribute (e.g., the elongated shape of a knife) showed a higher level of activation when it was task-relevant. An fMRI study by van Dam, van Dijk, Bekkering, and Rueschemeyer (2012) further showed that similar effects can be observed even for objects with dominant action and visual features (e.g., the prominent colour and shape of a tennis ball). The relevant sen-sorimotor system is thus recruited when it can contribute to the task. In this regard, these studies help explain why less or no sensorimotor activations occur with, for instance, complex verbs with motor stems (e.g., Rueschemeyer, Brass, & Friederici, 2007), idioms (e.g., Raposo, Moss, Stamatakis, & Tyler, 2009; Schuil, Smits, & Zwaan, 2013) 
 
Language Dependency on Sensorimotor Activations:  
Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Evidence Embodied theories of language postulate that language meaning is stored in modality-specific brain areas. These theories have gained prominence in explaining the rele-vance of non-language areas in the brain for language processing (e.g., Barsalou, Santos, Simmons & Wilson, 2008; Glenberg & Gallese, 2012; Kemmerer & Gonzalez-Castillo, 2010; Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012; Louwerse, 2011; Mahon & Caramazza, 2008; Pulvermül-ler, 2005; Zwaan, 2004). In support of such theories, numerous reports demonstrate the influences of these brain areas in a variety of behavioural and neuroimaging studies (e.g., Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 2004; Rueschemeyer, Brass, & Friederici, 2007; Simmons et al., 2007; van Dam, van Dijk, Bekkering, & Rueschemeyer, 2012). Still, the theories differ in their respec-tive views of language dependency on sen-sorimotor activations; thus, the relevance of sensorimotor activation for meaning varies.  First, the Action-Perception Networks view (Pulvermüller, 2005) states that language necessarily entails the activation of modality-specific brain areas because of their involve-ment during word acquisition. In result, lan-guage and modality-specific activations be-come intertwined and form part of a word’s meaning. Embodied effects are thus part and parcel of word processing.  Second, the Language and Situated Simula-tion theory (Barsalou, Santos, Simmons & Wilson, 2008) posits that linguistic and em-bodied representations both contribute to meaning. However, greater importance is attributed to modality-specific activations because deep comprehension presumably hinges on embodied representations.   Third, the Symbol Interdependency Theory (Louwerse, 2011) also assumes the joint contribution of linguistic and embodied rep-resentations to meaning. The theory, howev-er, accords greater relevance to linguistic representations because language, like a well-crafted tool, has been shaped over time by its users to encode meaning. It does not down-play the relevance of embodied representa-
tions, but it asserts that linguistic representa-tions retain enough meaning to function in typical language use. Because the theory claims that language itself constitutes mean-ing, this stance puts it in direct contrast to the Action-Perception Networks view which assumes that meaning is to be found in em-bodied representations.   The distinguishing feature between the theo-ries is thus the relevance of sensorimotor activations for meaning. Accordingly, many studies have been focused on showing the availability of sensorimotor activations dur-ing language processing.  As reviewed in Chapter I, a range of behav-ioural and neuroimaging studies do demon-strate sensorimotor involvement during language processing. For instance, Myung, Blumstein, and Sedivy (2006) reported faster response times to action-related pairs (e.g., ‘piano’—‘typewriter’) than to unrelated pairs (e.g., ‘blanket’—‘typewriter’) in a lexical deci-sion task. Interestingly, such effects also affect eye movements. When participants heard a word (e.g., ‘piano’) and viewed a display of pictured objects, they were more likely to fixate their gaze on a typewriter than a bucket. ‘Piano’ and ‘typewriter’ share similar action (manipulation) features; thus, the result suggested that the activation of manip-ulation knowledge is automatic. Likewise, words with shared visual features such as shape facilitated response times to, for exam-ple, ‘ball’—‘orange’ (Schreuder, Flores d’Arcais, & Glazenborg, 1984) and ‘pizza’—‘coin’ (Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Raaijmaaker, 1998) relative to unrelated pairs.  Whereas behavioural findings provide an overt measure of sensorimotor involvement, neuroimaging studies have been especially important in relating embodied effects to the brain. In an event-related fMRI study, Hauk, Johnsrude, and Pulvermüller (2004) showed that reading action words referring to face, arm, or leg actions (e.g., ‘lick’, ‘pick’, ‘kick’) activated the corresponding motor areas involved with the actual movement. Crucially, the overlap between areas involved in action 
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 separate the presentation of the prime word and the target word. The assumption is that word processing either activates a given feature or not, but to minimise the use of strategies, a short ISI is usually preferred. In line with the automatic-vs-strategic pro-cessing distinction, effects obtained using short ISIs are thus presumed to reflect auto-matic activation (e.g., Posner & Snyder, 1975; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). Theoretical dis-tinctions aside, the assumption that feature activation is binary (i.e., either present or absent) disregards how different aspects of a concept, represented across different parts of the brain, unfold over time (see Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012 for a discussion on how different brain areas make up the rich and extended network of a concept).  There is now greater recognition that word processing and other forms of cognitive pro-cessing are subject to both automatic and strategic processing (e.g., Kiefer, 2012; Kiefer & Martens, 2010; Kutas & Federmeier, 2011; also see Logan, 1985; Moors & De Houwer, 2006; Naccache, Blandin, & Dehaene, 2002; Neumann, 1990). In this regard, the choice of ISI is not so much a question of automaticity but whether or not a particular aspect of semantic representation is activated at a given moment in time.   The results of Chapter II (also see Lam, Dijks-tra, & Rueschemeyer, 2015) exemplified how different features appear over time by meas-uring at four ISIs (100-, 250-, 400-, and 1,000-ms, equivalent to SOAs of 500-, 650-, 800-, and 1,400-ms, respectively). At ISIs 100-, 250-, and 1,000-ms, word pairs denot-ing objects sharing manipulation features (e.g., ‘housekey’—‘screwdriver’) elicited action priming effects. In contrast, only at ISI 1,000-ms, word pairs denoting objects sharing form features (e.g., ‘soldering iron’—‘screwdriver’) elicited a visual priming effect. These results provided new insight on the relative tem-poral development of action and visual fea-tures in a lexical decision task: Action fea-tures were activated prior to visual features. Furthermore, action feature activation oc-curred in two waves as inferred by an ab-sence of action priming effects at ISI 400-ms followed by priming effects at ISI 1,000-ms. This activation profile differed from associa-
tive-semantic priming effects which were found at all four ISIs with varying magni-tudes. Altogether, the three priming effects revealed three distinct patterns of activation, highlighting how different aspects of an ob-ject’s representation come into play over time (see Hauk, Coutout, Holden, & Chen, 2012 for similar arguments).   The behavioural study in Chapter II showed that action priming of words denoting objects sharing manipulation features can be elicited using visually presented words. Previously, an eye-tracking and RT study reported action priming effects with auditory stimuli (Myung, Blumstein, & Sedivy, 2006). In Experiment 1, participants performed lexical decisions to word pairs presented in succession. Action-related (e.g., ‘piano’) primes facilitated pro-cessing of the target word (e.g., ‘typewriter’) compared to unrelated (e.g., ‘blanket’) primes. In Experiment 2 using eye-tracking, partici-pants produced a higher number of fixations to action-related objects than to visual con-trols and unrelated objects. The action prim-ing effects in Chapter II provide new evidence that manipulations features are not only activated during object noun processing, but that the activation is relatively robust over time.  The finding of action priming effects in three out of the four ISIs suggests a prominent place for manipulation features in the seman-tic representation of manipulable objects. Indeed, a PET study on object representation showed selective activation of multiple brain areas related to tool manipulation, whereas functional use knowledge did not show such selective activation (Kellenbach, Brett, & Patterson, 2003). The authors interpreted the findings as reflecting greater relevance of manipulation knowledge for object represen-tation. More generally, there may be a greater emphasis on action features for the recogni-tion of tools and visual features for natural object recognition (e.g., Gerlach, Law, Gade, & Paulson, 1999; Moore & Price, 1999). In this regard, it is unsurprising that visual feature activation is less robust across studies using stimuli referring to manipulable or man-made objects. Altogether, it is noteworthy that the activation profiles derived from comparing multiple ISIs can reflect the rela-
 and negations (e.g., Tomasino, Weiss, Fink 2010). In such cases, there is no motor mean-ing and thus the relevance of sensorimotor activations is minimal. However, an explana-
tion for why motor activation nevertheless occurs when there is no apparent motor meaning is still missing. 
 
Language Dependency on Sensorimotor Activations:  
A Matter of Temporal Availability and Relevance The thesis was guided by two related issues. First, I considered the issue of feature availa-bility over time. Namely, an assessment of the time course of feature activation is needed before further claims can be made about how sensorimotor activations may or may not contribute to meaning. If a given feature is not (yet) activated when an effect of interest (e.g., priming) is measured, the conclusion that the feature is therefore not involved or relevant for the word’s meaning is incorrect. Second, I also considered the issue that sen-sorimotor activation changes according to 
relevance – i.e., activation occurs when it can contribute to meaning. Moreover, a critical test for whether sensorimotor activations necessarily contribute to meaning is conduct-ed on non-native language users. To this end, I also examined how the linguistic experience of non-native language users may modulate the reliance on sensorimotor activations. In the following sections, the two lines of in-quiry are discussed wherein each section contains a summary and discussion of each empirical chapter.  
 
(a) The Temporal Dynamics of Activation: Action and Visual Features In Chapter II, embodied effects in the form of behavioural priming (i.e., facilitated response times) occurred relatively early and late in time during single word processing. In the lexical-decision priming study, participants read word pairs sharing associative-semantic, visual, or action features. Response times of these word pairs were compared to those sharing none of the above features (i.e., con-trol condition). The relative timing of each feature was determined by manipulating the preview time between prime and target word presentation.   Of the two embodied effects assessed, action manipulation features were activated at both short and long intervals. By contrast, visual shape features elicited priming effects measureable at the longest interval. The results thus show the temporal availability of different features, with different features having their unique time course of activation. Manipulation information may play a more prominent role than shape information in the representation of object nouns during visual word processing. The difference in the time course of feature activation may also reflect the underlying organisation of object knowledge elicited by linguistic stimuli with-in the confines of the task. 
The conceptual representation of objects consists of features such as the shape, tex-ture, colour, manner of manipulation, etc. Consequently, these various types of knowledge may be organised by similarity within the semantic network. Research on the organisation of semantic representations have demonstrated that related concepts are linked and manifest as facilitated RTs (i.e., priming; see McNamara, 2005 for an in-depth discussion). The priming effect thus indexes the relatedness between concepts (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971). Notably, this effect is not limited to associative-semantic features of a concept. Priming occurs also for words with shared perceptual (e.g., ‘pizza’ and ‘coin’, Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Raaijmakers, 1998; Schreuder, Flores d’Arcais, & Glazenborg, 1984) or action (e.g., ‘typewriter’ and ‘piano’, Myung, Blumstein, & Sedivy, 2006, Experi-ment 1) features. This is particularly relevant in the debate on embodied representations because it shows that modality-specific fea-tures play a role as well in the organisation of knowledge.  However, priming studies are typically de-signed with little consideration for the dy-namics of feature activation. Often, one inter-stimulus interval (ISI) value is selected to 
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 separate the presentation of the prime word and the target word. The assumption is that word processing either activates a given feature or not, but to minimise the use of strategies, a short ISI is usually preferred. In line with the automatic-vs-strategic pro-cessing distinction, effects obtained using short ISIs are thus presumed to reflect auto-matic activation (e.g., Posner & Snyder, 1975; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). Theoretical dis-tinctions aside, the assumption that feature activation is binary (i.e., either present or absent) disregards how different aspects of a concept, represented across different parts of the brain, unfold over time (see Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012 for a discussion on how different brain areas make up the rich and extended network of a concept).  There is now greater recognition that word processing and other forms of cognitive pro-cessing are subject to both automatic and strategic processing (e.g., Kiefer, 2012; Kiefer & Martens, 2010; Kutas & Federmeier, 2011; also see Logan, 1985; Moors & De Houwer, 2006; Naccache, Blandin, & Dehaene, 2002; Neumann, 1990). In this regard, the choice of ISI is not so much a question of automaticity but whether or not a particular aspect of semantic representation is activated at a given moment in time.   The results of Chapter II (also see Lam, Dijks-tra, & Rueschemeyer, 2015) exemplified how different features appear over time by meas-uring at four ISIs (100-, 250-, 400-, and 1,000-ms, equivalent to SOAs of 500-, 650-, 800-, and 1,400-ms, respectively). At ISIs 100-, 250-, and 1,000-ms, word pairs denot-ing objects sharing manipulation features (e.g., ‘housekey’—‘screwdriver’) elicited action priming effects. In contrast, only at ISI 1,000-ms, word pairs denoting objects sharing form features (e.g., ‘soldering iron’—‘screwdriver’) elicited a visual priming effect. These results provided new insight on the relative tem-poral development of action and visual fea-tures in a lexical decision task: Action fea-tures were activated prior to visual features. Furthermore, action feature activation oc-curred in two waves as inferred by an ab-sence of action priming effects at ISI 400-ms followed by priming effects at ISI 1,000-ms. This activation profile differed from associa-
tive-semantic priming effects which were found at all four ISIs with varying magni-tudes. Altogether, the three priming effects revealed three distinct patterns of activation, highlighting how different aspects of an ob-ject’s representation come into play over time (see Hauk, Coutout, Holden, & Chen, 2012 for similar arguments).   The behavioural study in Chapter II showed that action priming of words denoting objects sharing manipulation features can be elicited using visually presented words. Previously, an eye-tracking and RT study reported action priming effects with auditory stimuli (Myung, Blumstein, & Sedivy, 2006). In Experiment 1, participants performed lexical decisions to word pairs presented in succession. Action-related (e.g., ‘piano’) primes facilitated pro-cessing of the target word (e.g., ‘typewriter’) compared to unrelated (e.g., ‘blanket’) primes. In Experiment 2 using eye-tracking, partici-pants produced a higher number of fixations to action-related objects than to visual con-trols and unrelated objects. The action prim-ing effects in Chapter II provide new evidence that manipulations features are not only activated during object noun processing, but that the activation is relatively robust over time.  The finding of action priming effects in three out of the four ISIs suggests a prominent place for manipulation features in the seman-tic representation of manipulable objects. Indeed, a PET study on object representation showed selective activation of multiple brain areas related to tool manipulation, whereas functional use knowledge did not show such selective activation (Kellenbach, Brett, & Patterson, 2003). The authors interpreted the findings as reflecting greater relevance of manipulation knowledge for object represen-tation. More generally, there may be a greater emphasis on action features for the recogni-tion of tools and visual features for natural object recognition (e.g., Gerlach, Law, Gade, & Paulson, 1999; Moore & Price, 1999). In this regard, it is unsurprising that visual feature activation is less robust across studies using stimuli referring to manipulable or man-made objects. Altogether, it is noteworthy that the activation profiles derived from comparing multiple ISIs can reflect the rela-
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The conceptual representation of objects consists of features such as the shape, tex-ture, colour, manner of manipulation, etc. Consequently, these various types of knowledge may be organised by similarity within the semantic network. Research on the organisation of semantic representations have demonstrated that related concepts are linked and manifest as facilitated RTs (i.e., priming; see McNamara, 2005 for an in-depth discussion). The priming effect thus indexes the relatedness between concepts (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971). Notably, this effect is not limited to associative-semantic features of a concept. Priming occurs also for words with shared perceptual (e.g., ‘pizza’ and ‘coin’, Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Raaijmakers, 1998; Schreuder, Flores d’Arcais, & Glazenborg, 1984) or action (e.g., ‘typewriter’ and ‘piano’, Myung, Blumstein, & Sedivy, 2006, Experi-ment 1) features. This is particularly relevant in the debate on embodied representations because it shows that modality-specific fea-tures play a role as well in the organisation of knowledge.  However, priming studies are typically de-signed with little consideration for the dy-namics of feature activation. Often, one inter-stimulus interval (ISI) value is selected to 
 the unrelated condition in the study was well-controlled. Unlike the ratings-based selection of the shape-related stimuli, control stimuli did not follow this selection criterion. In this regard, the reliability of the reported N400 effect is questionable.  The results of Chapter II also revealed that the magnitudes of action and visual priming effects are smaller relative to associative-semantic priming effects. This might imply that embodied effects are subtle effects. Thus, this observation may partly explain why such priming effects (e.g., visual priming in partic-ular) are not consistently reported. Neverthe-less, the finding of an interaction between ISI and type of priming effect indicates that these effects are present and play some role in the organisation of semantic representations.  
Altogether, Chapter II presented results in line with a dynamic view of feature activa-tion. Various features representing object knowledge unfold over time when processing words denoting man-made manipulable objects. Together with the reviewed studies, meaning also appears to be dynamically influenced by the experimental context in which words are being understood (Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Raaijmakers, 1998; see also Willems & Casasanto, 2011). According to this view, the activation profiles presented in Chapter II reflect feature availability deter-mined (partly) by the context in which words were presented. The subsequent three empir-ical chapters examined more closely the influence of various factors on the involve-ment of the motor system during sentence processing.  
(b) The Contextual Relevance of Motor Activation in Deriving Meaning The dynamics of feature activation highlight the relative involvement of a given feature over time. This involvement is also co-determined by the context in which words are used. With regard to action-related lan-guage, whether the motor component of a word is relevant for understanding is deter-
mined not merely by the presence of an ac-tion word but, among others, the linguistic context, task demands, and also the linguistic experience of the language user. These three factors were addressed separately in Chap-ters III through V.  
The Contextual Modulation of Action Plausibility In Chapter III, context-sensitivity reflected in the N400 measure indicated that readers naturally engage in semantic processing during a silent reading task. The complemen-tary measure of motor activity (mu) yielded an interaction between verb meaning and contextual plausibility. This latter result indicated that the motor system serves as an interpretive heuristic during action-related sentence processing. In a plausible context, the specific meaning of the described action was reflected by motor activation patterns. That is, greater motor activation for specific actions, less for non-specific actions. In an implausible context, differences in motor patterns were not observed, but the presence of motor activation revealed attempts at deriving coherence. This study thus described how motor activation not only reflects mean-ing, but indexes the derivation of meaning in certain contexts. The highly specific yet con-text-dependent motor activation patterns support an interpretive heuristic account. 
 The effect of context on the processing of action-related language implied that the meaning of words does not strictly determine the presence or absence of motor activation. In fact, the mere presence of an action word does not elicit motor activation. For instance, a German word such as ‘greifen’ (to grasp) with action meaning activates motor-related brain areas (Rueschemeyer, Brass, & Frie-derici, 2007). However, ‘begreifen’ (to com-prehend), though it contains ‘greifen’, does not show the same activation; instead, the lack of motor activation reflects its overall non-action meaning.   Contextual influences extend beyond the word level: Relative to literal sentences (e.g., “The fruit cake was the last one so Claire grabbed it”; “The muddy children trampled over Sarah’s clean floor”), idiomatic sentenc-es (e.g., “The job offer was a great chance so Claire grabbed it”; “The spiteful critic tram-
 tive weightings of action and visual features in object representation.   The later-occurring visual priming effects in Chapter II also help explain previous incon-sistent reports. An early set of studies by Schreuder and colleagues reported perceptu-al priming effects (Schreuder, Flores d’Arcais, & Glazenborg, 1984; Flores d’Arcais, Schreuder, & Glazenborg, 1985). Notably, the items used to elicit these effects consisted of words denoting objects sharing colour or shape features (e.g., ‘apple’—‘ball’). Subse-quent studies failed to replicate these find-ings (e.g., Moss, McCormick, & Tyler, 1997; Moss, Ostrin, Tyler, & Marslen-Wilson, 1995) but one study did report priming effects (e.g., ‘pizza’—‘coin’) if a biasing context was in place (Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Raaijmakers, 1998; discussed further below). A pre-activation task designed to activate perceptu-al features elicited the intended effects in a subsequent pronunciation task. Perceptual priming effects were found in a lexical deci-sion task if preceded by a pre-activation task and associative-semantic word pairs were excluded. In other words, perceptual feature activation can be measured under very spe-cific experimental conditions.  However, the above studies used relatively short ISIs which, according to Chapter II, are not favourable for eliciting visual priming effects. Furthermore, the stimuli used in these studies to elicit perceptual priming consisted of varied features (e.g., shape, col-our, texture) and also words referring to animate and inanimate objects. In contrast, the stimuli used in Chapter II consisted only of words denoting man-made manipulable objects and critical items were related only on one dimension. Critically, visual priming was thus found, in line with a visual-world paradigm study that also reported visual priming of objects similar in shape (Yee, Huffstetler, & Thompson-Schill, 2011). Inter-estingly, the study by Yee et al. using pictured target objects found visual priming in one of two preview times (using the same logic of comparing multiple ISIs). A shorter 1,000-ms preview time to identify four pictured objects elicited visual priming (e.g., ‘pizza’—‘Frisbee’), whereas a longer 2,000-ms preview 
time elicited functional priming (e.g., ‘glue’—‘tape’).   The eye-tracking results (Yee et al., 2011) suggested that visual feature activation oc-curs rather early (see also Huettig & McQueen, 2007). A preview time of 1,000-ms to evaluate a display of four objects afforded each object approximately 250-ms of viewing time. However, early shape feature activation may be a consequence of increased visual processing for object recognition in the visu-al-world paradigm; given a certain amount of time, participants are expected to quickly identify all four items to respond correctly. Some authors cautioned that online eye-tracking data cannot be directly compared to RTs (Huettig & Altmann, 2011). For example, eye-tracking data reflect the process of using activated information provided by the display (typically of pictures) in a manner different than in a lexical decision task (using words). The results in Chapter II nevertheless showed that visual priming of shape-related objects is possible but the effects may take longer to develop with words. When explicit measures to elicit these features are in place, then the effects may appear sooner (e.g., Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Raaijmakers, 1998 with per-ceptually related items).  The relatively late activation of visual fea-tures may also explain the results of a previ-ous study that did not observe behavioural priming effects using a short ISI of 150 ms (SOA of 300; Kellenbach, Wijers, & Mulder, 2000). However, concurrent EEG measures yielded an N400 effect on the target word, indicating that visual features were indeed activated but only captured by an implicit measure. The authors speculated that the N400 reflects context-invariant semantic features but this explanation is incompatible with the accumulating evidence of context-dependent N400 effects (e.g., Heil, Rolke, & Pecchinenda, 2004; Kutas & Federmeier, 2000; 2011). Also, dissociations between RTs and N400 effects are not unusual as each measure is assumed to reflect different stages of processing (e.g., Chwilla, Kolk, & Mulder, 2000; Holcomb, 1988; Kounios & Holcomb, 1992). The N400 data in Kellenbach et al. (2000) illustrate the potential to measure online feature activation but it is unclear if 
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 the unrelated condition in the study was well-controlled. Unlike the ratings-based selection of the shape-related stimuli, control stimuli did not follow this selection criterion. In this regard, the reliability of the reported N400 effect is questionable.  The results of Chapter II also revealed that the magnitudes of action and visual priming effects are smaller relative to associative-semantic priming effects. This might imply that embodied effects are subtle effects. Thus, this observation may partly explain why such priming effects (e.g., visual priming in partic-ular) are not consistently reported. Neverthe-less, the finding of an interaction between ISI and type of priming effect indicates that these effects are present and play some role in the organisation of semantic representations.  
Altogether, Chapter II presented results in line with a dynamic view of feature activa-tion. Various features representing object knowledge unfold over time when processing words denoting man-made manipulable objects. Together with the reviewed studies, meaning also appears to be dynamically influenced by the experimental context in which words are being understood (Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Raaijmakers, 1998; see also Willems & Casasanto, 2011). According to this view, the activation profiles presented in Chapter II reflect feature availability deter-mined (partly) by the context in which words were presented. The subsequent three empir-ical chapters examined more closely the influence of various factors on the involve-ment of the motor system during sentence processing.  
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The Contextual Modulation of Action Plausibility In Chapter III, context-sensitivity reflected in the N400 measure indicated that readers naturally engage in semantic processing during a silent reading task. The complemen-tary measure of motor activity (mu) yielded an interaction between verb meaning and contextual plausibility. This latter result indicated that the motor system serves as an interpretive heuristic during action-related sentence processing. In a plausible context, the specific meaning of the described action was reflected by motor activation patterns. That is, greater motor activation for specific actions, less for non-specific actions. In an implausible context, differences in motor patterns were not observed, but the presence of motor activation revealed attempts at deriving coherence. This study thus described how motor activation not only reflects mean-ing, but indexes the derivation of meaning in certain contexts. The highly specific yet con-text-dependent motor activation patterns support an interpretive heuristic account. 
 The effect of context on the processing of action-related language implied that the meaning of words does not strictly determine the presence or absence of motor activation. In fact, the mere presence of an action word does not elicit motor activation. For instance, a German word such as ‘greifen’ (to grasp) with action meaning activates motor-related brain areas (Rueschemeyer, Brass, & Frie-derici, 2007). However, ‘begreifen’ (to com-prehend), though it contains ‘greifen’, does not show the same activation; instead, the lack of motor activation reflects its overall non-action meaning.   Contextual influences extend beyond the word level: Relative to literal sentences (e.g., “The fruit cake was the last one so Claire grabbed it”; “The muddy children trampled over Sarah’s clean floor”), idiomatic sentenc-es (e.g., “The job offer was a great chance so Claire grabbed it”; “The spiteful critic tram-
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time elicited functional priming (e.g., ‘glue’—‘tape’).   The eye-tracking results (Yee et al., 2011) suggested that visual feature activation oc-curs rather early (see also Huettig & McQueen, 2007). A preview time of 1,000-ms to evaluate a display of four objects afforded each object approximately 250-ms of viewing time. However, early shape feature activation may be a consequence of increased visual processing for object recognition in the visu-al-world paradigm; given a certain amount of time, participants are expected to quickly identify all four items to respond correctly. Some authors cautioned that online eye-tracking data cannot be directly compared to RTs (Huettig & Altmann, 2011). For example, eye-tracking data reflect the process of using activated information provided by the display (typically of pictures) in a manner different than in a lexical decision task (using words). The results in Chapter II nevertheless showed that visual priming of shape-related objects is possible but the effects may take longer to develop with words. When explicit measures to elicit these features are in place, then the effects may appear sooner (e.g., Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Raaijmakers, 1998 with per-ceptually related items).  The relatively late activation of visual fea-tures may also explain the results of a previ-ous study that did not observe behavioural priming effects using a short ISI of 150 ms (SOA of 300; Kellenbach, Wijers, & Mulder, 2000). However, concurrent EEG measures yielded an N400 effect on the target word, indicating that visual features were indeed activated but only captured by an implicit measure. The authors speculated that the N400 reflects context-invariant semantic features but this explanation is incompatible with the accumulating evidence of context-dependent N400 effects (e.g., Heil, Rolke, & Pecchinenda, 2004; Kutas & Federmeier, 2000; 2011). Also, dissociations between RTs and N400 effects are not unusual as each measure is assumed to reflect different stages of processing (e.g., Chwilla, Kolk, & Mulder, 2000; Holcomb, 1988; Kounios & Holcomb, 1992). The N400 data in Kellenbach et al. (2000) illustrate the potential to measure online feature activation but it is unclear if 
 greater motor activation because the precise motoric repertoire is not replicable with a human body. Thus, motor activation to the same verb can differ depending on one’s motoric repertoire (see e.g., Willems, Ha-goort, & Casasanto, 2010 on left- vs. right-handers). Specifically, understanding an action beyond the context of one’s motor repertoire may involve (greater) motor simu-lation.  Therefore, the lack of experience with per-forming particular actions has implications for the relative involvement of motor activa-tion. Indeed, reading sentences about hockey events yielded different activation patterns in hockey players and novices (Beilock, Lyons, Mattarella-Micke, Nusbaum, & Small, 2008). Importantly, unlike expert hockey players, novices recruited brain areas related to in-stantiation of simple movements when at-tempting to understand hockey action sen-tences (e.g., “The hockey player finished the stride/shot”). Expert players relied instead on brain areas involved in high-level action selection. Another study asked expert volley-ball players, fans, and novices to judge whether phrases refer to possible actions or not (e.g., “Cut shot!”, “Jump roll”, respectively; Tomasino, Guatto, Rumiati, & Fabbro, 2012). Notably, novices attempted to simulate all described actions regardless of plausibility (also see Tomasino, Maieron, Guatto, Fabbro, & Rumiati, 2013). These results underscore the point that understanding actions beyond one’s motoric repertoire actually entails 
greater motor activation.   The proposed interpretive heuristic account can also help explain how readers make sense of novel actions. In an EEG study (Chwilla, Kolk, & Vissers, 2007), reading about unfamiliar and implausible actions (e.g., “The boys searched for bushes with which they went drumming…”) elicited a larger N400 amplitude on the word 'drum-
ming' relative to descriptions of unfamiliar but plausible actions (e.g., “The boys searched for branches with which they went drum-ming…”). Crucially, from a pure semantic-associative point of view, the act of drum-ming with branches and bushes are equally unrelated, but from an embodied view, branches yield drumming affordances that 
are not available with bushes (see Gibson, 1986, for the notion of affordances). The N400 difference to these two types of sen-tences is similar to the N400 effect reported in Chapter III. Importantly, the mu effects forming the basis of the interpretive heuristic account highlight a mechanism underlying the comprehension processes.  More generally, context-dependent motor activation shows that motor involvement depends on whether there is motor meaning, or the attempt to derive motor meaning, as reported here. Consequently, studies report-ing motor activity to words with no action meaning may be explained in terms of the use of the motor system to derive meaning. For example, Pulvermüller and Hauk (2006) reported motor activation to form-related words (e.g., ‘rectangle’). Participants were asked to make semantic judgements as to whether words refer to a shape, a colour, or an object that can be visually perceived.  Another study showed that abstract words (e.g., ‘idea’), like concrete words (e.g., ‘dog’), used in verb-noun phrases also elicited motor activation measured by MEPs in a sensibility judgement task, including non-sensible phrases (Scorolli, Jacquet, Binkofski, Nicoletti, Tessari, & Borghi, 2012). Remarkably, pseu-doverbs also showed motor involvement (e.g., Postle, McMahon, Ashton, Meredith, & de Zubicaray, 2008; Shapiro et al., 2005; Tomasino, Weiss, & Fink, 2010). For example, participants were asked to perform lexical decisions to imperative phrases such as “Do/Don’t grasp” (Tomasino, Weiss, & Fink, 2010). Importantly, some phrases included pseudoverbs (e.g., “Do/Don’t gralp”). Though motor activation differences were observed only between positive and negative impera-tives using real verbs, pseudoverbs neverthe-less elicited motor activation. Altogether, these results indicate that motor activation is not unique to action verb processing, but an index of motor involvement during the deri-vation of meaning across tasks. Also, the evidence suggests that the silent reading task does not imply a lack of extensive processing (see also Chen, Davis, Pulvermüller, & Hauk, 2015; Hauk, Davis, Kherif, & Pulvermüller, 2008).  In sum, the motor activation results reported 
 pled over Sarah’s feelings”) did not elicit motor activation (Raposo, Moss, Stamatakis, & Tyler, 2009). Interestingly, Boulenger, Hauk, and Pulvermüller (2009) reported somatotopic activation to both literal and idiomatic arm- and leg-action sentences (e.g., “John grasped the object/idea”; “Pablo kicked the ball/habit”). Notably, somatotopic activa-tion was greatest at the end of the sentence, when the meanings of the words were com-bined. A subsequent study showed that the position of the action verb relative to the context may have contributed to the different outcomes (Schuil, Smits, & Zwaan, 2013). When the context was established prior to the verb (e.g., in Dutch, “De student had het tentamen toch gehaald, ondanks dat hij op zijn tenen liep”/ “The student had passed the exam, even though he on his toes walked”), there was less motor activation measured on the verb used idiomatically (see meta-analysis by Yang & Shu, 2016 on motor acti-vation in idiom comprehension). Motor acti-vation is thus not simply a reflection of the word’s meaning in isolation. Indeed, a recent EEG study confirmed that motor activation measured by mu activity is not restricted to the meaning of the verb but involved also in subsequent processing of nouns in the sen-tence (Moreno et al., 2015). In this sense, motor activation can reflect the accrual of information for simulation.  Chapter III presented two main findings: (1) the functional role of motor activation ex-tends to the comprehension of plausible and implausible actions; and (2) the results from sentences describing plausible actions exhib-ited action specificity (i.e., more action speci-ficity elicited more motor activation). In line with an interpretive heuristic account, the motor system can proactively play a func-tional role in making sense of less familiar or implausible actions, beyond only represent-ing the meaning of individual words (see Schubotz, 2007 for a similar perspective on reproducible and non-reproducible event prediction).  Sensitivity to contextual plausibility resulted in different motor patterns. In the plausible context, descriptions of specific actions (e.g., “The shopping carts that she pushes away are broken”) led to greater motor activation 
relative to non-specific action descriptions (e.g., “The shopping carts that she delivers are broken”). A previous fMRI study reported graded motor activation according to the amount of kinetic information implied by the verb (van Dam, Rueschemeyer, & Bekkering, 2010). The specific action ‘to wipe’ elicited more motor activation relative to a more general action ‘to clean’. A behavioural study showed that action-specific verbs were pro-cessed more quickly than non-specific verbs (e.g., ‘to sign’ vs. ‘to recycle’; Marino, Gallese, Buccino, & Riggio, 2012). Another fMRI study showed that the degree of implied effort (e.g., “pushing the piano/chair”) is reflected by different degrees of motor activation (Moody & Gennari, 2010; see also Urrutia, Gennari, & de Vega, 2012). Altogether, the current and previous findings demonstrate that motor activation patterns can be highly detailed, in accordance with the implied meaning.  Interestingly, reading about implausible actions yielded a different outcome. Motor activation was indeed found for such descrip-tions; however, the patterns no longer re-flected the verb’s meaning, as was found in the plausible context. The undifferentiated motor activation patterns, instead, suggested that readers appear to be interpreting through motor simulation. Crucially, the proposed interpretive heuristic account ex-plains the finding by attributing a specific role to the motor system in making sense of implausible descriptions.   The involvement of the motor system in deriving meaning can be observed in several studies. In an EEG study, van Elk, van Schie, Zwaan, and Bekkering (2010) showed that reading about actions recruited the motor system differently depending on whether the agent was human or an animal. Notably, more motor activation was found on the verb when reading “The deer jumps over the fence” compared to “The athlete jumps over the hurdle”. At first glance, the results appear to contradict the embodied view which would have predicted the reverse pattern: more motor activation for actions performed by human agents. Rather, this finding depicts the motor system as a heuristic in deriving mean-ing. For example, attempting to understand how a deer would jump over a fence elicits 
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 greater motor activation because the precise motoric repertoire is not replicable with a human body. Thus, motor activation to the same verb can differ depending on one’s motoric repertoire (see e.g., Willems, Ha-goort, & Casasanto, 2010 on left- vs. right-handers). Specifically, understanding an action beyond the context of one’s motor repertoire may involve (greater) motor simu-lation.  Therefore, the lack of experience with per-forming particular actions has implications for the relative involvement of motor activa-tion. Indeed, reading sentences about hockey events yielded different activation patterns in hockey players and novices (Beilock, Lyons, Mattarella-Micke, Nusbaum, & Small, 2008). Importantly, unlike expert hockey players, novices recruited brain areas related to in-stantiation of simple movements when at-tempting to understand hockey action sen-tences (e.g., “The hockey player finished the stride/shot”). Expert players relied instead on brain areas involved in high-level action selection. Another study asked expert volley-ball players, fans, and novices to judge whether phrases refer to possible actions or not (e.g., “Cut shot!”, “Jump roll”, respectively; Tomasino, Guatto, Rumiati, & Fabbro, 2012). Notably, novices attempted to simulate all described actions regardless of plausibility (also see Tomasino, Maieron, Guatto, Fabbro, & Rumiati, 2013). These results underscore the point that understanding actions beyond one’s motoric repertoire actually entails 
greater motor activation.   The proposed interpretive heuristic account can also help explain how readers make sense of novel actions. In an EEG study (Chwilla, Kolk, & Vissers, 2007), reading about unfamiliar and implausible actions (e.g., “The boys searched for bushes with which they went drumming…”) elicited a larger N400 amplitude on the word 'drum-
ming' relative to descriptions of unfamiliar but plausible actions (e.g., “The boys searched for branches with which they went drum-ming…”). Crucially, from a pure semantic-associative point of view, the act of drum-ming with branches and bushes are equally unrelated, but from an embodied view, branches yield drumming affordances that 
are not available with bushes (see Gibson, 1986, for the notion of affordances). The N400 difference to these two types of sen-tences is similar to the N400 effect reported in Chapter III. Importantly, the mu effects forming the basis of the interpretive heuristic account highlight a mechanism underlying the comprehension processes.  More generally, context-dependent motor activation shows that motor involvement depends on whether there is motor meaning, or the attempt to derive motor meaning, as reported here. Consequently, studies report-ing motor activity to words with no action meaning may be explained in terms of the use of the motor system to derive meaning. For example, Pulvermüller and Hauk (2006) reported motor activation to form-related words (e.g., ‘rectangle’). Participants were asked to make semantic judgements as to whether words refer to a shape, a colour, or an object that can be visually perceived.  Another study showed that abstract words (e.g., ‘idea’), like concrete words (e.g., ‘dog’), used in verb-noun phrases also elicited motor activation measured by MEPs in a sensibility judgement task, including non-sensible phrases (Scorolli, Jacquet, Binkofski, Nicoletti, Tessari, & Borghi, 2012). Remarkably, pseu-doverbs also showed motor involvement (e.g., Postle, McMahon, Ashton, Meredith, & de Zubicaray, 2008; Shapiro et al., 2005; Tomasino, Weiss, & Fink, 2010). For example, participants were asked to perform lexical decisions to imperative phrases such as “Do/Don’t grasp” (Tomasino, Weiss, & Fink, 2010). Importantly, some phrases included pseudoverbs (e.g., “Do/Don’t gralp”). Though motor activation differences were observed only between positive and negative impera-tives using real verbs, pseudoverbs neverthe-less elicited motor activation. Altogether, these results indicate that motor activation is not unique to action verb processing, but an index of motor involvement during the deri-vation of meaning across tasks. Also, the evidence suggests that the silent reading task does not imply a lack of extensive processing (see also Chen, Davis, Pulvermüller, & Hauk, 2015; Hauk, Davis, Kherif, & Pulvermüller, 2008).  In sum, the motor activation results reported 
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relative to non-specific action descriptions (e.g., “The shopping carts that she delivers are broken”). A previous fMRI study reported graded motor activation according to the amount of kinetic information implied by the verb (van Dam, Rueschemeyer, & Bekkering, 2010). The specific action ‘to wipe’ elicited more motor activation relative to a more general action ‘to clean’. A behavioural study showed that action-specific verbs were pro-cessed more quickly than non-specific verbs (e.g., ‘to sign’ vs. ‘to recycle’; Marino, Gallese, Buccino, & Riggio, 2012). Another fMRI study showed that the degree of implied effort (e.g., “pushing the piano/chair”) is reflected by different degrees of motor activation (Moody & Gennari, 2010; see also Urrutia, Gennari, & de Vega, 2012). Altogether, the current and previous findings demonstrate that motor activation patterns can be highly detailed, in accordance with the implied meaning.  Interestingly, reading about implausible actions yielded a different outcome. Motor activation was indeed found for such descrip-tions; however, the patterns no longer re-flected the verb’s meaning, as was found in the plausible context. The undifferentiated motor activation patterns, instead, suggested that readers appear to be interpreting through motor simulation. Crucially, the proposed interpretive heuristic account ex-plains the finding by attributing a specific role to the motor system in making sense of implausible descriptions.   The involvement of the motor system in deriving meaning can be observed in several studies. In an EEG study, van Elk, van Schie, Zwaan, and Bekkering (2010) showed that reading about actions recruited the motor system differently depending on whether the agent was human or an animal. Notably, more motor activation was found on the verb when reading “The deer jumps over the fence” compared to “The athlete jumps over the hurdle”. At first glance, the results appear to contradict the embodied view which would have predicted the reverse pattern: more motor activation for actions performed by human agents. Rather, this finding depicts the motor system as a heuristic in deriving mean-ing. For example, attempting to understand how a deer would jump over a fence elicits 
 action (e.g., “I wonder”) verbs. The authors explained that motor activation was inhibited during action verb processing in the syllable task. Considering that a decrease in MEPs implies that a particular motor program was activated and needed to be inhibited (Koch et 
al., 2006), this indicates that motor activity was indeed present in the syllable task.  The finding of an N400 congruence effect in the letter-search task is consistent with pre-vious reports of automatic access to meaning with distractor tasks (e.g., Connolly, Stewart, & Phillips, 1990; Dombrowski & Heil, 2006; Heil, Rolke, & Pecchinenda, 2004; Küper & Heil, 2009; but see Chwilla, Brown, & Ha-
goort, 1995; Marí-Beffa, Valdés, Cullen, Cate-na, & Houghton, 2005) and subliminal stimu-lus presentation (e.g., Kiefer, 2002; but see Deacon & Shelley-Tremblay, 2000). However, concurrent motor activation is limited be-cause it did not reflect context-sensitivity and meaning. The function of the motor system in this regard is best characterised as reactive. Crucially, finding motor activation per se is insufficient for making claims about its con-tribution to meaning. Rather, systematic differences in meaning and contextually modulated activation are needed to charac-terise the functional contribution (see also Papeo, Rumiati, Cecchetto, & Tomasino, 2012).  
ii. Sensibility Judgement Task Remarkably, Chapter IV also provided evi-dence that motor activity is not necessarily engaged as a proactive interpretive heuristic in deeper semantic processing. Whereas little to no motor contribution can be expected in shallower tasks, an assumption is that deeper processing of action-related stimuli should entail (extensive) motor involvement. Evi-dence from task comparison studies do gen-erally point in favour of this assumption. However, task instructions have confounded the results by explicitly asking for motor imagery or other ways of emphasising motor meaning. Even when no such emphasis is made, concurrent manual responses in the form of the implied actions (i.e., action-sentence compatibility effect) arguably pre-activate the relevant motor programs that lead to the expected effects.  By excluding these potential biases, the re-sults from the sensibility judgement task showed that explicit judgements to combine the object noun and verb (i.e., if the pair makes sense in combination) led to an N400 congruence effect. More interestingly, the motor activation patterns were very similar to those in the letter-search task: Neither differences in meaning nor context were found. Participants had clearly engaged deeper processing of the stimuli, as revealed by a comparison of the N400 effects: Larger mean amplitudes, relative to the letter-search task, as well as larger differences between conditions were found in the sensibility judgement task. The motor activation results 
thus contrast with previous behavioural studies using the sensibility judgement task (e.g., Kaschak & Borregine, 2008; Marino, Gallese, Buccino, & Riggio, 2012; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006).   Crucially, the experimental design in Chapter IV did not make explicit reference to motor meaning and also did not require an immedi-ate manual response. Thus, the motor system was not inadvertently induced at the meas-ured time point. These results are evidence that carrying out explicit judgements about actions can proceed without the full involve-ment of the motor system. Indeed, evidence that a semantic task does not necessarily elicit greater motor involvement can be found in a recent study. Chen, Davis, Pulvermüller, and Hauk (2015) did not find robust effects of a semantic variable (i.e., imageability) in a semantic decision task, attributing the results to task instructions by which participants were asked to decide if a person’s name was present. That is, no explicit mention to re-trieve features related to actions or senses was made. Rather, the authors reported larg-er imageability effects for silent reading com-pared to a lexical decision task. Similarly, a previous study using a silent reading task reported imageability effects (Hauk, Davis, Kherif, & Pulvermüller, 2008). Altogether, greater semantic processing or task demand is not tantamount to greater recruitment of the motor system, and vice versa (see also Scorolli et al., 2012).  
 in Chapter III characterised a non-trivial role of the motor system during sentence pro-cessing. Motor activation reflects not only meaning, but it also proactively contributes to the act of deriving meaning in implausible contexts. The interpretive heuristic account 
also converges with the notion that motor activation might reflect participants’ strategic use of the motor system (Tomasino & Rumi-ati, 2013), especially if “the default posture of our conceptual system is to be engaged with the sensorimotor system” (Mahon, 2015).  
The Relevance of Motor Activation in Linguistic Tasks In Chapter IV, the involvement and potential functional contribution of the motor system was further assessed in two linguistic tasks, in which the access to meaning was selective-ly modulated.  In the letter-search task, there were effects of context-sensitivity in the N400 data even though meaning was irrelevant to task per-formance. This finding is in line with evidence showing automatic access to meaning during language processing. More importantly, mo-tor activation (mu) persisted. However, the interaction between verb meaning and con-textual plausibility was absent: motor activa-tion patterns did not reflect verb meaning nor did they differ by context.  The sensibility judgement task tested wheth-er the explicit request to make sense of object noun and verb pairs necessarily involves full engagement of the motor system. If so, the interaction was expected. Effects of context-sensitivity were once again observed in the 
N400 data. Notably, motor activation was present but did not show the expected inter-action.   This comparison study delimits the contribu-tion of the motor system in important ways. Motor activation is indeed part of action-related language processing, but it does not function as an interpretive heuristic in either task. This outcome is less surprising in the case of shallow processing given that the task did not require elaboration of the linguistic input. However, that sensibility judgements can proceed without full involvement of the motor system is remarkable. Importantly, this latter result suggests that highly specific motor simulation is not necessary for the derivation and combination of meaning. In this respect, motor activation plays a subsidi-ary or reactive role for certain language tasks. Together, Chapters III and IV showed that the engagement of the motor system is not uniform, thus implying different routes to meaning. 
i. Letter-Search Task Motor activation patterns in the letter-search task did not show differences as a function of verb meaning: action specific verbs did not elicit greater motor activation than non-specific verbs. Nevertheless, motor activation persisted. In a previous fMRI study (Tomasi-no, Werner, Weiss, & Fink, 2007), the con-trast between motor (e.g., “She paints”) and non-motor (e.g. “He borrows”) phrases showed greater motor activation when par-ticipants were engaged in an explicit motor imagery task relative to a letter-search task. In the motor imagery task, a difference be-tween motor and non-motor phrases was found, but this difference was absent in the letter-search task. Even so, motor activation was nevertheless found in the letter-search task, as was in Chapter IV. Importantly, in that chapter, the concurrent N400 congru-
ence effect – i.e., an index of meaning pro-cessing – clarified that despite the distraction, there was access to meaning that differenti-ated between plausible and implausible con-texts. In this sense, there was context-sensitivity but the effect did not modulate motor activity.  Other evidence that motor activation may be present in a shallow task can be found in a TMS study (Experiment 3; Papeo, Vallesi, Isaja, & Rumiati, 2009). In a syllable segmen-tation task (i.e., count the number of syllables in a verb), MEPs measured on the right-hand muscles while reading hand-actions (e.g., “I stir”) decreased, whereas in a semantic task (i.e., judge whether verbs are action-related), MEPs increased. Importantly, this difference was specific to hand-action and not to non-
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 action (e.g., “I wonder”) verbs. The authors explained that motor activation was inhibited during action verb processing in the syllable task. Considering that a decrease in MEPs implies that a particular motor program was activated and needed to be inhibited (Koch et 
al., 2006), this indicates that motor activity was indeed present in the syllable task.  The finding of an N400 congruence effect in the letter-search task is consistent with pre-vious reports of automatic access to meaning with distractor tasks (e.g., Connolly, Stewart, & Phillips, 1990; Dombrowski & Heil, 2006; Heil, Rolke, & Pecchinenda, 2004; Küper & Heil, 2009; but see Chwilla, Brown, & Ha-
goort, 1995; Marí-Beffa, Valdés, Cullen, Cate-na, & Houghton, 2005) and subliminal stimu-lus presentation (e.g., Kiefer, 2002; but see Deacon & Shelley-Tremblay, 2000). However, concurrent motor activation is limited be-cause it did not reflect context-sensitivity and meaning. The function of the motor system in this regard is best characterised as reactive. Crucially, finding motor activation per se is insufficient for making claims about its con-tribution to meaning. Rather, systematic differences in meaning and contextually modulated activation are needed to charac-terise the functional contribution (see also Papeo, Rumiati, Cecchetto, & Tomasino, 2012).  
ii. Sensibility Judgement Task Remarkably, Chapter IV also provided evi-dence that motor activity is not necessarily engaged as a proactive interpretive heuristic in deeper semantic processing. Whereas little to no motor contribution can be expected in shallower tasks, an assumption is that deeper processing of action-related stimuli should entail (extensive) motor involvement. Evi-dence from task comparison studies do gen-erally point in favour of this assumption. However, task instructions have confounded the results by explicitly asking for motor imagery or other ways of emphasising motor meaning. Even when no such emphasis is made, concurrent manual responses in the form of the implied actions (i.e., action-sentence compatibility effect) arguably pre-activate the relevant motor programs that lead to the expected effects.  By excluding these potential biases, the re-sults from the sensibility judgement task showed that explicit judgements to combine the object noun and verb (i.e., if the pair makes sense in combination) led to an N400 congruence effect. More interestingly, the motor activation patterns were very similar to those in the letter-search task: Neither differences in meaning nor context were found. Participants had clearly engaged deeper processing of the stimuli, as revealed by a comparison of the N400 effects: Larger mean amplitudes, relative to the letter-search task, as well as larger differences between conditions were found in the sensibility judgement task. The motor activation results 
thus contrast with previous behavioural studies using the sensibility judgement task (e.g., Kaschak & Borregine, 2008; Marino, Gallese, Buccino, & Riggio, 2012; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006).   Crucially, the experimental design in Chapter IV did not make explicit reference to motor meaning and also did not require an immedi-ate manual response. Thus, the motor system was not inadvertently induced at the meas-ured time point. These results are evidence that carrying out explicit judgements about actions can proceed without the full involve-ment of the motor system. Indeed, evidence that a semantic task does not necessarily elicit greater motor involvement can be found in a recent study. Chen, Davis, Pulvermüller, and Hauk (2015) did not find robust effects of a semantic variable (i.e., imageability) in a semantic decision task, attributing the results to task instructions by which participants were asked to decide if a person’s name was present. That is, no explicit mention to re-trieve features related to actions or senses was made. Rather, the authors reported larg-er imageability effects for silent reading com-pared to a lexical decision task. Similarly, a previous study using a silent reading task reported imageability effects (Hauk, Davis, Kherif, & Pulvermüller, 2008). Altogether, greater semantic processing or task demand is not tantamount to greater recruitment of the motor system, and vice versa (see also Scorolli et al., 2012).  
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N400 data. Notably, motor activation was present but did not show the expected inter-action.   This comparison study delimits the contribu-tion of the motor system in important ways. Motor activation is indeed part of action-related language processing, but it does not function as an interpretive heuristic in either task. This outcome is less surprising in the case of shallow processing given that the task did not require elaboration of the linguistic input. However, that sensibility judgements can proceed without full involvement of the motor system is remarkable. Importantly, this latter result suggests that highly specific motor simulation is not necessary for the derivation and combination of meaning. In this respect, motor activation plays a subsidi-ary or reactive role for certain language tasks. Together, Chapters III and IV showed that the engagement of the motor system is not uniform, thus implying different routes to meaning. 
i. Letter-Search Task Motor activation patterns in the letter-search task did not show differences as a function of verb meaning: action specific verbs did not elicit greater motor activation than non-specific verbs. Nevertheless, motor activation persisted. In a previous fMRI study (Tomasi-no, Werner, Weiss, & Fink, 2007), the con-trast between motor (e.g., “She paints”) and non-motor (e.g. “He borrows”) phrases showed greater motor activation when par-ticipants were engaged in an explicit motor imagery task relative to a letter-search task. In the motor imagery task, a difference be-tween motor and non-motor phrases was found, but this difference was absent in the letter-search task. Even so, motor activation was nevertheless found in the letter-search task, as was in Chapter IV. Importantly, in that chapter, the concurrent N400 congru-
ence effect – i.e., an index of meaning pro-cessing – clarified that despite the distraction, there was access to meaning that differenti-ated between plausible and implausible con-texts. In this sense, there was context-sensitivity but the effect did not modulate motor activity.  Other evidence that motor activation may be present in a shallow task can be found in a TMS study (Experiment 3; Papeo, Vallesi, Isaja, & Rumiati, 2009). In a syllable segmen-tation task (i.e., count the number of syllables in a verb), MEPs measured on the right-hand muscles while reading hand-actions (e.g., “I stir”) decreased, whereas in a semantic task (i.e., judge whether verbs are action-related), MEPs increased. Importantly, this difference was specific to hand-action and not to non-
 early behavioural evidence suggested that the L2, like the L1, may involve motor activation during verb processing. Indeed, an fMRI study with native Dutch and German learners of Dutch showed that Dutch motor verbs (e.g., ‘gooien’, throw) elicited greater activation in motor areas relative to non-motor verbs (e.g., ‘aarzelen’, hesitate) in L1 and L2 participants (de Grauwe, Willems, Rueschemeyer, Lemhöfer, & Schriefers, 2014). As in the be-havioural study, L1 and L2 processing exhib-ited similar motor involvement.  However, in an EEG priming study, differ-ences in the magnitude of motor activation was found in the L1 and L2 of German learn-ers of English (Vukovic & Shtyrov, 2014). Relative to the L2, motor activation was greater to verbs read in the L1. Consistent with this difference, motor activation was indeed observed in L2 processing in Chapter V. Importantly, the results further clarified that the motor system was not proactively involved in L2 processing as an interpretive heuristic, as was reported in L1 (Chapter III). Altogether, the studies on L2 processing converge in reporting motor activation at the single-word and sentence levels. However, studies using time-sensitive EEG revealed subtle magnitude differences in motor activa-tion between the L1 and the L2. In Chapter V, I clarified the reactive role of the motor sys-tem for L2 processing. The lack of differences in motor activation in the L2 may reflect the manner by which an L2 is acquired. The conjoint linguistic and body experiences participating during L2 acquisi-tion and use are arguably less immersive. Consequently, meaning is not as entrenched and enriched as in the L1. Still, L2 processing is not necessarily deprived from making use of the motor system. Time-resolved EEG data reported in Chapter V and elsewhere (Vukovic & Shtyrov, 2014) offer evidence 
that, at least during online L2 processing, embodied effects similar to the L1 are not present. In contrast, the reports of L1-like embodied effects in previous studies using behavioural (Bergen et al., 2010) and fMRI (de Grauwe et al., 2014) measures may have tapped into extended processing that did in fact make greater use of the motor system. At the same time, these motor patterns may also reflect a consequence of limited re-sources. Possessing two languages leads to greater processing demands imposed by the parallel activation of the two languages (e.g., Hasegawa, Carpenter, & Just, 2002). For ex-ample, keeping the irrelevant language from interfering with processing in the relevant language necessitates control and inhibitory mechanisms (e.g., Abutalebi & Green, 2008; Green, 1998). Likewise, the relatively lower familiarity with L2 words can cause difficulty in retrieving meaning (e.g., Abu-Rabia, 2003; Francis & Gutiérrez, 2012). Given an already taxing L2, fully activating the motor system would incur additional cost.  More importantly, the demonstration that L2 processing does not recruit the motor system as a proactive interpretive heuristic is critical evidence for embodied views that claim such contribution is a necessary component to meaning. On the one hand, this finding is indeed consistent with the embodied view because it reflects the weaker interaction between language acquisition and use with action. On the other hand, an embodied view that does not make room for less sensorimo-tor involvement is self-contradicting: it dis-counts, in this particular case, the possibility that a language learned later in life with few-er immersive experiences will rely less on such contributions.  
Theoretical Considerations On a continuum of language dependency on sensorimotor activations, the results are most in line with the Symbol Interdependen-cy Theory (Louwerse, 2011). This theory assumes the contribution of both linguistic and embodied representations to meaning, 
but it contends that language itself is suffi-cient for meaning. Like a well-crafted tool, language has been shaped over time by its users to encode meaning.    The thesis showed that sensorimotor activa-
 Together, the similar patterns in motor activi-ty from the letter-search and sensibility judgement tasks revealed a role of the motor system, different than the one presented in Chapter III. On the one hand, the motor sys-tem can proactively serve as an interpretive heuristic. On the other hand, some forms of language processing do not exploit this func-tional role. Chapter IV showed that motor activity can play a passive, reactive role. If these results are taken to reflect a superficial form of language processing (Sanford & Sturt, 2002), then one route to “good enough” 
meaning (Ferreira, Bailey, & Ferraro, 2002; Ferreira & Patson, 2007) does not entail full motor activation. From a processing cost viewpoint, there is no need to recruit an extended network of brain areas when un-derstanding can be minimally attained. The results are also in line with a proposal that does recognise the joint contributions of language and sensorimotor representations, but argues that language already encodes much of the embodied relations (Louwerse, 2011).  
The Relevance of Motor Activation for Non-Native Readers In Chapter V, it became interesting to ask which of the two roles (i.e., proactive inter-pretive heuristic vs. reactive) identified in Chapters III and IV are involved in L2 pro-cessing. An examination of potential differ-ences in this group of language users is par-ticularly apt for the discussion on embodied representation and processing. Namely, the differences between L1 and L2 acquisition may have consequences for how the motor system is involved during comprehension in either language. An L2 learned later in life, such as in a formal classroom setting (involv-ing, for example, rote learning of words and their meanings) offers experiences substan-tially different from an immersive one. In turn, a "less embodied" experience should show correspondingly less reliance on the motor system. At the same time, there are processing costs associated with using two languages (e.g., Abutalebi et al., 2007; Ardila, 2003; Hasegawa, Carpenter, & Just, 2002; Meuter & Allport, 1999). If the motor system does play a role in L2 processing, the extent of its involvement may be restricted from a processing cost viewpoint. Accordingly, the distinct trajectories by which the L1 and the L2 are acquired must have consequences for understanding either lan-guage. Consistent with the general frame-work formed in Chapters III and IV, Chapter V provided evidence that L2 readers elicited motor activation during action-related sen-tence processing. Specifically, the results were consistent with the reactive account described in Chapter IV. Motor activation patterns did not differ by meaning nor by 
context, despite N400 evidence that L2 read-ers did understand the stimuli in a similar way to L1 readers during silent reading (Chapter III) – i.e., sensitive to descriptions of plausible and implausible actions. Even so, only L1 readers exhibited context-dependent motor activation during silent reading (pro-active interpretive heuristic account). To-gether, the comparison between these two groups highlights a difference in the relative contribution of the motor system during language processing. While L2 processing does recruit the motor system, it does not appear to proactively contribute during silent reading. The current work showed that the sentential context influences L2 processing (e.g., van Assche, Duyck, & Hartsuiker, 2016; Moreno, Bialystok, Wodniecka, & Alain, 2010; Schwartz & Kroll, 2006; van Hell & de Groot, 2008). Importantly, the contextual influence did not modulate motor activation. The new results thus extend previous findings not only to online L2 sentence processing, but also characterised the accompanying motor in-volvement. Previous work suggested that motor activity is involved in L2 processing, but did not examine whether meaning and context can modulate the activity during online sentence processing. For instance, when asked to decide whether a stick man figure matched a given verb, response times were slowed if both the verb and figure im-plied a common effector (Bergen, Lau, Nara-yan, Stojanovic, & Wheeler, 2010). Interest-ingly, this finding was observed in both L1 and L2 (learners of English) participants. This 
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 early behavioural evidence suggested that the L2, like the L1, may involve motor activation during verb processing. Indeed, an fMRI study with native Dutch and German learners of Dutch showed that Dutch motor verbs (e.g., ‘gooien’, throw) elicited greater activation in motor areas relative to non-motor verbs (e.g., ‘aarzelen’, hesitate) in L1 and L2 participants (de Grauwe, Willems, Rueschemeyer, Lemhöfer, & Schriefers, 2014). As in the be-havioural study, L1 and L2 processing exhib-ited similar motor involvement.  However, in an EEG priming study, differ-ences in the magnitude of motor activation was found in the L1 and L2 of German learn-ers of English (Vukovic & Shtyrov, 2014). Relative to the L2, motor activation was greater to verbs read in the L1. Consistent with this difference, motor activation was indeed observed in L2 processing in Chapter V. Importantly, the results further clarified that the motor system was not proactively involved in L2 processing as an interpretive heuristic, as was reported in L1 (Chapter III). Altogether, the studies on L2 processing converge in reporting motor activation at the single-word and sentence levels. However, studies using time-sensitive EEG revealed subtle magnitude differences in motor activa-tion between the L1 and the L2. In Chapter V, I clarified the reactive role of the motor sys-tem for L2 processing. The lack of differences in motor activation in the L2 may reflect the manner by which an L2 is acquired. The conjoint linguistic and body experiences participating during L2 acquisi-tion and use are arguably less immersive. Consequently, meaning is not as entrenched and enriched as in the L1. Still, L2 processing is not necessarily deprived from making use of the motor system. Time-resolved EEG data reported in Chapter V and elsewhere (Vukovic & Shtyrov, 2014) offer evidence 
that, at least during online L2 processing, embodied effects similar to the L1 are not present. In contrast, the reports of L1-like embodied effects in previous studies using behavioural (Bergen et al., 2010) and fMRI (de Grauwe et al., 2014) measures may have tapped into extended processing that did in fact make greater use of the motor system. At the same time, these motor patterns may also reflect a consequence of limited re-sources. Possessing two languages leads to greater processing demands imposed by the parallel activation of the two languages (e.g., Hasegawa, Carpenter, & Just, 2002). For ex-ample, keeping the irrelevant language from interfering with processing in the relevant language necessitates control and inhibitory mechanisms (e.g., Abutalebi & Green, 2008; Green, 1998). Likewise, the relatively lower familiarity with L2 words can cause difficulty in retrieving meaning (e.g., Abu-Rabia, 2003; Francis & Gutiérrez, 2012). Given an already taxing L2, fully activating the motor system would incur additional cost.  More importantly, the demonstration that L2 processing does not recruit the motor system as a proactive interpretive heuristic is critical evidence for embodied views that claim such contribution is a necessary component to meaning. On the one hand, this finding is indeed consistent with the embodied view because it reflects the weaker interaction between language acquisition and use with action. On the other hand, an embodied view that does not make room for less sensorimo-tor involvement is self-contradicting: it dis-counts, in this particular case, the possibility that a language learned later in life with few-er immersive experiences will rely less on such contributions.  
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but it contends that language itself is suffi-cient for meaning. Like a well-crafted tool, language has been shaped over time by its users to encode meaning.    The thesis showed that sensorimotor activa-
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 N400 congruence effects were consistently found regardless of depth of processing. In contrast, mu effects were found, but did not suggest full engagement of the motor system in two of out the three EEG studies. Thus, the predominantly subtle embodied effects across the four studies suggest that sen-sorimotor activations may not fully contrib-ute to language processing. Critically, the manipulation of context (plausible vs. implau-sible) and verb meaning (action specific vs. non-action specific) helped clarify that even when motor activation is present, it may or may not be fully engaged. Thus, it is im-portant to evaluate whether differences in context and meaning modulate activation patterns accordingly in order to attribute proper roles to these activations. 
Future studies should also explicitly test for linguistic and embodied variables (á la Louwerse and colleagues) to assess the rela-tive contributions of each across various tasks in different language users, individuals with different (motoric) expertise, etc. Thus, the focus should be placed on how linguistic and embodied factors contribute to language processing and how different individuals make use of these factors uniquely, as op-posed to gathering evidence in favour of an embodied vs. disembodied account. In summary, the thesis provided supporting evidence for a nuanced view of embodied language processing, highlighting constraints for the scope and interpretation of sen-sorimotor involvement. 
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 tions do not only reflect word meaning, but are subject to context, task, and the linguistic experience of the language user. More im-portantly, meaning may not fully involve sensorimotor activations, contrary to the Action-Perception Networks view (Pulver-müller, 2005). The conclusions also do not fully conform to the Language and Situated Simulation theory (Barsalou, Santos, Sim-mons & Wilson, 2008) that assumes that deep comprehension hinges on embodied repre-sentations. 
The thesis also highlighted some points of consideration for embodied theories of lan-guage. The dynamics of feature activation show that the timing of embodied effects is not just a question of when, but how it chang-es over time. By implication, theories need to explain what these dynamics reflect – e.g., structural or functional organisation. Also, better specification is needed to predict the circumstances in which the motor system makes a proactive contribution to meaning. At the same time, one’s linguistic experience may further constrain these specifications. 
Conclusions The thesis examined the processing dynamics of action-related language. The timing and relative contribution of non-linguistic sen-sorimotor content across contexts, tasks, and linguistic experience formed the lines of inquiry.  Firstly, when reading nouns denoting to manipulable objects (e.g., ‘screwdriver’, ‘housekey’), knowledge about the shape of the object and how one uses the object unfolds over time. Importantly, each type of knowledge has its own unique time course of activation. The finding helps to explain incon-sistencies across studies by highlighting the need to measure at multiple time points in order to effectively capture the presence of a particular type of knowledge.   Secondly, when reading about plausible ac-tions (e.g., “The shopping carts that she push-es/delivers are broken”), the accompanying motor simulation reflects the implied speci-ficity of the actions. However, the mere de-scription of an action does not simply result in motor activation patterns indifferent to the overall meaning. In particular, when reading about implausible actions (e.g., “The shopping carts that he sews/heals are broken”), read-ers proactively attempt to resolve the anoma-ly by making use of the motor system. Im-portantly, this finding characterises the func-
tional role of the motor system as a proactive interpretive heuristic. This account thus explains contradictory reports of motor acti-vation to linguistic descriptions lacking in motor meaning or plausibility.  Thirdly, our comparison of two language tasks that focus the reader’s attention on the letters (letter-search task) or the meaning (sensibility judgement task) of words high-lights an alternative reactive role of the mo-tor system. Remarkably, full motor involve-ment was not found in explicit judgements of noun-verb combinations, but patterned close-ly to those in the letter-search task. Im-portantly, this reduced and reactive form of involvement highlights an alternative means of understanding action-related language.  Fourthly, L2 readers show motor effects consistent with the alternative reactive ac-count when silently reading about plausible and implausible actions. This observation contrasts with the finding in L1 readers. The different linguistic experience of L2 users thus has direct consequence for how action-related language is understood. Importantly, the findings from comparing language tasks and language users underscore the viability of understanding action-related language without extensive motor contributions.  
Final Remarks The series of studies further highlighted one noteworthy observation: Embodied effects are not as robust as would be expected if sensorimotor activations regularly play some important role in language processing. As 
first noted in the priming study in Chapter II, the magnitude of action and visual priming effects were smaller than associative-semantic priming effects. A similar pattern was found in Chapters III through V in which 
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Chapter III 
Appendix 2. Sentence stimuli for the four experimental conditions (List A). 
plausible action verb implausible action verb 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
De wegwijzers die hij kerft zijn stoffig. De harmonica's die hij inpakt zijn nieuw. De nota's die zij schrijft zijn gescheurd. De brillen die hij ophangt zijn gebroken. De lampen die hij opwrijft zijn waardevol. De flessen die zij beschiet zijn leeg. De vazen die hij gebruikt zijn leeg. De meloenen die zij draagt zijn verrot. De hangsloten die hij smelt zijn gebogen. De winkelkarretjes die hij wegduwt zijn kapot. De bonen die hij plant zijn klein. De violen die zij aanpakt zijn handgemaakt. De schrijfmachines die hij breekt zijn waardevol. De archiefkasten die hij repareert zijn oud. De fietsen die hij verwijdert zijn roestig. De essays die zij stuurt zijn lang. De vesten die zij schoonmaakt zijn duur. De stenen die hij tilt zijn zwaar. De tomaten die hij uitdeelt zijn verrot. De stoelen die hij verft zijn wankel. De taarten die hij aansnijdt zijn enorm. De spiegels die hij afveegt zijn gebroken. De touwen die hij knoopt zitten in de war. De dolken die zij smokkelt zijn roestig. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
De ramen die zij kookt zijn gebroken. De pompoenen die hij opvouwt zijn verrot. De pinda's die zij aannaait zijn klein. De standbeelden die hij stuitert zijn handgemaakt. De bezems die zij besmeert zijn kort. De pijlen die hij verdrinkt zijn stoffig. De deuren die zij wegroeit zijn kapot. De scheermessen die zij slaat zijn roestig. De sofa's die zij kietelt zijn geïmporteerd. De nageltangen die hij doorroert zijn nieuw. De koorden die zij stampt zitten in de war. De banken die zij oprekt zijn wankel. De druiven die hij mishandelt zijn verrot. De bekers die zij borduurt zijn waardevol. De documenten die hij knuffelt zijn gescheurd. De dekens die zij plukt zijn vuil. De munten die zij bakt zijn bekrast. De koekjes die zij knijpt zijn klein. De naalden die zij grilt zijn gebogen. De scharen die hij schudt zijn zwaar. De lepels die hij afpelt zijn gebogen. De handschoenen die zij achtervolgt zitten vol vlekken. De schermen die zij strijkt zijn gebroken. De kussens die hij intypt zijn vuil. 
plausible non-action verb implausible non-action verb 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
De dozen die hij ontdekt zijn zwaar. De formules die hij vereist zijn lang. De nagels die zij bewaart zijn gebogen. De souvenirs die zij vermijdt zijn stoffig. De ringen die hij doneert zijn handgemaakt. De tafels die zij controleert zijn wankel. De stropdassen die zij leent zitten vol vlekken. De messen die hij huurt zijn roestig. De schelpen die zij verzamelt zijn stoffig. De boekenkasten die hij adviseert zijn handgemaakt. De brochures die zij faxt zijn gescheurd. De gedichten die hij zendt zijn gescheurd. De frisbee's die hij verbiedt zijn bekrast. De telescopen die zij vervangt zijn bekrast. De kruiden die zij weigert zijn klein. De boeken die hij verbergt zitten vol vlekken. De hoeden die zij selecteert zijn geïmporteerd. De vloermatten die zij bewondert zijn geïmporteerd. De aardappels die hij bestelt zijn verrot. De zwembrillen die zij levert zijn gebroken. De kinderwagens die zij achterlaat zijn kapot. De waterkannen die zij vervloekt zijn leeg. De kasten die zij verkoopt zijn wankel. De brieven die hij beoordeelt zijn lang. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
De borstels die hij verwondt zijn nieuw. De theepotten die zij voedt zijn leeg. De linten die hij zinkt zitten in de war. De scripts die hij spoelt zijn lang. De klemmen die zij fokt zijn gebogen. De hamers die zij stoort zijn zwaar. De paraplu's die hij uitnodigt zijn waardevol. De schoenveters die zij waardeert zitten in de war. De zinnen die zij kwetst zijn lang. De trompetten die hij straft zijn bekrast. De truien die hij verraadt zijn vuil. De botten die zij ontwerpt zijn kort. De vogelkooien die hij verveelt zijn wankel. De badlakens die zij irriteert zitten vol vlekken. De sculpturen die zij benijdt zijn stoffig. De verbanden die hij beledigt zitten in de war. De verrekijkers die hij troost zijn gebroken. De ketens die zij amputeert zijn handgemaakt. De maaiers die zij geneest zijn kapot. De kokosnoten die hij trouwt zijn verrot. De gordels die zij vreest zijn kort. De pannenkoeken die hij aanklaagt zijn enorm. De fluitjes die hij bedreigt zijn roestig. De ketels die zij adopteert zijn leeg. 
 
 
A P P E N D I C E S 
Chapter II 
Appendix 1. Stimuli for the four critical prime conditions and the target words. 
prime target 
unrelated semantic action visual  Salatschüssel  
salad bowl Fischnetz  fishing net Peitsche  whip Autoantenne  radio antenna Angelrute  fishing rod Gürtelschnalle  
belt buckle Gummistiefel  rain boots Fahrradluftpumpe  bike pump Heizpilz  patio heater Regenschirm  umbrella Klappstuhl  
folding chair Benzinkanister  gas tank Nussknacker  nutcracker Spielautomat  slot machine Zapfsäule  gas pump Alufolie  
aluminium foil Dieselmotor  diesel engine Tresortür  vault door Autoreifen  car tires Steuerrad  steering wheel Mülltüte  
trashbag Notizbuch  notebook Essstäbchen  chopsticks Laserpointer  laser pointer Kugelschreiber  ballpoint pen Brechstange  
crowbar Reflektor  reflector Fernbedienung  remote control Mikrophon  microphone Taschenlampe  flashlight Zigarettenschachtel  
cigarette box Federball  shuttlecock Fliegenklatsche  fly swatter Sieb  colander Tennischläger  tennis racket Nähmaschine  
sewing machine Schwimmweste  life jacket Wischmop  mop Löffel  spoon Paddel  oar Motorsense  
grass mower Bleistiftspitzer  pencil sharpener Klebestift  glue stick USB-Stick  memory stick Radiergummi  eraser Heizkörper  
radiator Bettvorleger  rug Baseballschläger  baseball bat Kochlöffel  cooking spatula Teppichklopfer  carpet beater Skistock  
ski pole Trompete  trumpet Blasebalg  bellows Fächer  Chinese fan Accordeon  accordion Teebeutel  
teabag Videokamera  video camera Haarspray  hairspray Walkman  walkman Fotokamera  camera Serviette  
napkin Schraubenschlüssel  wrench Fahrradbremse  bike brakes Wünschelrute  dowsing rods Zange  pliers Kaffeetasse  
coffee cup Schubkarre  wheelbarrow Staubsauger  vacuum cleaner Schneeschieber  snow shovel Schaufel  shovel Funkgeräte  
walkie-talkie Zielscheibe  dartboard Papierflieger  paper plane Spritze  syringe Dartpfeil  dart Blutdruckmesser  
blood pressure monitor Weinglas  wine glass Türknopf  doorknob Spiralfeder  coil spring Korkenzieher  corkscrew Ladegerät  
battery charger Dübel  rawlplug Haustürschlüssel  housekey Lötkolben  soldering iron Schraubenzieher  screwdriver Stehlampe  
floor lamp Flaschenetikett  bottle label Wasserhahn  faucet Münze  coin Schraubverschluss  bottlecap Handschuh  
glove Heizdraht  heating coil Toilettenspülung  toilet flush Kofferradio  radio Toaster  toaster Schlagzeug  
drum kit Leuchtdiode  LED Lautstärkeregler  volume knob Frühstücksei  egg Glühbirne  lightbulb Gartenschlauch  
garden hose Pizza  pizza Schuhbürste  shoe brush Gitterrost  wire grate Käsereibe  cheese grater Klappbett  
folding bed Maßband  tape measure Feuerzeug  lighter Barometer  barometer Stoppuhr  stopwatch Hundeleine  
dog leash Waschmaschine  washing machine Cellobogen  cello bow Maurerkelle  trowel Bügeleisen  clothes iron Registrierkasse  
cash register Gummi  eraser Trillerpfeife  whistle Motorradhelm  helmet Luftballon  balloon 
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Appendix 2. Sentence stimuli for the four experimental conditions (List A). 
plausible action verb implausible action verb 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
De wegwijzers die hij kerft zijn stoffig. De harmonica's die hij inpakt zijn nieuw. De nota's die zij schrijft zijn gescheurd. De brillen die hij ophangt zijn gebroken. De lampen die hij opwrijft zijn waardevol. De flessen die zij beschiet zijn leeg. De vazen die hij gebruikt zijn leeg. De meloenen die zij draagt zijn verrot. De hangsloten die hij smelt zijn gebogen. De winkelkarretjes die hij wegduwt zijn kapot. De bonen die hij plant zijn klein. De violen die zij aanpakt zijn handgemaakt. De schrijfmachines die hij breekt zijn waardevol. De archiefkasten die hij repareert zijn oud. De fietsen die hij verwijdert zijn roestig. De essays die zij stuurt zijn lang. De vesten die zij schoonmaakt zijn duur. De stenen die hij tilt zijn zwaar. De tomaten die hij uitdeelt zijn verrot. De stoelen die hij verft zijn wankel. De taarten die hij aansnijdt zijn enorm. De spiegels die hij afveegt zijn gebroken. De touwen die hij knoopt zitten in de war. De dolken die zij smokkelt zijn roestig. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
De ramen die zij kookt zijn gebroken. De pompoenen die hij opvouwt zijn verrot. De pinda's die zij aannaait zijn klein. De standbeelden die hij stuitert zijn handgemaakt. De bezems die zij besmeert zijn kort. De pijlen die hij verdrinkt zijn stoffig. De deuren die zij wegroeit zijn kapot. De scheermessen die zij slaat zijn roestig. De sofa's die zij kietelt zijn geïmporteerd. De nageltangen die hij doorroert zijn nieuw. De koorden die zij stampt zitten in de war. De banken die zij oprekt zijn wankel. De druiven die hij mishandelt zijn verrot. De bekers die zij borduurt zijn waardevol. De documenten die hij knuffelt zijn gescheurd. De dekens die zij plukt zijn vuil. De munten die zij bakt zijn bekrast. De koekjes die zij knijpt zijn klein. De naalden die zij grilt zijn gebogen. De scharen die hij schudt zijn zwaar. De lepels die hij afpelt zijn gebogen. De handschoenen die zij achtervolgt zitten vol vlekken. De schermen die zij strijkt zijn gebroken. De kussens die hij intypt zijn vuil. 
plausible non-action verb implausible non-action verb 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
De dozen die hij ontdekt zijn zwaar. De formules die hij vereist zijn lang. De nagels die zij bewaart zijn gebogen. De souvenirs die zij vermijdt zijn stoffig. De ringen die hij doneert zijn handgemaakt. De tafels die zij controleert zijn wankel. De stropdassen die zij leent zitten vol vlekken. De messen die hij huurt zijn roestig. De schelpen die zij verzamelt zijn stoffig. De boekenkasten die hij adviseert zijn handgemaakt. De brochures die zij faxt zijn gescheurd. De gedichten die hij zendt zijn gescheurd. De frisbee's die hij verbiedt zijn bekrast. De telescopen die zij vervangt zijn bekrast. De kruiden die zij weigert zijn klein. De boeken die hij verbergt zitten vol vlekken. De hoeden die zij selecteert zijn geïmporteerd. De vloermatten die zij bewondert zijn geïmporteerd. De aardappels die hij bestelt zijn verrot. De zwembrillen die zij levert zijn gebroken. De kinderwagens die zij achterlaat zijn kapot. De waterkannen die zij vervloekt zijn leeg. De kasten die zij verkoopt zijn wankel. De brieven die hij beoordeelt zijn lang. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
De borstels die hij verwondt zijn nieuw. De theepotten die zij voedt zijn leeg. De linten die hij zinkt zitten in de war. De scripts die hij spoelt zijn lang. De klemmen die zij fokt zijn gebogen. De hamers die zij stoort zijn zwaar. De paraplu's die hij uitnodigt zijn waardevol. De schoenveters die zij waardeert zitten in de war. De zinnen die zij kwetst zijn lang. De trompetten die hij straft zijn bekrast. De truien die hij verraadt zijn vuil. De botten die zij ontwerpt zijn kort. De vogelkooien die hij verveelt zijn wankel. De badlakens die zij irriteert zitten vol vlekken. De sculpturen die zij benijdt zijn stoffig. De verbanden die hij beledigt zitten in de war. De verrekijkers die hij troost zijn gebroken. De ketens die zij amputeert zijn handgemaakt. De maaiers die zij geneest zijn kapot. De kokosnoten die hij trouwt zijn verrot. De gordels die zij vreest zijn kort. De pannenkoeken die hij aanklaagt zijn enorm. De fluitjes die hij bedreigt zijn roestig. De ketels die zij adopteert zijn leeg. 
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Appendix 1. Stimuli for the four critical prime conditions and the target words. 
prime target 
unrelated semantic action visual  Salatschüssel  
salad bowl Fischnetz  fishing net Peitsche  whip Autoantenne  radio antenna Angelrute  fishing rod Gürtelschnalle  
belt buckle Gummistiefel  rain boots Fahrradluftpumpe  bike pump Heizpilz  patio heater Regenschirm  umbrella Klappstuhl  
folding chair Benzinkanister  gas tank Nussknacker  nutcracker Spielautomat  slot machine Zapfsäule  gas pump Alufolie  
aluminium foil Dieselmotor  diesel engine Tresortür  vault door Autoreifen  car tires Steuerrad  steering wheel Mülltüte  
trashbag Notizbuch  notebook Essstäbchen  chopsticks Laserpointer  laser pointer Kugelschreiber  ballpoint pen Brechstange  
crowbar Reflektor  reflector Fernbedienung  remote control Mikrophon  microphone Taschenlampe  flashlight Zigarettenschachtel  
cigarette box Federball  shuttlecock Fliegenklatsche  fly swatter Sieb  colander Tennischläger  tennis racket Nähmaschine  
sewing machine Schwimmweste  life jacket Wischmop  mop Löffel  spoon Paddel  oar Motorsense  
grass mower Bleistiftspitzer  pencil sharpener Klebestift  glue stick USB-Stick  memory stick Radiergummi  eraser Heizkörper  
radiator Bettvorleger  rug Baseballschläger  baseball bat Kochlöffel  cooking spatula Teppichklopfer  carpet beater Skistock  
ski pole Trompete  trumpet Blasebalg  bellows Fächer  Chinese fan Accordeon  accordion Teebeutel  
teabag Videokamera  video camera Haarspray  hairspray Walkman  walkman Fotokamera  camera Serviette  
napkin Schraubenschlüssel  wrench Fahrradbremse  bike brakes Wünschelrute  dowsing rods Zange  pliers Kaffeetasse  
coffee cup Schubkarre  wheelbarrow Staubsauger  vacuum cleaner Schneeschieber  snow shovel Schaufel  shovel Funkgeräte  
walkie-talkie Zielscheibe  dartboard Papierflieger  paper plane Spritze  syringe Dartpfeil  dart Blutdruckmesser  
blood pressure monitor Weinglas  wine glass Türknopf  doorknob Spiralfeder  coil spring Korkenzieher  corkscrew Ladegerät  
battery charger Dübel  rawlplug Haustürschlüssel  housekey Lötkolben  soldering iron Schraubenzieher  screwdriver Stehlampe  
floor lamp Flaschenetikett  bottle label Wasserhahn  faucet Münze  coin Schraubverschluss  bottlecap Handschuh  
glove Heizdraht  heating coil Toilettenspülung  toilet flush Kofferradio  radio Toaster  toaster Schlagzeug  
drum kit Leuchtdiode  LED Lautstärkeregler  volume knob Frühstücksei  egg Glühbirne  lightbulb Gartenschlauch  
garden hose Pizza  pizza Schuhbürste  shoe brush Gitterrost  wire grate Käsereibe  cheese grater Klappbett  
folding bed Maßband  tape measure Feuerzeug  lighter Barometer  barometer Stoppuhr  stopwatch Hundeleine  
dog leash Waschmaschine  washing machine Cellobogen  cello bow Maurerkelle  trowel Bügeleisen  clothes iron Registrierkasse  
cash register Gummi  eraser Trillerpfeife  whistle Motorradhelm  helmet Luftballon  balloon 
    
          
 
plausible non-action verb implausible non-action verb 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
De nagels die zij bewaart zijn gebogen. De tafels die zij controleert zijn wankel. De messen die hij huurt zijn roestig. De ringen die hij doneert zijn handgemaakt. De souvenirs die zij vermijdt zijn stoffig. De dozen die hij ontdekt zijn zwaar. De boekenkasten die hij adviseert zijn handgemaakt. De formules die hij vereist zijn lang. De frisbee's die hij verbiedt zijn bekrast. De hoeden die zij selecteert zijn geïmporteerd. De gedichten die hij zendt zijn gescheurd. De telescopen die zij vervangt zijn bekrast. De stropdassen die zij ontvangt zitten vol vlekken. De schelpen die zij verzamelt zijn stoffig. De kruiden die zij weigert zijn klein. De brochures die zij faxt zijn gescheurd. De waterkannen die zij vervloekt zijn leeg. De boeken die hij verbergt zitten vol vlekken. De aardappels die hij bestelt zijn verrot. De vloermatten die zij bewondert zijn geïmporteerd. De kasten die zij verkoopt zijn wankel. De kinderwagens die zij achterlaat zijn kapot. De zwembrillen die zij levert zijn gebroken. De brieven die hij beoordeelt zijn lang. De kasten die hij inruimt zijn handgemaakt. De tassen die hij verfraait zijn te koop. De schoenen die zij wegdoet zijn beschadigd. De munten die zij inruilt zijn veel geld waard. De essays die hij aanpast zijn handgeschreven. De brillen die zij bevuilt zijn gloednieuw. De dekens die hij versiert zijn duur. De schrijfmachines die hij opknapt zijn kapot. De theepotten die zij leegmaakt zijn zeldzaam. De banken die zij leent zijn tweedehands. De bonen die hij klaarmaakt zijn biologisch. De borden die zij ontvreemdt zijn te koop. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
De hamers die zij stoort zijn zwaar. De schoenveters die zij waardeert zitten in de war. De borstels die hij verwondt zijn nieuw. De linten die hij zinkt zitten in de war. De klemmen die zij fokt zijn gebogen. De theepotten die zij voedt zijn leeg. De trompetten die hij straft zijn bekrast. De scripts die hij spoelt zijn lang. De badlakens die zij irriteert zitten vol vlekken. De truien die hij verraadt zijn vuil. De verbanden die hij beledigt zitten in de war. De verrekijkers die hij troost zijn gebroken. De vogelkooien die hij verveelt zijn wankel. De paraplu's die hij uitnodigt zijn waardevol. De zinnen die zij kwetst zijn lang. De botten die zij ontwerpt zijn kort. De fluitjes die hij bedreigt zijn roestig. De gordels die zij vreest zijn kort. De ketens die zij amputeert zijn handgemaakt. De sculpturen die zij benijdt zijn stoffig. De ketels die zij adopteert zijn leeg. De pannenkoeken die hij aanklaagt zijn enorm. De maaiers die zij geneest zijn kapot. De kokosnoten die hij trouwt zijn verrot. De ramen die hij bijhoudt zijn nieuw. De stenen die zij monteert zijn zwaar. De hangsloten die hij inlegt zijn zwaar. De brieven die hij ontmantelt zijn net binnengekomen. De dozen die zij toepast zijn pasgekocht. De flessen die zij ontwart zijn beschadigd. De kussens die zij oogst zitten vol vlekken. De knopen die hij uitroeit zijn gevonden. De veters die zij afspoelt zijn nieuw. De deuren die hij bereidt zijn geïmporteerd. De archiefkasten die zij spaart zijn stoffig. De spiegels die hij knutselt zijn net geleverd. 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter IV 
Appendix 3. Sentence stimuli for the four experimental conditions (List A).    
plausible action verb implausible action verb 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
De nota's die zij schrijft zijn gescheurd. De mondharmonica's die hij inpakt zijn nieuw. De flessen die zij beschiet zijn leeg. De hangsloten die hij smelt zijn gebogen. De brillen die hij ophangt zijn gebroken. De lampen die hij opwrijft zijn waardevol. De wegwijzers die hij kerft zijn stoffig. De vazen die hij gebruikt zijn leeg. De fietsen die hij verwijdert zijn roestig. De archiefkasten die hij repareert zijn oud. De winkelkarretjes die hij wegduwt zijn kapot. De essays die zij stuurt zijn lang. De meloenen die zij draagt zijn verrot. De schrijfmachines die hij breekt zijn waardevol. De violen die zij aanpakt zijn handgemaakt. De bonen die hij plant zijn klein. De taarten die hij aansnijdt zijn enorm. De spiegels die hij afveegt zijn gebroken. De tomaten die hij uitdeelt zijn verrot. De vesten die zij schoonmaakt zijn duur. De stenen die hij tilt zijn zwaar. De dolken die zij smokkelt zijn roestig. De touwen die hij knoopt zitten in de war. De stoelen die hij verft zijn wankel. De borstels die hij opraapt zijn gevallen. De aardappels die zij schilt zijn vers. De messen die hij slijpt zijn oud. De kettingsloten die zij losmaakt zijn nieuw. De souvenirs die hij neerzet zijn beschadigd. De koorden die hij vastbindt zijn lang. De boeken die hij stapelt zijn zwaar. De laarzen die zij uittrekt zijn nat. De documenten die hij verscheurt zijn ongelezen. De pannenkoeken die zij bedekt zijn lekker. De oesters die zij kraakt zijn enorm. De tafels die zij schildert zijn van hout. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
De pinda's die zij aannaait zijn klein. De standbeelden die hij stuitert zijn handgemaakt. De scheermessen die zij slaat zijn roestig. De pompoenen die hij opvouwt zijn verrot. De bezems die zij besmeert zijn kort. De deuren die zij wegroeit zijn kapot. De ramen die zij kookt zijn gebroken. De pijlen die hij verdrinkt zijn stoffig. De sofa's die zij kietelt zijn geïmporteerd. De bekers die zij borduurt zijn waardevol. De nagelknippers die hij doorroert zijn nieuw. De banken die zij oprekt zijn wankel. De documenten die hij knuffelt zijn gescheurd. De druiven die hij mishandelt zijn verrot. De dekens die zij plukt zijn vuil. De koorden die zij stampt zitten in de war. De scharen die hij schudt zijn zwaar. De kussens die hij intypt zijn vuil. De lepels die hij afpelt zijn gebogen. De munten die zij bakt zijn bekrast. De naalden die zij grilt zijn gebogen. De schermen die zij strijkt zijn gebroken. De koekjes die zij knijpt zijn klein. De handschoenen die zij achtervolgt zitten vol vlekken. De mondharmonica's die hij doorknipt zijn duur. De boekenkasten die zij platdrukt zijn geïmporteerd. De sculpturen die hij jongleert zijn nieuw. De pijlen die zij masseert zijn handgemaakt. De violen die hij omslaat zijn tweedehands. De naalden die hij bestuurt zijn ongebruikt. De koekjes die zij buigt zijn goedkoop. De pompoenen die hij omdoet zijn net binnengekomen. De paraplu's die zij poetst zijn te koop. De keukenkastjes die zij vlecht zijn nieuw. De scharen die zij harkt zijn beschadigd. De botten die hij aantrekt zijn waardevol.    
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plausible non-action verb implausible non-action verb 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
De nagels die zij bewaart zijn gebogen. De tafels die zij controleert zijn wankel. De messen die hij huurt zijn roestig. De ringen die hij doneert zijn handgemaakt. De souvenirs die zij vermijdt zijn stoffig. De dozen die hij ontdekt zijn zwaar. De boekenkasten die hij adviseert zijn handgemaakt. De formules die hij vereist zijn lang. De frisbee's die hij verbiedt zijn bekrast. De hoeden die zij selecteert zijn geïmporteerd. De gedichten die hij zendt zijn gescheurd. De telescopen die zij vervangt zijn bekrast. De stropdassen die zij ontvangt zitten vol vlekken. De schelpen die zij verzamelt zijn stoffig. De kruiden die zij weigert zijn klein. De brochures die zij faxt zijn gescheurd. De waterkannen die zij vervloekt zijn leeg. De boeken die hij verbergt zitten vol vlekken. De aardappels die hij bestelt zijn verrot. De vloermatten die zij bewondert zijn geïmporteerd. De kasten die zij verkoopt zijn wankel. De kinderwagens die zij achterlaat zijn kapot. De zwembrillen die zij levert zijn gebroken. De brieven die hij beoordeelt zijn lang. De kasten die hij inruimt zijn handgemaakt. De tassen die hij verfraait zijn te koop. De schoenen die zij wegdoet zijn beschadigd. De munten die zij inruilt zijn veel geld waard. De essays die hij aanpast zijn handgeschreven. De brillen die zij bevuilt zijn gloednieuw. De dekens die hij versiert zijn duur. De schrijfmachines die hij opknapt zijn kapot. De theepotten die zij leegmaakt zijn zeldzaam. De banken die zij leent zijn tweedehands. De bonen die hij klaarmaakt zijn biologisch. De borden die zij ontvreemdt zijn te koop. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
De hamers die zij stoort zijn zwaar. De schoenveters die zij waardeert zitten in de war. De borstels die hij verwondt zijn nieuw. De linten die hij zinkt zitten in de war. De klemmen die zij fokt zijn gebogen. De theepotten die zij voedt zijn leeg. De trompetten die hij straft zijn bekrast. De scripts die hij spoelt zijn lang. De badlakens die zij irriteert zitten vol vlekken. De truien die hij verraadt zijn vuil. De verbanden die hij beledigt zitten in de war. De verrekijkers die hij troost zijn gebroken. De vogelkooien die hij verveelt zijn wankel. De paraplu's die hij uitnodigt zijn waardevol. De zinnen die zij kwetst zijn lang. De botten die zij ontwerpt zijn kort. De fluitjes die hij bedreigt zijn roestig. De gordels die zij vreest zijn kort. De ketens die zij amputeert zijn handgemaakt. De sculpturen die zij benijdt zijn stoffig. De ketels die zij adopteert zijn leeg. De pannenkoeken die hij aanklaagt zijn enorm. De maaiers die zij geneest zijn kapot. De kokosnoten die hij trouwt zijn verrot. De ramen die hij bijhoudt zijn nieuw. De stenen die zij monteert zijn zwaar. De hangsloten die hij inlegt zijn zwaar. De brieven die hij ontmantelt zijn net binnengekomen. De dozen die zij toepast zijn pasgekocht. De flessen die zij ontwart zijn beschadigd. De kussens die zij oogst zitten vol vlekken. De knopen die hij uitroeit zijn gevonden. De veters die zij afspoelt zijn nieuw. De deuren die hij bereidt zijn geïmporteerd. De archiefkasten die zij spaart zijn stoffig. De spiegels die hij knutselt zijn net geleverd. 
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Appendix 3. Sentence stimuli for the four experimental conditions (List A).    
plausible action verb implausible action verb 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
De nota's die zij schrijft zijn gescheurd. De mondharmonica's die hij inpakt zijn nieuw. De flessen die zij beschiet zijn leeg. De hangsloten die hij smelt zijn gebogen. De brillen die hij ophangt zijn gebroken. De lampen die hij opwrijft zijn waardevol. De wegwijzers die hij kerft zijn stoffig. De vazen die hij gebruikt zijn leeg. De fietsen die hij verwijdert zijn roestig. De archiefkasten die hij repareert zijn oud. De winkelkarretjes die hij wegduwt zijn kapot. De essays die zij stuurt zijn lang. De meloenen die zij draagt zijn verrot. De schrijfmachines die hij breekt zijn waardevol. De violen die zij aanpakt zijn handgemaakt. De bonen die hij plant zijn klein. De taarten die hij aansnijdt zijn enorm. De spiegels die hij afveegt zijn gebroken. De tomaten die hij uitdeelt zijn verrot. De vesten die zij schoonmaakt zijn duur. De stenen die hij tilt zijn zwaar. De dolken die zij smokkelt zijn roestig. De touwen die hij knoopt zitten in de war. De stoelen die hij verft zijn wankel. De borstels die hij opraapt zijn gevallen. De aardappels die zij schilt zijn vers. De messen die hij slijpt zijn oud. De kettingsloten die zij losmaakt zijn nieuw. De souvenirs die hij neerzet zijn beschadigd. De koorden die hij vastbindt zijn lang. De boeken die hij stapelt zijn zwaar. De laarzen die zij uittrekt zijn nat. De documenten die hij verscheurt zijn ongelezen. De pannenkoeken die zij bedekt zijn lekker. De oesters die zij kraakt zijn enorm. De tafels die zij schildert zijn van hout. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
De pinda's die zij aannaait zijn klein. De standbeelden die hij stuitert zijn handgemaakt. De scheermessen die zij slaat zijn roestig. De pompoenen die hij opvouwt zijn verrot. De bezems die zij besmeert zijn kort. De deuren die zij wegroeit zijn kapot. De ramen die zij kookt zijn gebroken. De pijlen die hij verdrinkt zijn stoffig. De sofa's die zij kietelt zijn geïmporteerd. De bekers die zij borduurt zijn waardevol. De nagelknippers die hij doorroert zijn nieuw. De banken die zij oprekt zijn wankel. De documenten die hij knuffelt zijn gescheurd. De druiven die hij mishandelt zijn verrot. De dekens die zij plukt zijn vuil. De koorden die zij stampt zitten in de war. De scharen die hij schudt zijn zwaar. De kussens die hij intypt zijn vuil. De lepels die hij afpelt zijn gebogen. De munten die zij bakt zijn bekrast. De naalden die zij grilt zijn gebogen. De schermen die zij strijkt zijn gebroken. De koekjes die zij knijpt zijn klein. De handschoenen die zij achtervolgt zitten vol vlekken. De mondharmonica's die hij doorknipt zijn duur. De boekenkasten die zij platdrukt zijn geïmporteerd. De sculpturen die hij jongleert zijn nieuw. De pijlen die zij masseert zijn handgemaakt. De violen die hij omslaat zijn tweedehands. De naalden die hij bestuurt zijn ongebruikt. De koekjes die zij buigt zijn goedkoop. De pompoenen die hij omdoet zijn net binnengekomen. De paraplu's die zij poetst zijn te koop. De keukenkastjes die zij vlecht zijn nieuw. De scharen die zij harkt zijn beschadigd. De botten die hij aantrekt zijn waardevol.    
     
 
 
plausible non-action verb implausible non-action verb 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
De aardappels die hij bestelt zijn verrot. De boeken die hij verbergt zitten vol vlekken. De boekenkasten die hij adviseert zijn handgemaakt. De brieven die hij beoordeelt zijn lang. De brochures die zij faxt zijn gescheurd. De dozen die hij ontdekt zijn zwaar. De formules die hij vereist zijn lang. De frisbee's die hij verbiedt zijn bekrast. De gedichten die hij zendt zijn gescheurd. De hoeden die zij selecteert zijn geïmporteerd. De kasten die zij verkoopt zijn wankel. De kinderwagens die zij achterlaat zijn kapot. De kruiden die zij weigert zijn klein. De messen die hij huurt zijn roestig. De nagels die zij bewaart zijn gebogen. De ringen die hij doneert zijn handgemaakt. De schelpen die zij verzamelt zijn stoffig. De souvenirs die zij vermijdt zijn stoffig. De stropdassen die zij ontvangt zitten vol vlekken. De tafels die zij controleert zijn wankel. De telescopen die zij vervangt zijn bekrast. De vloermatten die zij bewondert zijn geïmporteerd. De waterkannen die zij vervloekt zijn leeg. De zwembrillen die zij levert zijn gebroken. De banken die zij leent zijn tweedehands. De bonen die hij klaarmaakt zijn biologisch. De borden die zij ontvreemdt zijn te koop. De brillen die zij bevuilt zijn gloednieuw. De dekens die hij versiert zijn duur. De essays die hij aanpast zijn handgeschreven. De kasten die hij inruimt zijn handgemaakt. De munten die zij inruilt zijn veel geld waard. De schoenen die zij wegdoet zijn beschadigd. De schrijfmachines die hij opknapt zijn kapot. De tassen die hij verfraait zijn te koop. De theepotten die zij leegmaakt zijn zeldzaam. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
De badlakens die zij irriteert zitten vol vlekken. De borstels die hij verwondt zijn nieuw. De botten die zij ontwerpt zijn kort. De fluitjes die hij bedreigt zijn roestig. De gordels die zij vreest zijn kort. De hamers die zij stoort zijn zwaar. De ketels die zij adopteert zijn leeg. De ketens die zij amputeert zijn handgemaakt. De klemmen die zij fokt zijn gebogen. De kokosnoten die hij trouwt zijn verrot. De linten die hij zinkt zitten in de war. De maaiers die zij geneest zijn kapot. De pannenkoeken die hij aanklaagt zijn enorm. De paraplu's die hij uitnodigt zijn waardevol. De schoenveters die zij waardeert zitten in de war. De scripts die hij spoelt zijn lang. De sculpturen die zij benijdt zijn stoffig. De theepotten die zij voedt zijn leeg. De trompetten die hij straft zijn bekrast. De truien die hij verraadt zijn vuil. De verbanden die hij beledigt zitten in de war. De verrekijkers die hij troost zijn gebroken. De vogelkooien die hij verveelt zijn wankel. De zinnen die zij kwetst zijn lang. De archiefkasten die zij spaart zijn stoffig. De brieven die hij ontmantelt zijn net binnengekomen. De deuren die hij bereidt zijn geïmporteerd. De dozen die zij toepast zijn pasgekocht. De flessen die zij ontwart zijn beschadigd. De hangsloten die hij inlegt zijn zwaar. De knopen die hij uitroeit zijn gevonden. De kussens die zij oogst zitten vol vlekken. De ramen die hij bijhoudt zijn nieuw. De spiegels die hij knutselt zijn net geleverd. De stenen die zij monteert zijn zwaar. De veters die zij afspoelt zijn nieuw.  
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter V 
Appendix 4. Sentence stimuli for the four experimental conditions (List A).    
plausible action verb implausible action verb 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
De archiefkasten die hij repareert zijn oud. De bonen die hij plant zijn klein. De brillen die hij ophangt zijn gebroken. De dolken die zij smokkelt zijn roestig. De essays die zij stuurt zijn lang. De fietsen die hij verwijdert zijn roestig. De flessen die zij beschiet zijn leeg. De hangsloten die hij smelt zijn gebogen. De lampen die hij opwrijft zijn waardevol. De meloenen die zij draagt zijn verrot. De mondharmonica's die hij inpakt zijn nieuw. De nota's die zij schrijft zijn gescheurd. De schrijfmachines die hij breekt zijn waardevol. De spiegels die hij afveegt zijn gebroken. De stenen die hij tilt zijn zwaar. De stoelen die hij verft zijn wankel. De taarten die hij aansnijdt zijn enorm. De tomaten die hij uitdeelt zijn verrot. De touwen die hij knoopt zitten in de war. De vazen die hij gebruikt zijn leeg. De vesten die zij schoonmaakt zijn duur. De violen die zij aanpakt zijn handgemaakt. De wegwijzers die hij kerft zijn stoffig. De winkelkarretjes die hij wegduwt zijn kapot. De aardappels die zij schilt zijn vers. De boeken die hij stapelt zijn zwaar. De borstels die hij opraapt zijn gevallen. De documenten die hij verscheurt zijn ongelezen. De kettingsloten die zij losmaakt zijn nieuw. De koorden die hij vastbindt zijn lang. De laarzen die zij uittrekt zijn nat. De messen die hij slijpt zijn oud. De oesters die zij kraakt zijn enorm. De pannenkoeken die zij bedekt zijn lekker. De souvenirs die hij neerzet zijn beschadigd. De tafels die zij schildert zijn van hout. 
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De banken die zij oprekt zijn wankel. De bekers die zij borduurt zijn waardevol. De bezems die zij besmeert zijn kort. De dekens die zij plukt zijn vuil. De deuren die zij wegroeit zijn kapot. De documenten die hij knuffelt zijn gescheurd. De druiven die hij mishandelt zijn verrot. De handschoenen die zij achtervolgt zitten vol vlekken. De koekjes die zij knijpt zijn klein. De koorden die zij stampt zitten in de war. De kussens die hij intypt zijn vuil. De lepels die hij afpelt zijn gebogen. De munten die zij bakt zijn bekrast. De naalden die zij grilt zijn gebogen. De nagelknippers die hij doorroert zijn nieuw. De pijlen die hij verdrinkt zijn stoffig. De pinda's die zij aannaait zijn klein. De pompoenen die hij opvouwt zijn verrot. De ramen die zij kookt zijn gebroken. De scharen die hij schudt zijn zwaar. De scheermessen die zij slaat zijn roestig. De schermen die zij strijkt zijn gebroken. De sofa's die zij kietelt zijn geïmporteerd. De standbeelden die hij stuitert zijn handgemaakt. De boekenkasten die zij platdrukt zijn geïmporteerd. De botten die hij aantrekt zijn waardevol. De keukenkastjes die zij vlecht zijn nieuw. De koekjes die zij buigt zijn goedkoop. De mondharmonica's die hij doorknipt zijn duur. De naalden die hij bestuurt zijn ongebruikt. De paraplu's die zij poetst zijn te koop. De pijlen die zij masseert zijn handgemaakt. De pompoenen die hij omdoet zijn net binnengekomen. De scharen die zij harkt zijn beschadigd. De sculpturen die hij jongleert zijn nieuw. De violen die hij omslaat zijn tweedehands.    
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plausible non-action verb implausible non-action verb 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
De aardappels die hij bestelt zijn verrot. De boeken die hij verbergt zitten vol vlekken. De boekenkasten die hij adviseert zijn handgemaakt. De brieven die hij beoordeelt zijn lang. De brochures die zij faxt zijn gescheurd. De dozen die hij ontdekt zijn zwaar. De formules die hij vereist zijn lang. De frisbee's die hij verbiedt zijn bekrast. De gedichten die hij zendt zijn gescheurd. De hoeden die zij selecteert zijn geïmporteerd. De kasten die zij verkoopt zijn wankel. De kinderwagens die zij achterlaat zijn kapot. De kruiden die zij weigert zijn klein. De messen die hij huurt zijn roestig. De nagels die zij bewaart zijn gebogen. De ringen die hij doneert zijn handgemaakt. De schelpen die zij verzamelt zijn stoffig. De souvenirs die zij vermijdt zijn stoffig. De stropdassen die zij ontvangt zitten vol vlekken. De tafels die zij controleert zijn wankel. De telescopen die zij vervangt zijn bekrast. De vloermatten die zij bewondert zijn geïmporteerd. De waterkannen die zij vervloekt zijn leeg. De zwembrillen die zij levert zijn gebroken. De banken die zij leent zijn tweedehands. De bonen die hij klaarmaakt zijn biologisch. De borden die zij ontvreemdt zijn te koop. De brillen die zij bevuilt zijn gloednieuw. De dekens die hij versiert zijn duur. De essays die hij aanpast zijn handgeschreven. De kasten die hij inruimt zijn handgemaakt. De munten die zij inruilt zijn veel geld waard. De schoenen die zij wegdoet zijn beschadigd. De schrijfmachines die hij opknapt zijn kapot. De tassen die hij verfraait zijn te koop. De theepotten die zij leegmaakt zijn zeldzaam. 
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De badlakens die zij irriteert zitten vol vlekken. De borstels die hij verwondt zijn nieuw. De botten die zij ontwerpt zijn kort. De fluitjes die hij bedreigt zijn roestig. De gordels die zij vreest zijn kort. De hamers die zij stoort zijn zwaar. De ketels die zij adopteert zijn leeg. De ketens die zij amputeert zijn handgemaakt. De klemmen die zij fokt zijn gebogen. De kokosnoten die hij trouwt zijn verrot. De linten die hij zinkt zitten in de war. De maaiers die zij geneest zijn kapot. De pannenkoeken die hij aanklaagt zijn enorm. De paraplu's die hij uitnodigt zijn waardevol. De schoenveters die zij waardeert zitten in de war. De scripts die hij spoelt zijn lang. De sculpturen die zij benijdt zijn stoffig. De theepotten die zij voedt zijn leeg. De trompetten die hij straft zijn bekrast. De truien die hij verraadt zijn vuil. De verbanden die hij beledigt zitten in de war. De verrekijkers die hij troost zijn gebroken. De vogelkooien die hij verveelt zijn wankel. De zinnen die zij kwetst zijn lang. De archiefkasten die zij spaart zijn stoffig. De brieven die hij ontmantelt zijn net binnengekomen. De deuren die hij bereidt zijn geïmporteerd. De dozen die zij toepast zijn pasgekocht. De flessen die zij ontwart zijn beschadigd. De hangsloten die hij inlegt zijn zwaar. De knopen die hij uitroeit zijn gevonden. De kussens die zij oogst zitten vol vlekken. De ramen die hij bijhoudt zijn nieuw. De spiegels die hij knutselt zijn net geleverd. De stenen die zij monteert zijn zwaar. De veters die zij afspoelt zijn nieuw.  
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Appendix 4. Sentence stimuli for the four experimental conditions (List A).    
plausible action verb implausible action verb 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
De archiefkasten die hij repareert zijn oud. De bonen die hij plant zijn klein. De brillen die hij ophangt zijn gebroken. De dolken die zij smokkelt zijn roestig. De essays die zij stuurt zijn lang. De fietsen die hij verwijdert zijn roestig. De flessen die zij beschiet zijn leeg. De hangsloten die hij smelt zijn gebogen. De lampen die hij opwrijft zijn waardevol. De meloenen die zij draagt zijn verrot. De mondharmonica's die hij inpakt zijn nieuw. De nota's die zij schrijft zijn gescheurd. De schrijfmachines die hij breekt zijn waardevol. De spiegels die hij afveegt zijn gebroken. De stenen die hij tilt zijn zwaar. De stoelen die hij verft zijn wankel. De taarten die hij aansnijdt zijn enorm. De tomaten die hij uitdeelt zijn verrot. De touwen die hij knoopt zitten in de war. De vazen die hij gebruikt zijn leeg. De vesten die zij schoonmaakt zijn duur. De violen die zij aanpakt zijn handgemaakt. De wegwijzers die hij kerft zijn stoffig. De winkelkarretjes die hij wegduwt zijn kapot. De aardappels die zij schilt zijn vers. De boeken die hij stapelt zijn zwaar. De borstels die hij opraapt zijn gevallen. De documenten die hij verscheurt zijn ongelezen. De kettingsloten die zij losmaakt zijn nieuw. De koorden die hij vastbindt zijn lang. De laarzen die zij uittrekt zijn nat. De messen die hij slijpt zijn oud. De oesters die zij kraakt zijn enorm. De pannenkoeken die zij bedekt zijn lekker. De souvenirs die hij neerzet zijn beschadigd. De tafels die zij schildert zijn van hout. 
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De banken die zij oprekt zijn wankel. De bekers die zij borduurt zijn waardevol. De bezems die zij besmeert zijn kort. De dekens die zij plukt zijn vuil. De deuren die zij wegroeit zijn kapot. De documenten die hij knuffelt zijn gescheurd. De druiven die hij mishandelt zijn verrot. De handschoenen die zij achtervolgt zitten vol vlekken. De koekjes die zij knijpt zijn klein. De koorden die zij stampt zitten in de war. De kussens die hij intypt zijn vuil. De lepels die hij afpelt zijn gebogen. De munten die zij bakt zijn bekrast. De naalden die zij grilt zijn gebogen. De nagelknippers die hij doorroert zijn nieuw. De pijlen die hij verdrinkt zijn stoffig. De pinda's die zij aannaait zijn klein. De pompoenen die hij opvouwt zijn verrot. De ramen die zij kookt zijn gebroken. De scharen die hij schudt zijn zwaar. De scheermessen die zij slaat zijn roestig. De schermen die zij strijkt zijn gebroken. De sofa's die zij kietelt zijn geïmporteerd. De standbeelden die hij stuitert zijn handgemaakt. De boekenkasten die zij platdrukt zijn geïmporteerd. De botten die hij aantrekt zijn waardevol. De keukenkastjes die zij vlecht zijn nieuw. De koekjes die zij buigt zijn goedkoop. De mondharmonica's die hij doorknipt zijn duur. De naalden die hij bestuurt zijn ongebruikt. De paraplu's die zij poetst zijn te koop. De pijlen die zij masseert zijn handgemaakt. De pompoenen die hij omdoet zijn net binnengekomen. De scharen die zij harkt zijn beschadigd. De sculpturen die hij jongleert zijn nieuw. De violen die hij omslaat zijn tweedehands.    
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   Suppose we encounter the statement “I grabbed a copy of Kevin’s thesis and headed to the aula”. Would we actually activate the brain areas involved in grabbing when we under-stand this sentence? Or perhaps we would not activate those areas because no actual grabbing action was performed. Would the answers be any different in the case of a non-native language? In general, the thesis adopted the embodied view of language processing: Understanding language relies (partially) on the very same sensorimotor brain areas that control how our bodies perceive (sensory) and act (motor) with the world. For example, brain areas responsible for hand movements are activated when understanding the word ‘grasp’. Likewise, reading the word ‘red’ activates brain areas involved in per-ceiving colour. These "embodied effects" have led researchers to ascribe varying importance of non-language areas to word meaning.  According to some scientific theories, the relation between language and sensorimotor areas is practically inseparable -- meaning is the combined result of these two areas. Others place meaning on language itself, with little to no involve-ment from sensorimotor areas necessary for meaning. Yet others place meaning on embodied effects, implying that very little meaning can come from language itself. Stated different-ly, each view places different emphasis on the contribution of language and sensorimotor activations for meaning.  This thesis investigated two issues concerning the relevance of embodied effects for understanding language. First, assum-ing that embodied effects do indeed exist (that is, observing sensorimotor involvement), when do their effects emerge during reading, and how do they change over time? This first issue was examined in Chapter II. Second, what is the contri-bution of any such effects to meaning? How does the contri-bution change with context, task, and language experience? This second issue was explored in Chapters III through V. 
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 Interestingly, in a non-meaningful context, descriptions about impossible actions (e.g., “The shopping carts that he sews/heals are broken”) did not stop readers from imagining these actions. However, the motor activation patterns did not reflect the implied specifici-ty, as was found when reading about possible actions. There was a hint of greater motor activation for non-specific actions like heal-
ing. This observation suggested that readers may have been attempting to make sense of the descriptions by imagining some possible way of performing the actions.  Accordingly, the patterns of motor activation observed with possible and impossible action descriptions led to the identification of one form of motor contribution: as a proactive interpretive heuristic. This account proposes that readers make use (proactive) of the motor system as a tool (heuristic) to help 
make sense (interpretive) not only of possi-ble action descriptions, but perhaps more strikingly, to make sense of impossible action descriptions. In order to assign such a role to the motor system, activation patterns must minimally reflect differences in implied pos-sible actions. Further evidence of motor acti-vation when reading about impossible ac-tions shows its involvement in resolving the problematic descriptions.   Such an account may help explain why motor activation has been previously reported with words that do not have clear motor meaning such as ‘rectangle’ or with nonsense words that appear like verbs such as ‘gralp’ instead of ‘grasp’. Put differently, motor activation may not be unique to words describing ac-tions. Rather, it may also reflect the involve-ment of the motor system in deriving mean-ing.  
(2b) Embodied effects in different tasks  The experiment reported in Chapter IV was intended to examine how different language tasks affect the contribution of the motor system when reading the same kinds of sen-tences used in Chapter III.   In one group, participants were asked to search for a letter within the sentence (letter-search task). Good performance on the task did not require any attention to meaning, and thus offered a way to assess whether motor activation still occurs simply as a result of reading action words.  In contrast, another group of participants was asked to decide if the sentence made sense (sensibility judgement task). Importantly, the instructions did not make any reference to action meaning to avoid biasing the outcome. Participants were left to their own devices on how they would make such decisions (name-ly, with or without the motor system).  Despite the different emphasis on meaning, both tasks produced similar results. This outcome is particularly noteworthy with regard to the sensibility judgement task. Sentences describing possible actions (e.g., “The shopping carts that she pushes/delivers are broken”) did not show motor activation 
patterns that reflected the implied actions. Instead, the pattern was similar to that ob-served with sentences describing impossible actions (e.g., “The shopping carts that he sews/heals are broken”), as was the case also in Chapter III.  This outcome is unexpected if one assumes that explicit judgements about action descrip-tions (that is, thinking about action meaning) would very likely involve the motor system. Instead, it appeared that participants made such judgements with little motor involve-ment, an observation also found in the letter-search task. Moreover, a complementary measure of brain activity that indexes under-standing as well as accuracy scores showed that the group indeed performed the task as instructed. At the same time, it is equally remarkable that motor activation was never-theless observed when meaning is not crucial for performing the letter-search task.  Taken together, the results confirmed that the motor system is activated while perform-ing these tasks despite their different re-quirements. However, the patterns of motor activation did not fit the account introduced in Chapter III because these patterns did not reflect the implied specificity when reading 
 
(1) When and how embodied effects appear over time In the experiment reported in Chapter II, participants viewed pairs of letter strings on a computer screen that were made up of either real words or combined with nonsense words. They were asked to press a button only to real word pairs. All the words re-ferred to man-made objects.   Some pairs were related in how you used the two objects (“action-related”; e.g., similar movements when using a housekey and a screwdriver), others were related in how the objects appeared in form (“visual-related”; 
e.g., similar shape between a soldering iron and a screwdriver). Others were not related at all and served as a control condition. The speed at which participants responded to a word pair was measured, and the response times for each related condition was com-pared against the unrelated control condition. The difference in response times indexed the presence of an effect of interest.  In general, faster response times are expected for related items because it is assumed that, when a word’s concept becomes activated in the brain, other words related to that concept are also activated. For example, the word ‘doctor’ activates related concepts like ‘nurse’, ‘hospital’, ‘ambulance’, etc.   In the current case, if an object’s concept activates knowledge about its action and visual features, then recognising a subse-quent action- or visual-related word should be faster. Importantly, such a finding would indicate that non-language (“embodied”) aspects of meaning are part of recognising a word. 
More interestingly, it is unclear if, for exam-ple, action or visual features become activat-ed at the same time, or appear at different moments. To pinpoint when a particular effect occurs, letter strings were shown one at a time so that the duration between pre-senting each string could be varied.   Indeed, response times to action-related pairs (‘house keys’—‘screwdriver’) and visual-related pairs (‘soldering iron’—‘screwdriver’) were faster than to unrelated pairs (‘charger’—‘screwdriver’). These results con-firmed that action and visual features are activated as part of word recognition and once activated, a feature speeds up the recognition of a subsequent word sharing the same feature. This result is taken as support for the embodied view of language pro-cessing. Reading words referring to objects results in the activation of knowledge about how you use these objects and how they look like.   More importantly, different embodied effects were found at particular time points. Action effects occurred first relatively early and again later on, whereas visual effects were found only at a late time point. This differ-ence in the time course of feature activation showed how different types of object knowledge – how an object is used or how it looks like – appear over time. This difference may reflect how object knowledge is organ-ised in the brain. For example, manipulation information may play a more prominent role than shape information for the meaning of object words. 
(2a) Embodied effects in different contexts A closer examination of the brain area in-volved with movement (the motor system) was conducted in the following series of three experiments. In the experiment reported in 
Chapter III, I evaluated the contribution of the motor system in response to descriptions of actions in meaningful and non-meaningful contexts. Participants silently read sentences while brain activity was measured for under-standing and motor activation. Very occa-sionally, they were asked to recall if a word was presented in the sentence. In this man-
ner, the task placed minimal demands to perform well on the experiment.  In a meaningful context in which participants read about possible actions (e.g., “The shop-ping carts that she pushes/delivers are bro-ken”), there was greater motor activation for specific actions like pushing, less for non-specific actions like delivering. This observa-tion of implied specificity showed full in-volvement of the motor system as readers imagined the described actions. 
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 Firstly, the thesis showed that different types of embodied effects appear at different mo-ments. At one moment, knowledge about an object's shape is present; at another moment, knowledge about how you use an object is present. These results illustrate that, as a word is unpacked over time, one or another aspect of its meaning comes to the fore. Meaning is thus in flux.  Secondly, the motor system makes one of two forms of contribution during reading. One form indexes its full involvement in making sense of action descriptions, including those of impossible actions with no clear meaning. Further examination revealed another form of contribution that indexes partial involve-ment. These results indicate that understand-
ing descriptions of actions may not always require the full contribution of the motor system, perhaps even more so when reading in a foreign language. The brain draws from available resources in order to understand language, but it errs on the economical side when task demands are greater or when one reads in a less proficient language.  Altogether, the thesis helped to define the boundaries within which embodied effects contribute to word meaning: Such effects can enrich the meaning of words, but words may already contain enough meaning on their own. Therefore, language and non-language brain areas are indeed part and parcel of meaning, but their relative contributions reflect how language is being understood. 
  
 about possible action descriptions as a mini-mal requirement. Instead, the similar pat-terns for possible and impossible action de-scriptions, neither of which reflected the implied specificity, suggest that the motor system played a reactive role. The motor system is activated automatically to a limited degree in reaction to language processing.  Crucially, the results of chapters III and IV illustrated two forms of contribution by the 
motor system. On the one hand, the motor system can proactively contribute as an in-terpretive heuristic to help readers make sense of what they are reading. On the other hand, some forms of language processing do not rely on this heuristic. Chapter IV showed that the motor system can play a passive, reactive role, in line also with reports of shal-low language processing in which deep and elaborate meaning may not be routinely derived.  
(2c) Embodied effects in a foreign language The final experiment of the series was re-ported in Chapter V. Having identified two forms of contribution by the motor system, it became interesting to ask which of the two (i.e., proactive interpretive heuristic vs. reac-tive) is involved in a foreign, or second lan-guage (L2).  An L2 learned later in life, such as in a formal classroom setting (involving, for example, rote learning of words and their meanings) may offer a "less embodied" experience. In effect, understanding an L2 could show a weaker reliance on the motor system. At the same time, using two languages can be de-manding. So, even if the motor system can contribute to understanding an L2, its in-volvement may be restricted to reduce de-mands. As was done in Chapter III, participants si-lently read sentences in their L2, and as they did so, brain activity was measured for un-derstanding and motor activation. At the end of each sentence, they were asked to recall if a word was presented.  Notably, the results differed from the L1 participants of Chapter III despite using the same task. Instead, in line with the reactive 
account presented in Chapter IV, motor acti-vation patterns did not reflect implied speci-ficity when participants read about possible actions (e.g., “The shopping carts that she pushes/delivers are broken”). These patterns were similar to those measured while reading about impossible actions. Together, the comparison between L1 and L2 readers presented a striking difference in understanding action descriptions. Silent reading in the L1 made full use of the motor system as a proactive interpretive heuristic. By contrast, L2 processing showed evidence of reactive motor activation. These results conform to embodied views wherein language and non-language areas are involved in understanding language. However, the comparison between the L1 and the L2 highlighted different contributions of the motor system. This finding may reflect the weaker links that were formed between L2 words and their meanings. Accordingly, an L2 learned under fewer immersive experi-ences should show less motor involvement. However, just as importantly, the finding showed that understanding language is pos-sible without full motor involvement. 
Conclusions The thesis was concerned with clarifying the contribution of non-language brain areas, such as those involved with movement, to word meaning. When people read and lis-tened to language referring to actions, previ-ous studies had reported embodied effects – that is, the activation of such brain areas alongside language areas. According to some 
theories, language and non-language brain areas are part and parcel of meaning and thus contribute interdependently. Other theories ascribe more or less importance on non-language brain areas depending on whether they consider words to be able to contain meaning on their own.  
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       Nehmen wir an, wir lesen die Aussage “Ich griff mir eine Ausgabe von Kevins Dissertation und ging in die Aula”. Wür-den wir dabei die gleichen Hirnareale aktivieren, die auch für die Bewegung 'greifen' zuständig sind? Oder nicht, weil wir ja nicht direkt diese Handlung ausführen? Würde die Antwort anders aussehen wenn es sich um eine später erlernte Fremdsprache handelt? Generell vertritt diese Dissertation den Blickwinkel des “Em-bodiments”: Sprachverstehen basiert (zumindest teilweise) auf den gleichen sensomotorischen Hirnarealen, die auch dafür zuständig sind wie unser Körper die Umwelt wahr-nimmt (sensorisch) und mit ihr interagiert (motorisch). So werden beispielsweise Hirnareale aktiviert, die für die Hand-bewegung zuständig sind wenn wir das Wort 'greifen' lesen. Genauso aktiviert das Lesen des Wortes 'rot' Hirnareale der Farbwahrnehmung. Diese “Embodiment Effekte” haben For-scher dazu bewogen nicht-sprachlichen Hirnbereichen unter-schiedliche Relevanz bei der Sprachverarbeitung zuzuschrei-ben.  Einige Theorien dazu besagen, dass Sprache und sensomoto-rische Areale praktisch untrennbar miteinander verbunden sind -- die Bedeutung/der Sinngehalt resultiert aus der Kom-bination dieser beiden Areale. Andere Forscher nehmen an, dass die Bedeutung eher aus der Sprache selbst hervor-kommt und gehen davon aus, dass sensomotorische Areale  wenig bis gar keinen Einfluss darauf haben. Wieder andere Theorien besagen, dass Bedeutung/Sinngehalt im Embodi-ment (also in den Einflüssen des Sensomotorischen Systems) angesiedelt ist und weniger aus der Sprache selbst kommen. Mit anderen Worten: Jede Theorie spricht Aktivität von Spra-che und sensomotorischen Arealen unterschiedliche Bedeu-tung zu. Diese Dissertation hat zwei Fragen bezüglich  der Relevanz von Embodiment-Effekten für das Sprachverständnis unter-sucht. Erstens: Angenommen, dass Embodiment-Effekte tatsächlich existieren (also, dass sensomotorische Aktivie-rung bei der Sprachverarbeitung beobachtet werden kann), wann treten diese Effekte dann beim Lesen auf und wie ver-ändern sie sich über die Zeit hinweg? Diese Frage wurde in Kapitel II untersucht. Zweitens: Was ist der Einfluss dieser Aktivität auf das Sprachverständnis? Wie verändert sich dieser Einfluss bei kontextuellen Veränderungen, der Aufga-be oder der Spracherfahrung des Lesers? Diese Zweite Frage wurde in den Kapiteln III bis V untersucht.  
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(2a) Embodiment-Effekte in unterschiedlichen Kontexten In den nächsten drei Experimenten wurden die für Bewegungen verantwortlichen Hirn-areale (das motorische System) genauer untersucht. Im Experiment welches in Kapi-
tel III beschrieben wird, habe ich den Ein-fluss des motorischen Systems auf das Sprachverständnis von sinnvollen und sinn-losen Handlungsbeschreibungen untersucht. Während Teilnehmer still Sätze gelesen ha-ben, wurde die Hirnaktivität des motorischen Systems und Arealen die im Zusammenhang mit Sprachverständnis stehen gemessen. Hin und wieder wurden die Teilnehmer gebeten sich zu erinnern, ob sie sich an ein bestimm-tes Wort in einem Satz erinnern konnten oder nicht. Die Anforderungen der Aufgabe an die Teilnehmer waren also minimal. Im sinnvollen Kontext, bei dem die Teilneh-mer Sätze über mögliche Handlungen lasen (z.B. “Die Einkaufswagen, die er schob/ablieferte, sind kaputt”), zeigte sich eine stärkere Aktivierung des motorischen Systems bei spezifischen Handlungen wie z.B. ‘schieben’ als bei unspezifischen Handlungen wie z.B. ‘abliefern’. Diese Beobachtung spie-gelt die Beteiligung des motorischen Systems, wider während sich Teilnehmer die Hand-lungen vorstellten. Interessanterweise hielt ein sinnloser Kon-text, also die Beschreibung von unmöglichen Handlungen (z.B. “Die Einkaufswagen, die er nähte/heilte, sind kaputt”), die Teilnehmer nicht davon ab sich diese Handlungen vorzu-stellen. Die Aktivierung des motorischen Systems spiegelte aber nicht, wie beim Lesen sinnvoller Sätze, die Spezifität der beschrie-benen Handlungen wider. Es gab jedoch einen Hinweis auf eine leicht stärkere Akti-
vierung bei unspezifischen Handlungen wie .z.B. ‘heilen’. Diese Beobachtungen deuten darauf hin, dass Leser versuchten die Sätze zu verstehen indem sie sich mögliche Durchfüh-rungen der beschriebenen Handlungen vor-stellten. Dementsprechend wurde, anhand der Muster der motorischen Aktivierung bei möglichen und unmöglichen Handlungen, eine Möglich-keit der Einflussnahme des motorischen Systems identifiziert: Als eine proaktive In-terpretationsheuristik. Diese Theorie besagt, dass Leser das motorische System als Werk-zeug (Heuristik) proaktiv benutzen um nicht nur mögliche Handlungen zu verstehen (In-terpretation), sondern erstaunlicherweise auch um zu versuchen unmögliche Handlun-gen zu verstehen. Um dem motorischen Sys-tem eine solche Rolle zuschreiben zu können, müsste dessen Aktivierung auch kleine Un-terschiede in möglichen Handlungen wider-spiegeln. Es gibt ausserdem Hinweise, dass das motorische System aktiv wird während des Lesens über unmögliche Handlungen und zeigt so auch dessen Rolle solche problemati-schen Beschreibungen einen Sinn zu geben. Diese Theorie hilft dabei zu erklären warum auch schon früher motorische Aktivierung bei Wörtern beobachtet wurde, die keine motori-sche Bedeutung haben (wie z.B. 'Rechteck') oder bei sinnlosen Wörtern, die wie Verben aussehen (z.B. 'greiten' anstatt 'greifen'). Mit anderen Worten: Die Aktivierung motori-scher Areale ist nicht einzigartig für Wörter, die motorische Handlungen beschreiben. Vielmehr spiegelt sie die Mitwirkung des motorischen Systems am Herausfiltern von Sinngehalt/Bedeutung wider. 
(2b) Embodiment-Effekte in unterschiedlichen Aufgaben Das in Kapitel IV beschriebene Experiment hat untersucht wie sich unterschiedliche Aufgaben auf den Beitrag des motorischen Systems auswirken, wenn Teilnehmer ähnli-che Sätze wie Experiment in Kapitel III lesen. Eine Gruppe von Versuchspersonen hatte die Aufgabe einen Buchstaben innerhalb eines Satzes zu finden (eine sogenannte Buchsta-bensuchaufgabe). Ein gutes Abschneiden in 
dieser Aufgabe basiert also nicht auf tieferem Verständnis des Satzes, sodass diese Aufgabe genutzt werden konnte um zu überprüfen, ob es alleine durch das Lesen eines Handlungs-wortes zur Aktivierung des motorischen Systems kommt. Im Gegensatz dazu sollte eine andere Gruppe von Versuchspersonen entscheiden, ob ein Satz Sinn ergibt (eine sogenannte Sensibility 
 
(1) Wann und wie treten Embodiment Effekte über die Zeitverlauf auf  Im Kapitel II beschriebenen Experiment sollten Teilnehmer Paare von Buchstabenfol-gen auf einem Bildschirm beobachten. Diese Paare bestanden entweder aus zwei existie-renden Wörtern ('Serviette'—'Zange') oder einem existierendenWort, kombiniert mit einer sinnlosen Buchstabenreihe ('Serviet-
te'—'Ondnork'). Die Teilnehmer sollten nur dann eine Taste drücken wenn das Paar aus zwei existierenden Wörtern bestand. Alle gewählten realen Wörter waren Substantive von Menschenhand geschaffener Objekte. Einige Paare waren darüber vergleichbar in ihrer Handhabung (“handlungsähnlich”; z.B. die ähnliche Bewegung bei der Benutzung eines Schlüssels und eines Schraubenziehers) und andere Paare waren vergleichbar in ihrem Aussehen (“visuell-ähnlich”; z.B. die ähnliche Form eines Lötkolbens und eines Schraubenziehers). Wieder andere Paare waren sich gar nicht ähnlich und wurden als Vergleichs- oder Kontrollbedigung benutzt (z.B. Schraubenzieher und Ladegerät). Die Geschwindigkeit mit der Teilnehmer ent-schieden, ob das Paar aus existierenden Wör-tern bestand wurde gemessen und jede Be-dingung (z.B. handlungsähnlich oder visuell-ähnlich) mit der Kontrollbedingung vergli-chen. Unterschiede in der Reaktionszeit wür-den auf einen gesuchten Effekt hindeuten. Generell geht man davon aus, dass die Reak-tionszeit bei verwandten Paaren geringer ist, da man davon ausgeht, dass die Aktivierung eines Wortkonzepts im Gehirn auch andere ähnliche Wörter aktiviert. Zum Beispiel wür-de das Wort 'Arzt' auch ähnliche Konzepte wie z.B. 'Krankenschwester', 'Medizin' oder 'Klinik' u.s.w. aktivieren. Sollte im vorliegenden Experiment ein Wort-konzept auch das Wissen über die typische Handlung mit diesem Objekt und dessen Aussehen aktivieren, so würde man erwar-ten, dass die Reaktionszeit bei Wortpaaren, die entweder handlungsähnlich oder visuell-ähnlich sind, geringer ist. Insbesondere wür-de dies bedeuten, dass nicht-sprachliche 
(“Embodied”) Aspekte der Bedeutung eines Wortes eine Rolle bei der Erkennung spielen. Vor allem aber ist es unklar, ob Handlungsei-genschaften oder visuelle Eigenschaften zur gleichen Zeit aktiviert werden oder zu unter-schiedlichen Zeitpunkten verarbeitet werden. Um dies herauszufinden wurden die einzel-nen Buchstabenfolgen eines Paares einzeln nacheinander präsentiert, sodass die Dauer zwischen Wörtern variiert werden konnte. Tatsächlich waren die Reaktionszeiten bei handlungsähnlichen Paaren ('Haustürschlüs-
sel'—'Schraubenzieher') und bei visuell-ähnlichen Paaren ('Lötkolben'— 'Schrauben-
zieher') schneller als bei den nicht verwand-ten Paaren ('Ladegerät'—'Schraubenzieher'). Diese Ergebnisse bestätigen, dass Handlungs-eigenschaften und visuelle Eigenschaften bei der Erkennung eines Wortes aktiviert werden und die Erkennung eines verwandten (ent-weder visuell oder handlungsverwandtem) Wortes beschleunigen. Dieses Ergebnis un-terstützt die Hypothese eines Embodiment Blickwinkels von Sprachverarbeitung. Das Lesen von Wörtern die Objekte beschreiben aktiviert Wissen darüber wie man diese Ob-jekte benutzt und wie sie aussehen. Darüberhinaus wurden unterschiedliche Embodiment-Effekte zu bestimmten Zeit-punkten gefunden. Effekte der Handlung wurden einerseits relativ früh in der Verar-beitung aber auch zu einem späteren Zeit-punkt gefunden, wohingegen visuelle Effekte nur zu einem späten Zeitpunkt gefunden wurden. Die Unterschiede im Zeitablauf der Aktivierung zeigen uns wie unterschiedliches Wissen - wie ein Objekt benutzt wird und wie es aussieht - zu unterschiedlichen Zeitpunk-ten aktiviert wird. Dieser Unterschied könnte einen Hinweis darauf geben wie Wissen im Gehirn verarbeitet wird. So könnte z.B. Wis-sen über die Benutzung von Objekten eine wichtigere Rolle für den Sinngehalt von Wör-tern spielen als Wissen über dessen Ausse-hen. 
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 das Verstehen einer S2 in einem geringeren Maße auf das motorische System stützen. Gleichzeitig kann es anspruchsvoll sein zwei Sprachen zu benutzen, sodass selbst wenn das motorische System hier eine Rolle spielt, diese begrenzt sein könnte um die Anforde-rungen an Sprachverarbeitung zu reduzieren. Parallel zum Vorgehen in Kapitel III lasen Versuchspersonen in ihrer S2 und während-dessen wurde die Hirnaktivität in Bezug auf das Sprachverstehen und die Aktivierung des motorischen Systems im Speziellen gemes-sen. Am Ende eines jeden Satzes wurden die Versuchsteilnehmer gefragt, ob sie sich an ein bestimmtes Wort im gelesenen Satz erinnern konnten. Bemerkenswerterweise unterschieden sich die Ergebnisse dieses Experiments von denen der Muttersprache (S1) Versuchspersonen in Kapitel III, obwohl beide Gruppen die gleiche Aufgabe bearbeiten mussten. Im Gegensatz zu den vorhergehenden Resultaten in Kapitel III spiegelten die Ergebnisse in diesem Experi-ment die Annahmen einer reaktiven Rolle des motorischen Systems wider, parallel zu den Ergebnissen in Kapitel IV. Die Aktivierung des motorischen Systems variierte hierbei nicht in Abhängigkeit der Spezifität der beschrie-benen Handlungen, über die die Teilnehmer lasen (z.B. “Die Einkaufswagen, die er schob/ablieferte, sind kaputt”). Diese Ergeb-
nisse waren ähnlich zu denen als die Ver-suchspersonen über unmögliche Handlungen lasen. Zusammengenommen zeigt der Vergleich zwischen S1- und S2-Lesern einen bemer-kenswerten Unterschied im Verstehen von Handlungsbeschreibungen. Stilles Lesen in der S1 stütze sich voll auf die Funktion des motorischen Systems als proaktive Interpre-tationsheuristik. Im Gegensatz dazu zeigte die Verarbeitung der S2 ein Muster, das auf eine reaktive motorische Aktivierung hindeutet. Diese Ergebnisse stimmen überein mit An-nahmen des Embodiment bei der Sprachver-arbeitung, also der Annahme dass sowohl sprachliche, als auch nicht-sprachliche Hirn-areale beteiligt sind. Jedoch betont der Ver-gleich zwischen S1 und S2 unterschiedliche Einflüsse des motorischen Systems. Diese Beobachtung könnte eine geringere Verknüp-fung zwischen erlernten S2 Wörtern und ihrer Bedeutung widerspiegeln. Dementspre-chend sollte eine S2, die unter weniger prak-tischen Bedingungen (also der Kombination des Wortes mit konkreten Handlungen) ge-lernt wurde, eine geringere Aktivierung mo-torischer Hirnareale hervorrufen. Gleicher-massen relevant ist es, dass die vorliegenden Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Sprachverständnis auch ohne volle Beteiligung des motorischen Systems möglich ist. 
Schlussfolgerung Die Dissertation befasste sich mit der Klärung inwieweit nicht-sprachliche Hirnareale, z.B. Areale die für Bewegung zuständig sind, eine Rolle im Sprachverstehen spielen. Frühere Studien berichteten, dass Menschen, die Sprache über Handlungen lasen oder hörten sog. Embodiment-Effekte zeigten, also dass motorische Areale gleichzeitig mit Spracha-realen aktiviert werden. Entsprechend man-cher Theorien sind sprachliche und nicht-sprachliche Areale voneinander abhängig und tragen dementsprechend gemeinsam zum Verstehen des Sinngehalts von Sprache bei. Andere Theorien schreiben nicht-sprachlichen Arealen mehr oder weniger Bedeutung zu, je nachdem inwieweit sie davon ausgehen, dass Wörter selbst deren Bedeutung beinhalten. 
Erstens zeigte diese Dissertation, dass unter-schiedliche Arten von Embodiment zu unter-schiedlichen Zeiten in der Verarbeitung auf-treten. In einem Moment ist das Wissen über das Aussehen eines Objekts verfügbar, in einem anderen das Wissen über die Benut-zung und Interaktion mit dem Objekt. Die vorliegenden Ergebnisse zeigen, dass zu unterschiedlichen Momenten in der Verarbei-tung eines Wortes, jeweils ein anderer Teil der Bedeutung in den Vordergrund tritt. Bedeutung ist also in Bewegung. Zweitens zeigt die Dissertation, dass sich das motorische System auf eine von zwei Arten an Sprachverstehen beteiligen kann. Eine Form ist dabei als proaktive Heuritistik be-schrieben, die zum Sprachverstehen beiträgt bei möglichen Handlungen mit unterschiedli-cher Spezifizität sowei bei unmöglichen Sät-
 Judgement Task). Dabei ist es wichtig zu wissen, dass die Instruktion der Aufgabe nicht explizit auf die Wichtigkeit der Bedeu-tung der beschriebenen Handlung hinwies um eine Verzerrungen des Ergebnisses zu vermeiden. Versuchspersonen wurde es selbst überlassen wie sie die Entscheidung treffen, ob ein Satz Sinn ergab oder nicht (also mit oder ohne Mitwirken des motori-schen Systems). Obwohl sich beide Aufgaben darin unter-schieden inwieweit die Verarbeitung des Sinngehalts eine Rolle spielte, produzierten sie ähnliche Ergebnisse. Dieses Ergebnis ist besonders in Bezug auf den “Sensibility Jud-gement Task” beachtenswert. Sätze, die mög-liche Handlungen beschrieben (z.B. “Die Einkaufswagen, die er schob/ablieferte, sind kaputt”) zeigten keine Aktivierung des moto-rischen Systems, welche die implizierte Spe-zifität widerspiegelte. Die spezifische Hand-lung 'schieben' produzierte also keine stärke-re Aktivierung des motorischen Systems im Vergleich zur unspezifischen Handlung 'ablie-
fern'. Vielmehr ähnelte die Aktivierung, wie in Kapitel III, den Beobachtungen bei Sätzen, die unmögliche Handlungen beschrieben (z.B. “Die Einkaufswagen, die er nähte/heilte, sind kaputt”). Dieses Ergebnis ist unerwartet wenn man annimmt, dass ein explizites Urteil über die Beschreibung einer Handlung (indem über die Bedeutung nachgedacht wird) sehr wahr-scheinlich das motorische System mit einbe-ziehen würde. Im Gegensatz dazu erscheint es so, als ob die Versuchspersonen ihr Urteil mit geringem oder sogar ohne jeglichen Ein-bezug des motorischen Systems fällten, eine Beobachtung, die auch in der Buchstaben-suchaufgabe gemacht wurde. Darüber hinaus zeigte eine zusätzliche Messung der Hirnakti-
vität, die einen Hinweis auf das Sprachver-ständnis sowie ein Maß der Fehlerfreiheit gab, dass Teilnehmer die Aufgabe wie ange-wiesen erfüllt hatten. Gleichzeitig ist es be-merkenswert, dass motorische Hirnaktivität bei der Buchstabensuchaufgabe aufgetreten ist, obwohl das Verständnis des Sinns nicht notwendig war um die Aufgabe zu erfüllen. Zusammengenommen bestätigen diese Er-gebnisse, dass das motorische System bei der Erfüllung beider Aufgaben aktiviert wird, trotz unterschiedlicher Anforderungen. Je-doch bestätigen die gefundenen Muster der Aktivierung nicht die in Kapitel III eingeführ-te Theorie der proaktiven Interpretations-heuristik, da die Aktivierungsmuster als Minimalbedingung nicht die den Sätzen in-newohnenden Unterschiede der Spezifität der Handlung widerspiegelten. Die ähnlichen Muster der Aktivierung deuten vielmehr darauf hin, dass das motorische System wäh-rend des Lesens von sinnlosen und sinnhaf-ten Sätzen eine reaktive Rolle spielt, ohne einen Unterschied in wechselnder Spezifität. Mit anderen Worten erscheint das motori-sche System in begrenztem Maß automatisch aktiv, als Reaktion auf Sprachverarbeitung. Gemeinsam illustrieren die Ergebnisse aus Kapitel III und IV zwei Formen der Beteili-gung des motorischen Systems. Einerseits kann das motorische System proaktiv als Interpretatiosheuristik den Leser beim Ver-ständnis eines Satzes unterstützen. Anderer-seits stützen sich einige Formen der Sprach-verarbeitung nicht auf diese Heuristik. In Kapitel IV wurde gezeigt, dass das motorische System eine passive, reaktive Rolle spielen kann. Dies ist in Übereinstimmung mit Be-richten von oberflächlicher Sprachverarbei-tung, bei der der tiefere Sinngehalt nicht automatisch abgeleitet wird.  
(2c) Embodiment-Effekte in einer Fremdsprache Das abschließende Experiment dieser Reihe wurde in Kapitel V beschrieben. Basierend darauf, dass zwei Formen der Beteiligung des motorischen Systems bei der Sprachverarbei-tung gefunden wurden, stellte sich die Frage welche dieser Formen bei der Verarbeitung einer Fremd- oder Zweitsprache (S2) eine Rolle spielt.  
Eine L2, die später im Leben erlernt wird, beispielsweise in der Schuledurch auswen-diglernen von Vokabeln und deren Bedeu-tung, wird vermutlich in geringerem Maße mit konkreten Bewegungen während des Lernens kombiniert werden und dement-sprechend geringer im Sinne des “Embodi-ments” verarbeitet werden. Daher sollte sich 
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 das Verstehen einer S2 in einem geringeren Maße auf das motorische System stützen. Gleichzeitig kann es anspruchsvoll sein zwei Sprachen zu benutzen, sodass selbst wenn das motorische System hier eine Rolle spielt, diese begrenzt sein könnte um die Anforde-rungen an Sprachverarbeitung zu reduzieren. Parallel zum Vorgehen in Kapitel III lasen Versuchspersonen in ihrer S2 und während-dessen wurde die Hirnaktivität in Bezug auf das Sprachverstehen und die Aktivierung des motorischen Systems im Speziellen gemes-sen. Am Ende eines jeden Satzes wurden die Versuchsteilnehmer gefragt, ob sie sich an ein bestimmtes Wort im gelesenen Satz erinnern konnten. Bemerkenswerterweise unterschieden sich die Ergebnisse dieses Experiments von denen der Muttersprache (S1) Versuchspersonen in Kapitel III, obwohl beide Gruppen die gleiche Aufgabe bearbeiten mussten. Im Gegensatz zu den vorhergehenden Resultaten in Kapitel III spiegelten die Ergebnisse in diesem Experi-ment die Annahmen einer reaktiven Rolle des motorischen Systems wider, parallel zu den Ergebnissen in Kapitel IV. Die Aktivierung des motorischen Systems variierte hierbei nicht in Abhängigkeit der Spezifität der beschrie-benen Handlungen, über die die Teilnehmer lasen (z.B. “Die Einkaufswagen, die er schob/ablieferte, sind kaputt”). Diese Ergeb-
nisse waren ähnlich zu denen als die Ver-suchspersonen über unmögliche Handlungen lasen. Zusammengenommen zeigt der Vergleich zwischen S1- und S2-Lesern einen bemer-kenswerten Unterschied im Verstehen von Handlungsbeschreibungen. Stilles Lesen in der S1 stütze sich voll auf die Funktion des motorischen Systems als proaktive Interpre-tationsheuristik. Im Gegensatz dazu zeigte die Verarbeitung der S2 ein Muster, das auf eine reaktive motorische Aktivierung hindeutet. Diese Ergebnisse stimmen überein mit An-nahmen des Embodiment bei der Sprachver-arbeitung, also der Annahme dass sowohl sprachliche, als auch nicht-sprachliche Hirn-areale beteiligt sind. Jedoch betont der Ver-gleich zwischen S1 und S2 unterschiedliche Einflüsse des motorischen Systems. Diese Beobachtung könnte eine geringere Verknüp-fung zwischen erlernten S2 Wörtern und ihrer Bedeutung widerspiegeln. Dementspre-chend sollte eine S2, die unter weniger prak-tischen Bedingungen (also der Kombination des Wortes mit konkreten Handlungen) ge-lernt wurde, eine geringere Aktivierung mo-torischer Hirnareale hervorrufen. Gleicher-massen relevant ist es, dass die vorliegenden Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Sprachverständnis auch ohne volle Beteiligung des motorischen Systems möglich ist. 
Schlussfolgerung Die Dissertation befasste sich mit der Klärung inwieweit nicht-sprachliche Hirnareale, z.B. Areale die für Bewegung zuständig sind, eine Rolle im Sprachverstehen spielen. Frühere Studien berichteten, dass Menschen, die Sprache über Handlungen lasen oder hörten sog. Embodiment-Effekte zeigten, also dass motorische Areale gleichzeitig mit Spracha-realen aktiviert werden. Entsprechend man-cher Theorien sind sprachliche und nicht-sprachliche Areale voneinander abhängig und tragen dementsprechend gemeinsam zum Verstehen des Sinngehalts von Sprache bei. Andere Theorien schreiben nicht-sprachlichen Arealen mehr oder weniger Bedeutung zu, je nachdem inwieweit sie davon ausgehen, dass Wörter selbst deren Bedeutung beinhalten. 
Erstens zeigte diese Dissertation, dass unter-schiedliche Arten von Embodiment zu unter-schiedlichen Zeiten in der Verarbeitung auf-treten. In einem Moment ist das Wissen über das Aussehen eines Objekts verfügbar, in einem anderen das Wissen über die Benut-zung und Interaktion mit dem Objekt. Die vorliegenden Ergebnisse zeigen, dass zu unterschiedlichen Momenten in der Verarbei-tung eines Wortes, jeweils ein anderer Teil der Bedeutung in den Vordergrund tritt. Bedeutung ist also in Bewegung. Zweitens zeigt die Dissertation, dass sich das motorische System auf eine von zwei Arten an Sprachverstehen beteiligen kann. Eine Form ist dabei als proaktive Heuritistik be-schrieben, die zum Sprachverstehen beiträgt bei möglichen Handlungen mit unterschiedli-cher Spezifizität sowei bei unmöglichen Sät-
 Judgement Task). Dabei ist es wichtig zu wissen, dass die Instruktion der Aufgabe nicht explizit auf die Wichtigkeit der Bedeu-tung der beschriebenen Handlung hinwies um eine Verzerrungen des Ergebnisses zu vermeiden. Versuchspersonen wurde es selbst überlassen wie sie die Entscheidung treffen, ob ein Satz Sinn ergab oder nicht (also mit oder ohne Mitwirken des motori-schen Systems). Obwohl sich beide Aufgaben darin unter-schieden inwieweit die Verarbeitung des Sinngehalts eine Rolle spielte, produzierten sie ähnliche Ergebnisse. Dieses Ergebnis ist besonders in Bezug auf den “Sensibility Jud-gement Task” beachtenswert. Sätze, die mög-liche Handlungen beschrieben (z.B. “Die Einkaufswagen, die er schob/ablieferte, sind kaputt”) zeigten keine Aktivierung des moto-rischen Systems, welche die implizierte Spe-zifität widerspiegelte. Die spezifische Hand-lung 'schieben' produzierte also keine stärke-re Aktivierung des motorischen Systems im Vergleich zur unspezifischen Handlung 'ablie-
fern'. Vielmehr ähnelte die Aktivierung, wie in Kapitel III, den Beobachtungen bei Sätzen, die unmögliche Handlungen beschrieben (z.B. “Die Einkaufswagen, die er nähte/heilte, sind kaputt”). Dieses Ergebnis ist unerwartet wenn man annimmt, dass ein explizites Urteil über die Beschreibung einer Handlung (indem über die Bedeutung nachgedacht wird) sehr wahr-scheinlich das motorische System mit einbe-ziehen würde. Im Gegensatz dazu erscheint es so, als ob die Versuchspersonen ihr Urteil mit geringem oder sogar ohne jeglichen Ein-bezug des motorischen Systems fällten, eine Beobachtung, die auch in der Buchstaben-suchaufgabe gemacht wurde. Darüber hinaus zeigte eine zusätzliche Messung der Hirnakti-
vität, die einen Hinweis auf das Sprachver-ständnis sowie ein Maß der Fehlerfreiheit gab, dass Teilnehmer die Aufgabe wie ange-wiesen erfüllt hatten. Gleichzeitig ist es be-merkenswert, dass motorische Hirnaktivität bei der Buchstabensuchaufgabe aufgetreten ist, obwohl das Verständnis des Sinns nicht notwendig war um die Aufgabe zu erfüllen. Zusammengenommen bestätigen diese Er-gebnisse, dass das motorische System bei der Erfüllung beider Aufgaben aktiviert wird, trotz unterschiedlicher Anforderungen. Je-doch bestätigen die gefundenen Muster der Aktivierung nicht die in Kapitel III eingeführ-te Theorie der proaktiven Interpretations-heuristik, da die Aktivierungsmuster als Minimalbedingung nicht die den Sätzen in-newohnenden Unterschiede der Spezifität der Handlung widerspiegelten. Die ähnlichen Muster der Aktivierung deuten vielmehr darauf hin, dass das motorische System wäh-rend des Lesens von sinnlosen und sinnhaf-ten Sätzen eine reaktive Rolle spielt, ohne einen Unterschied in wechselnder Spezifität. Mit anderen Worten erscheint das motori-sche System in begrenztem Maß automatisch aktiv, als Reaktion auf Sprachverarbeitung. Gemeinsam illustrieren die Ergebnisse aus Kapitel III und IV zwei Formen der Beteili-gung des motorischen Systems. Einerseits kann das motorische System proaktiv als Interpretatiosheuristik den Leser beim Ver-ständnis eines Satzes unterstützen. Anderer-seits stützen sich einige Formen der Sprach-verarbeitung nicht auf diese Heuristik. In Kapitel IV wurde gezeigt, dass das motorische System eine passive, reaktive Rolle spielen kann. Dies ist in Übereinstimmung mit Be-richten von oberflächlicher Sprachverarbei-tung, bei der der tiefere Sinngehalt nicht automatisch abgeleitet wird.  
(2c) Embodiment-Effekte in einer Fremdsprache Das abschließende Experiment dieser Reihe wurde in Kapitel V beschrieben. Basierend darauf, dass zwei Formen der Beteiligung des motorischen Systems bei der Sprachverarbei-tung gefunden wurden, stellte sich die Frage welche dieser Formen bei der Verarbeitung einer Fremd- oder Zweitsprache (S2) eine Rolle spielt.  
Eine L2, die später im Leben erlernt wird, beispielsweise in der Schuledurch auswen-diglernen von Vokabeln und deren Bedeu-tung, wird vermutlich in geringerem Maße mit konkreten Bewegungen während des Lernens kombiniert werden und dement-sprechend geringer im Sinne des “Embodi-ments” verarbeitet werden. Daher sollte sich 
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 zen. Eine genauere Untersuchung zeigte aber auch eine andere, beschränktere Form der Beteiligung des motorischen Systems. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass das Verständnis von Handlungsbeschreibungen nicht immer auf die volle Beteiligung des motorischen Sys-tems angewiesen ist, insbesondere dann wenn es um eine Fremdsprache geht. Das Gehirn bedient sich dabei freier Ressourcen um Sprache zu verstehen, tendiert jedoch bei hoher Belastung zur Ökonomie, insbesondere wenn die Anforderungen einer Aufgabe hoch sind oder eine Fremdsprache verarbeitet werden muss. 
Zusammengenommen half diese Arbeit dabei herauszufinden welchen Beitrag zum Wort-verstehen Embodiment-Effekte leisten kön-nen und wo sie an ihre Grenzen stossen. Solche Effekte können den Sinngehalt von Wörtern anreichern, aber auch Wörter selbst können genug Sinnhaftigkeit in sich tragen um verstanden zu werden. Somit sind sowohl sprachliche als auch nicht-sprachliche Hirn-areale an der Verarbeitung von Sprache be-teiligt, ihr relativer Beitrag spiegelt jedoch wider wie (vollständig) Sprache verstanden wird. 
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     Stel je eens voor dat je de volgende zin leest: “Ik greep een kopie van Kevins proefschrift van mijn tafel en haastte me naar de aula”. Zouden bij het begrijpen van deze zin de gebie-den in je hersenen worden geactiveerd die met de echte han-deling ‘grijpen’ te maken hebben? Of gebeurt dat niet, omdat het niet om een feitelijke ‘grijp’-actie gaat? En zou het wat uitmaken of deze zin in het Engels is geformuleerd of in het Nederlands?  Bij deze vragen neemt dit proefschrift de zogenaamde “em-bodied view” op taalverwerking als theoretisch uitgangspunt: Het begrijpen van taal maakt (deels) gebruik van de sensori-motorische hersengebieden die verantwoordelijk zijn voor hoe onze lichamen de wereld (sensorisch) waarnemen en er (motorisch) in handelen. De hersengebieden die handbewe-gingen bepalen, bijvoorbeeld, worden geactiveerd als we het woord ‘grijpen’ begrijpen. Net zoals het woord ‘rood’ hersen-gebieden activeert die bij kleurwaarneming betrokken zijn. De vondst van zulke effecten noemen we “embodiment” –belichaming – en heeft onderzoekers ertoe gebracht aan niet-talige gebieden in de hersenen een rol van minder of meer belang toe te kennen bij het achterhalen van woordbeteke-nissen.  In sommige theoretische opvattingen zijn de bijdragen van taalgebieden en sensorimotorische gebieden (betrokken bij zintuigelijk waarnemen en bewegingen uitvoeren) aan bete-kenistoekenning vrijwel niet te scheiden. Hier veronderstelt het toekennen of ophalen van betekenis activatie in beide gebieden. Andere opvattingen stellen dat betekenis al op één of andere wijze in taal zelf zit, met weinig of geen betrokken-heid van sensorimotorische gebieden. Weer andere opvattin-gen beweren juist dat alle betekenis in embodiment effecten zit, het geen impliceert dat er maar weinig betekenis uit de taal zelf komt. Al met al legt elke theoretische benadering een andere nadruk op de bijdrage van taal- en sensorimotorische activatie aan de toekenning van woordbetekenissen.  Dit proefschrift onderzoekt twee problemen met betrekking tot embodiment effecten bij taalbegrip. Als men uitgaat van het bestaan van embodiment effecten (d.w.z. er wordt senso-rimotorische activiteit waargenomen), dan is de eerste kwes-tie wanneer zulke effecten tijdens het lezen ontstaan en hoe ze over tijd heen veranderen. Deze kwestie wordt onderzocht in Hoofdstuk II. De tweede kwestie betreft de bijdrage van embodiment effecten aan betekenistoekenning. Hoe veran-dert deze bijdrage afhankelijk van context, taak en taalerva-ring? Dit probleem wordt bestudeerd in de Hoofdstukken III t/m V.  
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(2a) Belichaamde effecten in verschillende conteksten De bijdrage van hersengebieden die betrok-ken zijn bij beweging (het motorische sys-teem) werd nader bestudeerd in een volgen-de serie van drie experimenten. In het expe-riment dat in Hoofdstuk III wordt gerappor-teerd, onderzocht ik de activiteit in het moto-rische systeem als reactie op beschrijvingen van handelingen in betekenisvolle en beteke-nisloze contexten. Proefpersonen lazen in stilte zinnen terwijl hun hersenactiviteit werd geregistreerd. Heel af en toe werd hen ge-vraagd om aan te geven of een bepaald woord in de zin was voorgekomen. Op deze manier stelde de taak slechts minimale eisen aan de proefpersoon voor het correct uitvoeren van het experiment.   Wanneer proefpersonen lazen over plausibe-le handelingen in een betekenisvolle context (bijv. “De winkelkarretjes die zij weg-duwt/levert zijn gebroken”) was er meer motorische activiteit bij specifieke handelin-gen zoals ‘duwen’, en minder bij non-specifieke handelingen zoals ‘leveren’. Dit effect van de impliciete specificiteit van de handeling wijst erop dat het motorische systeem volledig betrokken werd bij de voor-stelling die de lezers zich maakten van de beschreven handelingen.   Boeiend genoeg leidde lezen over onmogelij-ke handelingen in een onwaarschijnlijke contekst (bijv. “De winkelkarretjes die zij aannaait/geneest zijn gebroken”) er niet toe dat de lezers ermee ophielden zich deze han-delingen voor te stellen. De motorische pa-tronen vertoonden echter niet de impliciete specificiteit die gevonden werd bij het lezen van mogelijke handelingen. Er was verder een tendens naar meer motorische activiteit voor niet-specifieke acties zoals ‘genezen’. Dit 
suggereert dat lezers probeerden om de beschrijvingen zinvol te maken door een of andere manier te bedenken waarop de han-delingen konden worden uitgevoerd.   De patronen van motorische activiteit die waargenomen werden bij mogelijke en on-mogelijke beschrijvingen van handelingen leiden tot de vaststelling dat één manier waarop motorische activiteit een bijdrage levert, die is van een proactieve interpretatie-
ve heuristiek. Deze interpretatie houdt in dat lezers niet alleen (op proactieve wijze) ge-bruik maken van het motorische systeem als gereedschap (heuristiek) om betekenis toe te kennen (interpretatief) aan mogelijke be-schrijvingen van handelingen, maar, opval-lend genoeg, zelfs aan onmogelijke beschrij-vingen. Om zo’n rol aan het motorische sys-teem te kunnen toeschrijven, moeten de experimenteel waargenomen activatiepatro-nen ten minste de verschillen tussen soorten impliciete, mogelijke handelingen reflecteren. De observatie van motorische activatie tij-dens het lezen over onmogelijke handelingen geeft daarbij aan dat zulke activatie wordt ingezet bij het analyseren en begrijpen van problematische beschrijvingen.   Deze interpretatie kan verklaren waarom motorische activiteit eerder werd gerappor-teerd bij woorden die geen duidelijke motori-sche betekenis hebben, zoals ‘driehoek’ en bij non-woorden die op werkwoorden lijken, zoals ‘glijpen’ in plaats van ‘grijpen’. Samen-gevat treedt motorische activiteit niet enkel op bij woorden die handelingen beschrijven, maar kan deze ook de betrokkenheid van het motorische systeem bij het afleiden van woordbetekenis weerspiegelen.  
(2b) Embodiment effecten in verschillende taken  In het experiment beschreven in Hoofdstuk 
IV werd onderzocht hoe verschillende taalta-ken de bijdrage van het motorische systeem beïnvloeden tijdens het lezen van dezelfde soort zinnen als in Hoofdstuk III. Aan één proefpersoongroep werd gevraagd om naar een letter in de zin te zoeken (letter-zoektaak). Voor een goede uitvoering van deze taak hoeft men geen aandacht aan de 
betekenis van woorden en zinnen te beste-den. Daarom kan men met deze taak bepalen of er ook nog motorische activiteit optreedt als de actiewoorden simpelweg gelezen wor-den.   Een heel andere taak kreeg een tweede groep proefpersonen. Hen werd gevraagd te beslis-sen of een aangeboden zin zinvol was (zin-
 
(1) Wanneer en hoe embodiment effecten over tijd verschijnen In het experiment dat in Hoofdstuk II wordt gerapporteerd, zagen proefpersonen paren van letterreeksen op het computerscherm die bestonden uit twee echte woorden (bijv. ‘servet’—‘tang’) of een woord en een onzin-woord (bijv. ‘servet’—‘krawt’). De proefper-sonen werd gevraagd enkel op een knop te drukken als beide letterreeksen echte woor-den waren. Alle woorden verwezen naar voorwerpen die door de mens gemaakt wor-den.   Sommige woorden in de paren representeer-den objecten waarvan op vergelijkbare wijze gebruik wordt gemaakt (gerelateerd in han-deling), bijv. je maakt vergelijkbare bewegin-gen als je een huissleutel of een schroeven-draaier gebruikt. Bij andere woordparen was sprake van een overeenkomstige vorm van de objecten (visueel-gerelateerd), neem zoals de vorm van een soldeerijzer en een schroeven-draaier. Nog andere woordparen waren on-gerelateerd en dienden als een controlecondi-tie, bijv. oplader en schroevendraaier. Er werd gemeten hoe snel proefpersonen rea-geerden op elk woordpaar en de antwoord-tijden in beide gerelateerde condities werden vergeleken met die in de ongerelateerde controleconditie. Het verschil in reactietijden vormde een maat voor de aanwezigheid van een theoretisch interessant effect van gerela-teerde actie- of vormkenmerken.   In het algemeen worden snellere reacties verwacht voor gerelateerde woordparen, omdat (zoals bekend uit eerder onderzoek) bij activatie van een woordconcept in het brein, gewoonlijk ook andere, gerelateerde woorden worden geactiveerd. Het woord ‘dokter’ bijvoorbeeld activeert gerelateerde begrippen zoals ‘zuster’, ‘ziekenhuis’ en ‘am-
bulance’.   In het huidige experiment zou een woord kennis activeren over een bijhorende hande-ling of de visuele kenmerken van het betrok-ken object. Daardoor zou een woord dat direct daarna gepresenteerd wordt en gerela-teerd is qua handeling of visuele kenmerken sneller herkend moeten worden. Dit zou 
impliceren dat niet-talige (“embodied”) bete-kenisaspecten een inherent onderdeel uitma-ken van de woordherkenning.     Op dit moment weten we ook niet goed of handelings- en visuele kenmerken tegelijker-tijd worden geactiveerd, of op verschillende momenten. Om uit te vinden wanneer in de tijd een bepaald effect optreedt, presenteer-den we de letterreeksen na elkaar zodat de duur van de opeenvolgende woorden kon worden gevarieerd.   Het experiment liet zien dat reacties op actie-gerelateerde (‘sleutel’—‘schroevendraaier’) en visueel-gerelateerde woordparen (‘soldeer-
bout’—‘schroevendraaier’) inderdaad sneller waren dan op ongerelateerde (‘oplader’—‘schroevendraaier’). Deze resultaten onder-steunen de hypothese dat handelings- en visuele kenmerken geactiveerd worden als onderdeel van het woordherkenningsproces; eenmaal geactiveerd, versnelt een kenmerk de herkenning van een volgend woord dat dit kenmerk met het eerdere woord deelt. Dit resultaat kan worden geïnterpreteerd als bewijs ten gunste van een embodiment visie op taalverwerking. Het lezen van woorden die verwijzen naar objecten leidt tot activatie van kennis over hoe je deze objecten gebruikt en hoe ze eruit zien.   Van verder belang is dat verschillende soor-ten embodiment effecten op verschillende momenten in de tijd optraden. Actie-effecten traden eerst relatief vroeg in de woordver-werking op en kwamen later weer terug, terwijl visuele effecten alleen op een relatief laat tijdsmoment werden waargenomen. Dit verschil in tijdsverloop in activatie van uit-eenlopende kenmerken laat zien hoe ver-schillende typen objectkennis (hoe het object wordt gebruikt en hoe het eruit ziet), over tijd beschikbaar komen. Dit verschil reflec-teert mogelijk hoe objectkennis in de herse-nen is opgeslagen. Bijvoorbeeld, handelings-informatie zou een belangrijkere rol kunnen spelen dan vorminformatie bij de betekenis-toekenning aan objectwoorden.  
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suggereert dat lezers probeerden om de beschrijvingen zinvol te maken door een of andere manier te bedenken waarop de han-delingen konden worden uitgevoerd.   De patronen van motorische activiteit die waargenomen werden bij mogelijke en on-mogelijke beschrijvingen van handelingen leiden tot de vaststelling dat één manier waarop motorische activiteit een bijdrage levert, die is van een proactieve interpretatie-
ve heuristiek. Deze interpretatie houdt in dat lezers niet alleen (op proactieve wijze) ge-bruik maken van het motorische systeem als gereedschap (heuristiek) om betekenis toe te kennen (interpretatief) aan mogelijke be-schrijvingen van handelingen, maar, opval-lend genoeg, zelfs aan onmogelijke beschrij-vingen. Om zo’n rol aan het motorische sys-teem te kunnen toeschrijven, moeten de experimenteel waargenomen activatiepatro-nen ten minste de verschillen tussen soorten impliciete, mogelijke handelingen reflecteren. De observatie van motorische activatie tij-dens het lezen over onmogelijke handelingen geeft daarbij aan dat zulke activatie wordt ingezet bij het analyseren en begrijpen van problematische beschrijvingen.   Deze interpretatie kan verklaren waarom motorische activiteit eerder werd gerappor-teerd bij woorden die geen duidelijke motori-sche betekenis hebben, zoals ‘driehoek’ en bij non-woorden die op werkwoorden lijken, zoals ‘glijpen’ in plaats van ‘grijpen’. Samen-gevat treedt motorische activiteit niet enkel op bij woorden die handelingen beschrijven, maar kan deze ook de betrokkenheid van het motorische systeem bij het afleiden van woordbetekenis weerspiegelen.  
(2b) Embodiment effecten in verschillende taken  In het experiment beschreven in Hoofdstuk 
IV werd onderzocht hoe verschillende taalta-ken de bijdrage van het motorische systeem beïnvloeden tijdens het lezen van dezelfde soort zinnen als in Hoofdstuk III. Aan één proefpersoongroep werd gevraagd om naar een letter in de zin te zoeken (letter-zoektaak). Voor een goede uitvoering van deze taak hoeft men geen aandacht aan de 
betekenis van woorden en zinnen te beste-den. Daarom kan men met deze taak bepalen of er ook nog motorische activiteit optreedt als de actiewoorden simpelweg gelezen wor-den.   Een heel andere taak kreeg een tweede groep proefpersonen. Hen werd gevraagd te beslis-sen of een aangeboden zin zinvol was (zin-
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 EEG-componenten voor taalbegrip en moto-rische activiteit werden geregistreerd). Aan het einde van de zin moesten ze aangeven of een woord was aangeboden of niet (“recall”).  De resultaten voor de meertaligen in hun T2 verschilden van de T1 proefpersonen uit Hoofdstuk III in dezelfde taak. In overeen-stemming met de reactieve verklaring van Hoofdstuk IV, reflecteerden de motorische activatiepatronen niet de impliciete specifici-teit als de proefpersonen over mogelijke handelingen lazen (bijv. “De winkelkarretjes die zij wegduwt/levert zijn gebroken”). De patronen waren echter vergelijkbaar met die bij het lezen over onmogelijke handelingen.  Samengenomen liet de vergelijking tussen T1 en T2 lezers een opvallend verschil zien in hoe deze beschrijvingen van handelingen begrijpen. Stillezen in T1 maakte gebruik van 
het motorische systeem als een proactieve interpretatieve heuristiek; maar stillezen in T2 liet bewijs zien voor reactieve motorische activatie.  Deze resultaten passen bij embodiment visies op taalverwerking waarbij zowel taal- als niet-taalgebieden in de hersenen betrokken zijn. De vergelijking van taalverwerking in T1 en T2 benadrukte de verschillende bijdragen van het motorische systeem. De bevindingen voor T2 weerspiegelen mogelijk de zwakkere verbindingen tussen T2 woorden en hun betekenissen. Omdat je een T2 leert onder omstandigheden met minder ‘onderdompe-ling’ in het werkelijke leven, zou dat kunnen leiden tot minder motorische betrokkenheid. Tegelijkertijd laten deze bevindingen ook zien dat je een taal kunt begrijpen zonder volledige motorische betrokkenheid.  
Conclusies Dit proefschrift wil verhelderen hoe hersen-gebieden die niet direct met taal te maken hebben, maar bijv. met beweging, toch een bijdrage leveren aan de toekenning van woordbetekenis. Eerdere studies over hoe mensen lezen en luisteren naar taal die over handelingen gaat, hebben al embodiment effecten gerapporteerd – dat wil zeggen, dat zulke hersengebieden, naast de standaard taalgebieden, ook geactiveerd worden. Vol-gens sommige theoretische benaderingen zijn zowel taal- als niet-taalgebieden onlosmake-lijk verbonden met betekenistoekenning en leveren ze dus een onderling afhankelijke bijdrage. Andere theorieën schrijven meer of minder belang toe aan niet-taalgebieden afhankelijk van of ze denken dat woorden op zichzelf staand al betekenis hebben.   Dit proefschrift heeft allereerst laten zien dat verschillende typen embodiment effecten op verschillende momenten in de tijd zichtbaar worden. Op een bepaald moment van ver-werking is informatie over de vorm van een object prominent; op een ander moment, kennis over hoe je een object gebruikt. De verkregen resultaten laten zien dat, terwijl een woord als het ware wordt ‘uitgepakt’ over de tijd, het ene of het andere betekenis-
aspect naar voren komt. Betekenistoekenning is dus een dynamisch proces.   Op de tweede plaats kan het motorische systeem twee verschillende bijdragen leveren aan het leesproces. Het eerste type bijdrage omvat een volledige betrokkenheid bij het betekenis toekennen aan beschrijvingen van handelingen, inclusief onmogelijke handelin-gen zonder vastomlijnde betekenis. Het tweede type bijdrage houdt slechts een ge-deeltelijke betrokkenheid van het motorische systeem bij taalverwerking in. Deze resulta-ten geven aan dat het begrijpen van hande-lingsbeschrijvingen niet altijd een volledige bijdrage van het motorische systeem vereist, en dat geldt misschien nog wel meer als men in een vreemde taal leest. De hersenen maken gebruik van beschikbare hulpbronnen om taal te begrijpen, maar ze proberen zuinig te opereren bij zware taakeisen of als men leest in een taal waarin men minder vaardig is.   Al met al heeft het proefschrift geholpen om de grenzen te bepalen waarbinnen embodi-ment effecten een bijdrage leveren aan bete-kenistoekenning. Zulke effecten kunnen de betekenis van woorden verrijken, maar woorden hebben misschien al genoeg ab-stracte betekenis van zichzelf om begrijpelijk 
 volheidstaak). Hierbij verwezen de instruc-ties expres niet naar de handeling, om de uitkomsten niet te beïnvloeden. Proefperso-nen konden dus zelf bepalen hoe ze tot hun beslissing zouden komen (met of zonder gebruik van het motorische systeem).   Ondanks het verschil in nadruk op betekenis, leverden de twee taken dezelfde resultaten op. Dit is vooral opmerkelijk als je de zinvol-heidstaak in beschouwing neemt. Zinnen die mogelijke handelingen beschrijven (bijv. “De winkelkarretjes die zij wegduwt/levert zijn gebroken”) lieten geen motorische activatie-patronen zien die de impliciete handelingen weerspiegelen. In plaats daarvan was het patroon vergelijkbaar met dat van zinnen die onmogelijke handelingen beschrijven (bijv. “De winkelkarretjes die zij aannaait/geneest zijn gebroken”), net zoals in Hoofdstuk III.   Deze uitkomst is onverwacht als je aanneemt dat expliciete oordelen over actiebeschrijvin-gen (d.w.z. het nadenken over de betekenis van handelingen) heel waarschijnlijk het motorische systeem zouden inschakelen. In plaats daarvan lijkt het erop dat proefperso-nen zulke oordelen velden zonder veel moto-rische betrokkenheid, wat ook voor de letter-zoektaak gold. Verder toonden zowel de N400 (een EEG component voor moeilijk-heidsgraad van begrip) als het hoge percen-tage correcte reacties van de proefpersonen dat de taak inderdaad werd uitgevoerd zoals gevraagd was. Daarbij is het ook opmerkelijk dat er motorische activiteit optrad in de situ-atie waarin de betekenis niet essentieel was, 
namelijk bij de uitvoering van de letter-zoektaak.   Bij elkaar genomen ondersteunen de resulta-ten de stelling dat het motorische systeem geactiveerd wordt bij het uitvoeren van deze taken, ondanks de verschillende eisen die ze aan de proefpersoon stellen. De patronen van motorische activiteit passen echter niet in de verklaring die in Hoofdstuk III werd geïntro-duceerd, omdat ze niet als een minimale vereiste de impliciete specificiteit reflecteren bij het lezen van mogelijke handelingsbe-schrijvingen. In plaats daarvan suggereert de gelijkenis tussen de patronen voor mogelijke en onmogelijke handelingsbeschrijvingen, die geen van beide impliciete specificiteit reflec-teerden, dat het motorische systeem een 
reactieve rol speelde. Het motorische systeem wordt kennelijk automatisch in beperkte mate geactiveerd bij taalverwerking.   Bij elkaar genomen geven de resultaten van de Hoofdstukken III en IV twee typen bijdra-gen van het motorische systeem aan. Aan de ene kant kan het motorische systeem proac-tief dienen als interpretatieve heuristiek om lezers te helpen te begrijpen wat ze lezen. Aan de andere kant maken sommige vormen van taalverwerking geen gebruik van deze heuristiek. Hoofdstuk IV liet zien dat het motorische systeem ook een passieve, reac-tieve rol kan spelen. Dat past ook bij rappor-ten over “ondiepe” (“shallow”) vormen van taalverwerking, waarbij een diepere, meer omvattende betekenis niet bij wijze van stan-daardroutine wordt afgeleid. 
(2c) Embodiment effecten in een vreemde taal  Het laatste experiment van de serie werd gerapporteerd in Hoofdstuk V. De identifica-tie van twee soorten manieren waarop het motorische systeem bijdraagt, leidde tot de interessante vraag welke van de twee (de interpretatieve of de reactieve heuristiek) wordt toegepast bij een vreemde of tweede taal (T2).  Vaak leer je een T2 op latere leeftijd in een formele omgeving zoals de klas. Je leert dan bijvoorbeeld de betekenis van vreemde woorden uit je hoofd zonder de natuurlijke omgeving van een fysieke conversatie. Dat 
zou gepaard kunnen gaan met een “minder embodied” ervaring. Hierdoor zou het begrij-pen van een T2 mogelijk ook minder een beroep doen op het motorische systeem. Daarnaast is het gebruik van een vreemde taal nogal mentaal belastend. Zelfs als het motorische systeem een rol speelt bij T2 verwerking, zou de bijdrage ervan daarom beperkt kunnen blijven om de verwerkings-kosten te reduceren.  Net als in Hoofdstuk III lazen de proefperso-nen in stilte zinnen, nu in de T2, terwijl hun hersenactiviteit werd gemeten (waarbij de 
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 te zijn. Kortom, zowel taal- als niet-taalgebieden in de hersenen zijn betrokken bij de verwerking van een aangeboden zin, maar pas uit hun relatieve bijdrage aan de hersenactiviteit blijkt hoe die zin precies wordt opgevat.    
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